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Overview of the dissertation
As indicated by the title, the four papers in this dissertation tackle di¤erent topics in the
eld of monetary economics. The rst chapter relates to global oil market dynamics, the
second chapter highlights cross-country exports in the aftermath of the global nancial
crisis, the third chapter focuses on ination dynamics in connection with bank credit
evolutions whereas the nal chapter concerns monetary regime dependence of the extent of
wage indexation. Despite the wide angle of this dissertation, the chapters are very coherent
because of the applied methodology. Each of the four chapters is characterized by the use
of macro panels and accordingly by the application of macro panel data econometrics.
Macro panels are particularly attractive as they allow to exploit both the cross section
and time dimension of country-specic series but also require specic econometric care.
Throughout the chapters in this dissertation, I have endeavored to exploit the advantages
of the data for the topics in question while considering their peculiarities.
In the rst chapter, which is joint work with Gert Peersman, we employ cross-country
panel data to examine the role of the US dollar exchange rate as an economic driver of
global oil demand. There is a growing consensus that global crude oil price uctuations are
mainly driven by changes in the demand for oil. Notwithstanding this consensus, the US
dollar exchange rate has so far been ignored as an independent driver of oil demand in the
empirical literature on global oil market dynamics. A similar argument holds for several
empirical studies that exclusively focus on the analysis of the determinants of oil demand.
This is surprising since global oil prices are predominantly expressed in US dollars. In
this work, we explicitly recognize and quantify the role of the US dollar exchange rate as
an economic driver of oil consumption and the possible consequences of its e¤ect on the
dynamics in the global crude oil market. This is a rst contribution of the paper.
A second contribution of the paper to the literature is methodological. In particular,
we (i) take the cointegration relationships between the variables into account by estimating
a panel error correction oil demand model, (ii) allow for cross-country heterogeneity of the
coe¢ cients which is present in the data, and (iii) correct for cross-sectional dependence in
the error terms. We nd that an appreciation of the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate
leads to a decline in oil consumption in non-US dollar regions. Strikingly, the short-run US
dollar exchange rate elasticity of oil demand turns out to be substantially larger than the
elasticity of oil demand with respect to uctuations in the global price of crude oil expressed
in US dollar, i.e. more than double. A more detailed analysis of the pass-through of
changes in global crude oil prices and the US dollar exchange rate to oil products end-user
prices suggests that the di¤erence in the magnitudes of both elasticities is the consequence
of a signicant larger pass-through of exchange rate uctuations. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation furthermore suggests that the US dollar exchange rate is an economically
important contributor to the volatility of the global price of crude oil expressed in US
dollar, due to its inuence on oil demand. These ndings underline that the US dollar
exchange rate should be taken into account in the analysis of global oil market dynamics
and sources of oil price uctuations.
The second chapter of this dissertation is joint work with John Lewis and examines
advanced economies export performance since the "Great Trade Collapse" (GTC) in
a cross-country panel framework. Sharp falls in output in the immediate aftermath of
the nancial crisis were accompanied by even stronger falls in international trade. This
observed plunge of global trade during late 2008 and early 2009 received the term "Great
Trade Collapse" given its sudden nature and the extremely high level of synchronization
across all advanced economies and nearly all industries. Our focus in this paper is to
analyze what has happened to exports of advanced economies since the GTC and to
gauge how consistent they were with predictions based on a pre-crisis panel model, rather
than to uncover the cause of the GTC per se. In particular, we construct a forecast
benchmark for the actual exports of a panel of advanced economies to analyse their export
evolutions since the onset of the GTC. The capability of a pre-crisis standard export
relationship to account for the evolutions of exports during and following the GTC is
of great interest given its important policy implications. If the GTC marks structural
changes in the relationship between trade performance and the traditional macroeconomic
determinants, counterfactual export analyses based on traditional export determinants can
provide misleading policy guidance.
We therefore construct a panel error correction model of goods exports for sixteen ad-
vanced economies and control for the possible existence of unobserved common correlated
e¤ects. We develop a novel measure of sectoral shifts in world trade and examine its e¤ects
next to the traditional price and income determinants of exports. We nd the variable to
have only a limited e¤ect on export dynamics. We further nd that the source of the real
exchange rate shock matters for exports. The short-run response to relative unit labor
costs is around six times as large as to nominal exchange rates.
We then use the model estimated over a pre-crisis sample period to undertake a fore-
cast exercise to explore the dynamics of trade since the GTC. This exercise allows to
construct a benchmark to which the advanced economiesexports since the GTC can be
compared. First, we assess how average post crisis export ows compare to the predic-
tions of the pre-crisis model. We nd that the pre-crisis model fares well in predicting
the evolutions of exports over the entire forecast period once one controls for unobserved
common factors. Second, we examine the forecasts for each country conditional on the
country-specic variables and the common unobserved factors, proxied by the cross sec-
tion averages of all variables, to evaluate each countrys export performance against its
peers. We nd substantial variation across countries in terms of their actual exports rela-
tive to the forecasts based on the average panel coe¢ cients. For the United Kingdom in
particular, exports in 2011Q4 came in about 8 per cent below the benchmark suggested
by international comparisons.
In the third chapter, ination dynamics are analyzed in a cross-country Phillips curve
framework while considering credit evolutions and the occurrence of nancial stress to
quantify the reaction of ination to economic activity during di¤erent economic cycles. The
immediate aftermath of the global nancial crisis has been marked to contain a "missing
disination puzzle". Historically, persistent and pronounced economic downturns gave rise
to notable falls in the level of ination but these falls are not observed during the severe
economic downturns following the global nancial crisis of 2008-2009. Nonlinearities and
asymmetries in the Phillips curve relationship could o¤er an explanation for the muted
reaction of ination. The association of the downturns with a nancial crisis however
prompts one to question whether nancial distortions have inuenced the subsequent
ination dynamics beyond their impact via real output. The cross-country perspective
in this work o¤ers a way to obtain a su¢ cient number of observations on large negative
output gaps, nancial crises, credit downturns and their combinations.
We rst analyze whether the reaction of ination to economic activity di¤ers depending
on the sign, magnitude and persistence of the deviation of output from its potential. This
analysis is warranted given the substantial evidence of nonlinearities and asymmetries in
the Phillips curve depending on the level of economic activity documented in the existing
literature and their potential to account for the missing disination puzzle. Second, we
examine whether the reaction of ination to economic activity is in addition a¤ected by
the credit cycle. We particularly concentrate on credit cycle downturns and upturns next
to the occurrence of banking crises. As such, we try to answer the question whether the
large extent of economic slack can explain the relatively mild disination during and in
the aftermath of the global nancial crisis and whether the association with a nancial
crisis and related credit evolutions attenuated the ination reaction. In addition, we shed
light on the possibility of a speed limit e¤ect during periods of spare capacity driven by a
bounce-back in output. The focus on the existence of a speed limit e¤ect of spare capacity
on ination is especially relevant nowadays as a speed limit would result in inationary
pressures once the economy starts to recover, which is the situation currently faced by
most advanced economies.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that the mild ination reaction subsequent to
the global nancial crisis can be linked to an asymmetric reaction towards the extent of
spare production capacity whereas we do not nd evidence that bank credit evolutions
and nancial distress signicantly alter the reaction of ination to economic activity. We
further cannot nd evidence that underpins the existence of a speed limit e¤ect on ination
when the extent of spare capacity shrinks. The fact that a long-lasting and pronounced
contraction is more likely to alter production resources obsolete and inadequate does not
seem to generate additional inationary pressures.
The fourth chapter, which is joint work with Gert Peersman and Joris Wauters,
concerns the examination of the standard assumption in New Keynesian dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that wage indexation to past price ination
is invariant to policy regimes. In particular, we examine the possibility of a link between
the degree of wage indexation and monetary policy through ination uncertainty. Cross-
country panel data are employed to estimate a reduced-form empirical New Keynesian
wage Phillips curve where the degree of wage indexation to past ination is allowed to
vary according to the monetary policy regime. Since an individual countrys monetary
policy regime is in general quite stable over time, a panel dataset approach allows us to
enhance the power of the test whether the degree of wage indexation depends on the type
of monetary policy regime as the number of observations increases signicantly. We iden-
tify the monetary policy regime of a country in a specic period based on the presence
of an explicit quantitative monetary target. Quantitative targets are transparent policy
indicators and can be easily measured. A formal commitment to a quantitative target is
therefore expected to improve the formation of ination expectations and to reduce the
ination uncertainty of workers. The monetary target can take three forms: ination,
money growth and exchange rate targets. We distinguish between the presence of these
three types of target, because the underlying dynamics of the strategies and the forma-
tion of ination expectations are inherently di¤erent. Ination targeting central banks for
instance typically try to stabilize ination in the short to medium term, whereas money
growth targeting is more a commitment to low ination in the long run. We further control
for labor market institutions.
We nd that wage indexation to past ination varies across monetary policy regimes.
Specically, policy regimes that have an explicit quantitative ination target are charac-
terized by a lower degree of wage indexation. Discerning between three di¤erent types
of explicit targets makes it clear that the extent of wage indexation is only signicantly
di¤erent (lower) in countries that have an ination target whereas the e¤ects of money
and exchange rate targets are not signicantly di¤erent from a regime without any formal
quantitative target. These di¤erences could be due to varying strengths of the nominal
anchor under the di¤erent frameworks, as ination targeting has been found to estab-
lish better anchored ination expectations which, in turn, could strengthen the nominal
anchor. Overall, our results question the structural nature of hard-wiring a xed degree
of wage indexation in standard DSGE models. Our work corroborates and extends the
nding of substantial time variation in the degree of wage indexation for the US and it
shows that the documented dependence of price indexation to monetary policy can be
extended to wage indexation. From a policy standpoint, our ndings suggest that coun-
terfactual policy simulations and the analysis of optimal monetary policy based on modern
macroeconomic models are potentially misleading.
 
Samenvatting van het proefschrift
Zoals aangegeven door de titel, behandelen de vier hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift ver-
schillende domeinen van de monetaire economie. Het eerste hoofdstuk heeft betrekking
tot de dynamiek van de globale oliemarkt, het tweede hoofdstuk legt de nadruk op de ex-
porten van landen in de nasleep van de globale nanciële crisis, het derde hoofdstuk focust
op inatie in combinatie met evoluties in de algemene kredietverlening terwijl het laatste
hoofdstuk de afhankelijkheid van de mate van loonindexatie ten opzichte van monetaire
regimes behandelt. Ondanks de ruime invalshoek van dit proefschrift, zijn de hoofd-
stukken sterk samenhangend omwille van de gehanteerde methodologie. Elk van de vier
hoofdstukken wordt gekenmerkt door het gebruik van macro panels en bijgevolg door de
toepassing van macro panel data econometrie. Macro panels zijn bijzonder attractief om-
dat ze toelaten om gebruik te maken van zowel de cross sectie als de tijdsdimensie van
de landspecieke reeksen maar ze vereisen ook een specieke econometrische behandeling.
Doorheen de hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift, heb ik gepoogd om deze voordelen van de
data maximaal te gebruiken voor de behandelde themas terwijl ik de karakteristieken van
de data in acht nam.
In het eerste hoofdstuk, dat een gezamenlijk werk is met Gert Peersman, hanteren
we macro panel data om de rol van de wisselkoers van de Amerikaanse dollar in de glob-
ale olievraag na te gaan. Er is een toenemende consensus dat wijzigingen in de olieprijs
voornamelijk gedreven worden door veranderingen in de vraag naar olie. Ondanks deze
consensus is de wisselkoers van de Amerikaanse dollar tot nu toe genegeerd als onafhanke-
lijke determinant van de vraag naar olie in de empirische literatuur over de wijzigingen in
de globale oliemarkt. Dit is tevens aan de orde voor verscheidene empirische studies die
zich enkel focussen op het analyseren van de determinanten van de vraag naar oliepro-
ducten. Dit is opmerkelijk aangezien de globale olieprijzen hoofdzakelijk zijn uitgedrukt
in Amerikaanse dollar. In dit werk erkennen en kwanticeren we expliciet de rol van de
wisselkoers als een economische determinant van de consumptie van olie en de mogelijke
gevolgen van de e¤ecten van de dollar op de globale oliemarkt. Dit is de eerste bijdrage
van de paper.
Een tweede bijdrage van de paper tot de betre¤ende literatuur is methodologisch van
aard. We nemen immers de coïntegrerende relatie van de variabelen in rekening door
het schatten van een "panel error correction" model. Daarnaast houden we rekening
met heterogene coë¢ ciënten over de landen heen en tot slot nemen we mogelijke cross-
sectie correlatie in de storingstermen in acht. Aldus vinden we dat een appreciatie van
de wisselkoers van de Amerikaanse dollar tot een daling leidt in de consumptie van olie
in niet-dollar landen. Opvallend daarbij is dat de korte termijn elasticiteit van de vraag
naar olie ten opzichte van de wisselkoers aanzienlijk groter blijkt te zijn dan de elasticiteit
ten opzichte van wijzigingen in de wereldprijs van ruwe olie en meer bepaald dubbel zo
groot. Een meer diepgaande analyse van het e¤ect van wijzigingen in de wereldolieprijs en
wisselkoerswijzigingen op de prijzen van olieproducten voor de eindverbruiker geeft aan
dat de grootte van beide elasticiteiten gedreven wordt door een signicant groter e¤ect
van wisselkoerswijzigingen op de prijzen voor de eindverbruiker. De uitwerking van een
sterk vereenvoudigd vraag- en aanbod model leert ons tevens dat de wisselkoers van de
Amerikaanse dollar een economisch belangrijke bijdrage levert tot de volatiliteit van de
wereldolieprijs uitgedrukt in Amerikaanse dollar door de invloed op de vraag naar olie.
Deze resultaten benadrukken dat de Amerikaanse wisselkoers in acht dient genomen te
worden in de analyse van globale oliemarkt en wijzigingen in de olieprijs.
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift resulteert uit een samenwerking met John
Lewis en onderzoekt de prestaties van ontwikkelde landen inzake exporten sinds de "Great
Trade Collapse" (GTC) aan de hand van macro panel data. Zeer sterke dalingen van de
economische activiteit in de onmiddellijke nasleep van de nanciële crisis gingen gepaard
met nog sterkere dalingen in de internationale handel. De geobserveerde daling in de
wereldhandel tijdens eind 2008 en begin 2009 kreeg de term "Great Trade Collapse"
omwille van de abruptheid en de uiterst hoge mate van synchronisatie over alle ontwikkelde
landen en quasi alle sectoren heen. De focus van deze paper ligt op de analyse van de
evoluties in de exporten van ontwikkelde landen sinds de GTC en op de samenhang van
deze evoluties met de voorspellingen op basis van modellen voorafgaand aan de GTC en
niet zozeer op het ontrafelen van de oorzaken van de GTC op zich. We construeren in
dit verband een maatstaf om de feitelijke exporten van een groep ontwikkelde landen te
beoordelen op basis van de voorspelling van ons model voor de aanvang van de GTC.
Het vermogen van een standaard export vergelijking voorafgaand aan de crisis om de
exporten tijdens en na de GTC te verklaren is van groot belang omwille van de beleidsim-
plicaties. Indien de GTC een structurele breuk kenmerkt in de relatie tussen exporten en
de traditionele macro-economische determinanten, dan zullen de analyses op basis van de
traditionele determinanten misleidende informatie geven.
We hanteren daarom een "panel error correction" model voor de exporten van goederen
voor zestien ontwikkelde landen en controleren daarbij voor de mogelijke invloed van niet-
geobserveerde gemeenschappelijke factoren. We stellen een nieuwe maatstaf samen voor
sectorspecieke wijzigingen in de wereldhandel en onderzoeken de e¤ecten daarvan naast
de traditionele determinanten van exporten, met name prijs en inkomen. Deze variabele
blijkt slechts een beperkte invloed uit te oefenen op de dynamiek van exporten. Daarnaast
vinden we dat de oorzaak van reële wisselkoerswijzigingen belangrijk is voor exporten. Op
korte termijn is de reactie van exporten op een wijziging in relatieve arbeidskosten ongeveer
zes keer zo groot als wijzigingen in de nominale wisselkoers.
We gebruiken vervolgens het model dat geschat is op de periode voorafgaand aan de
crisis om een voorspelling te maken. Dit laat ons toe om een maatstaf op te stellen op
basis waarvan de exporten van de individuele landen sinds de GTC kunnen geëvalueerd
worden. Eerst gaan we na hoe de gemiddelde exporten sinds de GTC zich verhouden
ten opzichte van de voorspelling door middel van de geschatte coë¢ ciënten op basis van
de data voorafgaand aan de crisis. We vinden dat dit model de werkelijke daling in de
gemiddelde exporten tijdens en na de GTC goed kan verklaren. Ten tweede analyseren
we de exporten van elk individueel land conditioneel op de landspecieke variabelen en de
gemeenschappelijke factoren (die benaderd worden door de gemiddelden van de variabelen
over de landen) om de prestaties inzake exporten van de landen ten opzichte van elkaar
te vergelijken. Daarbij vinden we een aanzienlijke variatie tussen landen wat de relatieve
verhoudingen tussen de werkelijke en voorspelde exporten op basis van de gemiddelde
coë¢ ciënten betreft. Voor het Verenigd Koninkrijk in het bijzonder, waren de exporten
ongeveer 8 procent lager dan de maatstaf op basis van de panel coë¢ ciënten.
Het derde hoofdstuk betreft een analyse van de dynamiek van inatie aan de hand
van een "Phillips curve" geschat over een panel van landen terwijl evoluties in de kredi-
etverlening en het voorkomen van nanciëel moeilijke tijden in rekening worden genomen
om de reactie van inatie op de economische activiteit doorheen verschillende economis-
che cyclussen na te gaan. De periode volgend op de globale nanciële crisis werd geken-
merkt door een "missing disination" raadsel. Sterke en persistente economische recessies
gaven in het verleden aanleiding tot aanzienlijke dalingen in het niveau van inatie, maar
dergelijke sterke dalingen zijn niet geobserveerd tijdens de sterke economische recessies
volgend op de globale crisis van 2008-2009. Niet-lineariteit en asymmetrie in de "Phillips
curve" relatie bieden een mogelijke verklaring voor de milde reactie van inatie. De samen-
hang van de recessies met een crisis van nanciële aard roept echter de vraag op of nanciële
verstoringen de daaropvolgende inatie dynamiek kan beïnvloeden bovenop hun e¤ect via
het beïnvloeden van de reële output. Een panel data perspectief is in dit werk voornamelijk
relevant aangezien het een mogelijkheid biedt om een voldoende aantal observaties van
grote negatieve afwijkingen van output ten opzichte van het potentiële niveau van output,
van nanciële crisissen, van dalingen in de kredietverstrekking en van hun combinaties te
bekomen.
We onderzoeken eerst of de reactie van inatie op de economische activiteit afhangt
van het teken, de grootte en de persistentie van de afwijking van output van het potentiële
niveau. Deze analyse is gerechtvaardigd gegeven het aanzienlijke bewijs van niet-lineariteit
en asymmetrie in de "Phillips curve" afhankelijk van het niveau van economische activiteit
in de bestaande literatuur en door het potentieel om het "missing disination" raadsel deels
te verklaren. Daarnaast gaan we na of de reactie van inatie op de economische activiteit
eveneens wordt beïnvloed door de kredietcyclus en het voorkomen van een nanciële crisis.
Op die manier trachten we de vraag te beantwoorden of de grote mate van economische
malaise de relatief milde deatie tijdens en volgend op de globale nanciële crisis kan verk-
laren en of de samenhang met een nanciële crisis en de daarbij horende evoluties in de
algemene kredietverstrekking door banken de reactie van inatie temperden. Bovendien
laten we ons licht schijnen op de mogelijkheid van "speed limit" e¤ecten tijdens periodes
van overcapaciteit gedreven door een heropleving van de geaggregeerde output. De focus
op dergelijke e¤ecten op inatie is tegenwoordig uiterst relevant aangezien een snelhei-
dslimiet in een opwaartse druk op inatie zou resulteren van zodra de economie begint
te heropleven en dit is exact de situatie waarin vele ontwikkelde economieën zich op dit
moment bevinden.
Uit onze analyse kunnen we besluiten dat de milde reactie van inatie na de globale
nanciële crisis kan gelinkt worden aan een asymmetrische reactie ten opzichte van de
capaciteit van de economie terwijl we geen bewijs vinden voor een signicante invloed op
de reactie van inatie op de economische activiteit door evoluties in de kredietverlening of
door algemene nanciëel moeilijke tijden. Tevens vinden we geen bewijs dat het bestaan
van een "speed limit" e¤ect op inatie wanneer de mate van overcapaciteit verkleint on-
derbouwt.
Het vierde hoofdstuk, dat een gezamenlijk werk is met Gert Peersman en Joris
Wauters, onderzoekt de basisveronderstelling in de Nieuw-Keynesiaanse dynamische sto-
chastische evenwichtsmodellen (DSGE modellen) dat de indexatie van lonen aan prijs-
inatie uit het verleden onafhankelijk is van het beleidsregime. We onderzoeken in het
bijzonder de mogelijke link tussen de mate van loonindexatie en monetair beleid ten gevolge
van onzekerheid omtrent inatie. Macro panel data zijn toegepast om een gereduceerde
empirische Nieuw-Keynesiaanse "wage Phillips curve" vergelijking te schatten waarbij de
mate van loonindexatie aan inatie uit het verleden kan wijzigen met het monetair belei-
dsregime. Aangezien het monetair beleidsregime van één enkel land in het algemeen vrij
stabiel is doorheen de tijd, is een panel data methode belangrijk om voldoende obser-
vaties te bekomen die het schatten van de rol van een monetair beleidsregime mogelijk
maken. We bepalen het monetair beleidsregime in een land op een bepaald tijdstip aan de
hand van de aanwezigheid van een expliciete kwantitatieve monetaire doelstelling. Kwan-
titatieve doelstellingen zijn transparante beleidsindicatoren en kunnen op een eenvoudige
manier worden nagegaan. Men verwacht daarom dat een formele verbinding tot een kwan-
titatieve maatstaf de vorming van inatieverwachtingen verbetert en de onzekerheid over
inatie van de economische agenten reduceert. De monetaire doelstelling kan drie vormen
aannemen: doelstellingen met betrekking tot het niveau van inatie, de geldgroei of de
wisselkoers. We maken een onderscheid tussen deze drie types van doelstellingen aangezien
de onderliggende strategieën en de manier van het vormen van verwachtingen intrinsiek
verschillend zijn. Centrale banken met een inatie doelstelling proberen bijvoorbeeld in-
atie te stabiliseren op korte tot middellange termijn terwijl centrale banken met een
doelstelling voor de geldgroei zich meer engageren tot een lage inatie op lange termijn.
We controleren tevens voor evoluties in arbeidsmarktinstellingen.
We vinden dat loonindexatie aan prijsinatie uit het verleden varieert onder mone-
taire beleidsregimes. Regimes met een expliciete kwantitatieve inatie doelstelling worden
gekenmerkt door een lagere mate van dergelijke loonindexatie. Wanneer we een onder-
scheid maken tussen de drie verschillende types van expliciete doelstellingen, dan blijkt de
mate van loonindexatie enkel signicant verschillend (lager) te zijn voor landen met een
doelstelling voor inatie terwijl de e¤ecten van de doelstellingen met betrekking tot de
geldgroei en de wisselkoers niet signicant verschillen van een regime zonder enige kwan-
titatieve doelstelling. Deze verschillen zijn mogelijks het gevolg van een verschil in de
sterkte van de monetaire verankering onder de verschillende monetaire structuren. Een
rechtstreekse doelstelling voor inatie werd immers reeds gelinkt aan een betere veranker-
ing van de inatieverwachtingen, wat op zijn beurt leidt tot een betere verankering van het
monetaire doel. In het algemeen stellen onze resultaten de inherente structurele aard van
de mate van loonindexatie in de standaard DSGE modellen in vraag. Ons werk bevestigt
en breidt de reeds gedocumenteerde bevindingen van een substantiële mate van variatie in
de mate van loonindexatie over de tijd voor de Verenigde Staten uit en het toont aan dat
de eveneens reeds aangetoonde afhankelijkheid van prijsindexatie tot monetaire regimes
kan uitgebreid worden tot loonindexatie. Vanuit een beleidsoogpunt, suggereren onze re-
sultaten dat beleidssimulaties en analyses van een optimaal monetair beleid gebaseerd op
de moderne macro-economische modellen potentieel misleidend zijn.
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Abstract
Using recent advances in panel data estimation techniques, we nd that an appreciation of
the US dollar exchange rate leads to a signicant decline in oil demand for a sample of 65
oil-importing countries. The estimated e¤ect turns out to be considerably larger than the
impact of a shift in the global crude oil price expressed in US dollar. This nding appears
to be the consequence of a stronger pass-through of changes in the US dollar exchange
rate to domestic end-user oil products prices relative to changes in the global crude oil
price. Furthermore, we demonstrate the relevance of US dollar uctuations for global oil
price dynamics.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that global crude oil price uctuations are mainly driven by
changes in the demand for oil. Hamilton (2009), for instance, argues that strong growth
in world income was the primary cause of the oil price surge in 2007-08, whereas the
subsequent dramatic collapse of oil prices was the result of the global economic downturn
in the aftermath of the nancial crisis. Furthermore, Peersman (2005), Kilian (2009),
Peersman and Van Robays (2009), Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) and Kilian and
Murphy (2012) disentangle di¤erent sources of oil price shocks within a structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) model, and nd a dominant role for shocks at the demand side of
the global crude oil market. In order to better understand oil market uctuations, a more
detailed analysis of the drivers of oil demand is thus desirable.
In this paper, we examine the role of the US dollar exchange rate for oil consumption.
The US dollar exchange rate has so far been ignored as an independent driver of oil demand
in the empirical literature on global oil market dynamics. This is surprising since global oil
prices are predominantly expressed in US dollars. According to the local oil price channel,
a shift in the dollar exchange rate should then a¤ect the demand for crude oil in countries
that do not use the US dollar for local transactions (Austvik 1987). For instance, when
the US dollar exchange rate depreciates, oil becomes less expensive in local currency for
consumers in non-US dollar regions, boosting their demand for oil. The rise in oil demand
for countries that do not use the dollar for local transactions should in turn inuence
global oil production and oil prices expressed in US dollar. This line of reasoning was
raised in the work of Brown and Philips (1984) and Huntington (1986), and is supported
by the data shown in Figure 1.1. The panels in the gure show the evolution of the real
e¤ective US dollar exchange rate, as well as the deviation of oil consumption from its
trend, for a set of countries (and country aggregates) that are examined in this paper.
As can be seen in the gure, an appreciation (depreciation) of the dollar exchange rate is
often accompanied by a decline (rise) in oil consumption relative to its trend evolution,
indicating a fall (rise) in oil demand. Shifts in the US dollar exchange rate could thus be
important for global oil market dynamics.
A similar argument holds for several studies that exclusively focus on the analysis of
the determinants of oil demand. In particular, Gately and Huntington (2002), Cooper
(2003), Dargay, Gately and Huntington (2007), Narayan and Smyth (2007) and Dargay
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and Gately (2010) amongst others estimate oil demand functions for multiple countries.
These studies consider oil demand as a positive function of income per capita and a
negative function of its own price. For the latter, they typically use global crude oil prices
expressed in US dollars due to the lack of su¢ cient and/or reliable data on local oil prices.
The inuence of shifts in the US dollar exchange rate on oil demand is hence not taken into
account. Some studies (e.g. Gri¢ n and Schulman 2005; Dargay et al. 2007; Dargay and
Gately 2010; Fawcett and Price 2012) do use local oil/gasoline prices in the estimations,
but do not distinguish between local oil price movements caused by global oil price shifts
and movements caused by changes in the value of the US dollar.1 There is, however, no
a priori reason to assume that the pass-through and inuence of both sources of oil price
shifts on oil demand is the same.
We formally investigate the e¤ects of shifts in the US dollar exchange rate on oil
demand in non-US dollar regions, by estimating the determinants of oil consumption per
capita for a panel of 65 oil-importing countries over the sample period 1971-2008. A panel
data approach is commonly used in the literature on oil (energy) demand, as it allows
to exploit both the cross section and the time dimension of the data. We conduct panel
estimations for respectively a sample of 23 OECD countries, 42 non-OECD countries and
all 65 oil-importing countries. Besides real GDP per capita, we include global real crude oil
prices expressed in US dollar, as well as the real US dollar exchange rate in the estimations.
An explicit analysis of the role of the US dollar as a possible driver of oil consumption is
a rst contribution of the paper.2
A second contribution of the paper is methodological. In particular, most existing panel
data studies on oil demand do not fully take into account the specic salient features of
macro panel data sets such as heterogeneity of the coe¢ cients, unit root behavior and cross-
country dependence, even though the neglect of these matters can result in misleading
estimation outcomes. We apply recent advances in panel estimation techniques that are
1Gri¢ n and Schulman (2005), Dargay et al. (2007) and Dargay and Gately (2010) use end-user price
indexes, either in domestic currencies or in US dollar, whereas Fawcett and Price (2012) convert the global
crude oil price in US dollar to domestic prices by applying country-specic US dollar exchange rates.
2To our knowledge, the only empirical study which also considers the US dollar exchange rate as a
possible determinant of oil demand is Askari and Krichene (2010). They estimate, however, a time series
simultaneous equation model for (aggregate) world oil demand and supply between 1970 and 2008, whereas
we estimate the impact of the US dollar exchange rate for a panel of 65 countries. In addition, they examine
the e¤ect of the exchange rate as part of a monetary policy channel a¤ecting global oil prices, rather than
an independent driver of oil demand.
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capable to handle these econometric issues. Specically, we (i) take into account the long-
run relationship between the variables by estimating a panel error correction oil demand
model, (ii) allow for cross-country heterogeneity of the coe¢ cients which is present in the
data, and (iii) consider cross-sectional dependence in the error terms. The application of
these econometric advances and the addition of the US dollar exchange rate as a driver of
oil consumption turn out to matter for some of the estimated elasticities.
We nd that an appreciation of the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate leads to a
decline in oil consumption in non-US dollar regions. Strikingly, the short-run US dollar
exchange rate elasticity of oil demand turns out to be substantially larger than the elasticity
of oil demand with respect to uctuations in the global price of crude oil expressed in
US dollar. A more detailed analysis of the pass-through of changes in global crude oil
prices and the US dollar exchange rate to oil products end-user prices for a subset of 20
OECD-countries suggests that the di¤erence in the magnitudes of both elasticities is the
consequence of a signicant larger pass-through of exchange rate uctuations. A back-of-
the-envelope calculation furthermore suggests that shifts in the US dollar exchange rate
are an economically important contributor to the volatility of the global price of crude
oil expressed in US dollar, due to its inuence on oil demand. These ndings underline
that the US dollar exchange rate should be taken into account in the analysis of global oil
market dynamics and sources of oil price uctuations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe
the baseline empirical model for oil demand and discuss some econometric issues. Section
4 discusses the estimation and robustness of the results. The pass-through of changes in
global oil prices and the real e¤ective US dollar exchange rate to local end-user oil prices
is examined in section 4, while the economic relevance of the US dollar exchange rate for
global oil market dynamics is assessed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical oil demand model
In this section, we describe the benchmark oil demand model that will be used in the
estimations. Our sample contains 65 oil-importing countries that do not have the US
dollar as their local currency and covers the period 1971-2008.3 Details of the data and
3The United States is hence not included in the analysis, which should be taken into account when
comparing the results with existing studies. We do also not consider oil-exporting countries, since oil de-
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a list of the countries can be found in Appendix A. Consider the following general oil
demand specication for country i at time t:
demit = f (gdpit; oilpt; rert; trendt; ci) (1.1)
where demit is total oil consumption per capita, gdpit real income per capita, oilpt the
world real US dollar crude oil price and rert the real e¤ective US dollar exchange rate,
trendt a linear time trend and ci a country-specic constant. All variables are converted
to natural logarithms, such that the model is of the constant elasticity form. The data
are at annual frequency.
The existing empirical literature typically considers oil consumption, or energy con-
sumption more generally, as a positive function of real income and a negative function of
its own price (e.g., Dahl and Sterner 1991; Dahl 1993; Espey 1998; Gately and Huntington
2002; Cooper 2003; Gri¢ n and Schulman 2005; Hughes, Knittel and Sperling 2008; Lee and
Lee 2010; Dargay and Gately 2010). In line with these studies, we include country-specic
real GDP per capita in the general oil demand specication. Real GDP is assumed to rep-
resent the energy-using capital stock, such as buildings, equipment and vehicles (Dargay
and Gately 2010).
As a measure for the own price of oil demand, most studies use the global price of
crude oil expressed in US dollar (supra, page 3). However, as we have explained in the
introduction, the price that consumers face in countries that do not use the US dollar as
a currency for local transactions, is the price of oil determined in dollars multiplied by the
countrys exchange rate against the US dollar, i.e. the number of units of national currency
needed to buy one US dollar (Austvik 1987). Some studies use local oil/gasoline prices in
the estimations (supra, page 3), but this does not allow to distinguish between local oil-
price shifts caused by changes in the global price of crude oil, or changes in the US dollar
exchange rate, which is the central research question in this paper. Moreover, the lack of
availability of country-specic end-user prices would constrain the sample considerably.4
mand in these countries has been found to behave very di¤erently. See for example Gately and Huntington
(2002).
4Country-specic end-user prices are only available for a limited number of OECD countries, which
limits the usefulness for the analysis of global oil market dynamics, in particular since non-OECD countries
constitute an increasingly large share of this market. The use of global oil prices also avoids endogeneity
problems of using local oil prices. Specically, in contrast to local oil (gasoline) prices, it is more plausible
to assume that global crude oil prices are exogenous for an individual countrys oil demand.
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Accordingly, we include the global real crude oil price expressed in US dollar, as well as
the real US dollar e¤ective exchange rate as two separate variables in our empirical oil
demand model.
We use the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate rather than real bilateral exchange
rates in the benchmark estimations for three reasons. First, bilateral exchange rates (or
domestic CPI) are not available for several countries over the whole sample period, which
would reduce the size of the dataset. Second, bilateral exchange rates su¤er an endogeneity
problem as the demand for oil of an individual country is expected to inuence its own
exchange rate. Given the moderate weight of each individual country in the US trade
basket, this is much less the case for the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate. Third, a
multilateral weighted exchange rate is more useful to examine the role of changes in the
US dollar for global oil market dynamics. In section 3.2, however, we assess the robustness
of the results for a specication with the bilateral exchange rates estimated for a subsample
of countries using instrumental variables.
Finally, microeconomic theory (e.g. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 2007) suggests
that oil demand is also a function of the economys structure, technology and the prices
of substitutes. To capture the former two, all our estimations contain a country-specic
constant and a linear trend. In addition, we add proxies for unobserved common fac-
tors, as discussed in section 2.3. Unfortunately, prices of substitutes are not available for
our sample period. Gri¢ n and Schulman (2005), however, report only weak substitution
e¤ects when they include the real price of substitute fuels in a demand model for petro-
leum products, and argue that omitting cross-price e¤ects does not appreciably alter their
results.5
2.1 Panel unit root and cointegration tests
To avoid spurious regression results, we rst examine the time series properties of the
variables. Since cross section dependence tests (CD tests, Pesaran 2004) on the residuals
of Augmented Dickey Fuller regressions (ADF regressions, Dickey and Fuller 1979) indicate
5Frankel (2006) argues that oil and other commodity price developments are inuenced by interest rates.
Specically, when the interest rate declines, commodities become more attractive as an asset for investors.
In addition, a lower interest rate stimulates overall demand, including the demand for oil. Notice, however,
that this is not relevant for our analysis since we consider oil consumption (not inventories) at the LHS of
the oil demand function, while real GDP is included at the RHS.
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a signicant degree of cross section dependence for the country-specic variables (demit
and gdpit), we employ the Panel Analysis of Non-stationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common
components (PANIC) test proposed by Bai and Ng (2004) for both series.6 The number
of common factors (r) is determined by the Bai and Ng (2002) criteria.7 Table 1.1 shows
that r varies between one and four, depending on the variable and the criterion under
consideration. Both series are found to be non-stationary for all specications, which is
due to the non-stationarity of the common component and the idiosyncratic component
(or solely to the former).
Given that the global real crude oil price variable and the US dollar real e¤ective
exchange rate are observed common factors, we use standard ADF tests for both series.
For global crude oil prices, the existence of a unit root cannot be rejected for both a
constant only and linear trend model. This is, however, not the case for the US dollar real
e¤ective exchange rate, for which the ADF test rejects non-stationarity of the series. This
nding is at odds with the empirical purchasing power (PPP) literature, where standard
univariate ADF tests typically fail to reject the null hypothesis. Engel (2000) shows that
standard unit root tests may, however, be biased in favour of rejecting non-stationarity if
the real exchange rate has a stationary and a non-stationary component. For this reason,
and to ensure consistency with the other variables in the model, we continue to treat the
US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate as a non-stationary variable in the analysis.
In a second step, we test for a long-run relationship amongst the variables using the
panel error correction test of Gengenbach, Urbain and Westerlund (2008), henceforth
GUW test. The test is based on the signicance of the error correction term in the
panel error correction model (ECM). Compared to residual-based panel unit root tests,
the GUW test has the advantage that it is not subject to the common factor critique
(Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado 1992) and that it does not rely on a stepwise testing
procedure.8 Notice that the GUW test is nevertheless more restrictive than residual-
based tests by imposing weak exogeneity on the country-specic regressors of the ECM
6Other panel unit root tests that also use a common factor representation of the data to allow for cross-
section dependence (Moon and Perron 2004; Pesaran 2007) impose restrictions on the number of common
factors and/or assume stationarity of the common factors. Given the results concerning the number and
the stationarity properties of the common factors, these alternative tests are not used.
7We consider the IC1, IC2 and BIC3 criteria. The BIC3 criterion is more robust when there is cross
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors (Bai and Ng 2002).
8The common factor critique applies to residual-based panel cointegration tests as they rely on residual
rather than structural dynamics (Gengenbach et al. 2008).
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and strong exogeneity on the common factors, whereas residual-based tests allow for full
endogeneity. To take this restriction into account, we have also applied residual-based
panel cointegration tests in the spirit of Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) to check
the robustness of the results.9 The results of the tests are shown in Table 1.2. The pooled
GUW tests reject the null hypothesis of no error correction between demit, gdpit, oilpt
and rert for the model under consideration, i.e. including a constant and trend. The
alternative residual-based cointegration tests conrm this result. As a consequence, we
can safely conclude that demit, gdpit, oilpt and rert are cointegrated at the panel level.
2.2 Panel error correction oil demand model
Having established cointegration between the variables, we can formulate our general oil
demand specication as a panel ECM:
demit = i +  i  trendt + i  demi;t 1 + li  gdpi;t 1 + li  oilpt 1 + li  rert 1 +
i gdpit + i oilpt + i rert + "it (1.2)
Equation (1.2) is the baseline empirical specication for the panel ECMs that will
be estimated in this paper.10 Gately and Huntington (2002) and Gri¢ n and Schulman
(2005) are most closely related to our study as they both estimate single equation total
oil demand models for a panel of multiple countries with a moderate time dimension.11
Before we estimate the panel ECM, it is important to discuss two econometric issues which
are generally disregarded in the existing oil demand literature, namely slope heterogeneity
and cross-sectional error dependence.
9The approach we take to examine the robustness of the GUW test results is the following: we apply
the continuously-updated and bias-corrected (CupBC) estimator of Bai, Kao and Ng (2009) to the long-
run cointegration equation and we test the (de-factored) residuals for a unit root using the PANIC test
procedure.
10The lag order of the dynamic adjustment process is imposed to be 0 for all variables for reasons of
parsimony. Experiments with more lags, however, do not alter the results.
11Gately and Huntington (2002) have a sample of 93 countries over 1971-1997. Gri¢ n and Schulman
(2005) use data on 16 OECD countries over 1961-1999. Gri¢ n and Schulman (2005) include retail oil prices
instead of the world crude oil price in their model, which makes their estimation outcomes less adequate
to serve as a benchmark for the baseline model. Both works consider the standard Fixed E¤ects (FE)
estimator. Notice that this FE estimator su¤ers small T problems in dynamic panels (Arellano and Bond
1991). Given that the time dimension of our sample is moderately large, we assume that this bias is not
relevant for our purposes. Nickell (1981) shows that the upward bias on the error correction term becomes
insignicant when T !1:
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2.3 Econometric issues
In order to obtain reliable estimates, we need to consider two important econometric fea-
tures of macro panel data. The rst one concerns heterogeneity in the slope coe¢ cients.
Heterogeneity in the slope coe¢ cients renders the standard FE estimator biased as the
latter assumes homogeneity in the slope coe¢ cients. Some studies, e.g. Gately and Hunt-
ington (2002) and Dargay and Gately (2010), notice a substantial heterogeneity within
non-OECD countries and split their sample in di¤erent groups of countries, i.e. OECD
countries, oil exporters, income growers and other non-OECD countries. Given the cross-
country di¤erences in economic structures, the assumption of homogenous slope coe¢ -
cients within groups is nevertheless questionable, including the group of OECD countries.
Indeed, the application of Swamys Wald test consistently reveals that the homogeneity
restriction on the slope coe¢ cients is not valid, even for the subsample of OECD countries
(see Table 1.3). The FE estimates are hence potentially misleading. Accordingly, we use
the Mean Group (MG) estimator in the analysis, which o¤ers a consistent alternative as
the MG estimator does not impose homogeneity.12
The second important feature of macro panel data estimations relates to error cross
section dependence. In particular, the results of standard FE and MG estimators are
inconsistent and have biased standard errors when the observed explanatory variables are
correlated with unobserved common factors (Pesaran 2006). For oil demand, this is likely
the case. Country-specic income, the real price of crude oil, as well as the US dollar real
e¤ective exchange rate could for instance be driven by a common global business cycle.
The existing empirical oil demand studies do not consider the potentially far-reaching
consequences of cross-sectional dependence. The presence of cross section dependence in
the error terms of dynamic models could be tested by means of the CD test of Pesaran
(2004). Applying the CD test to our panel error correction oil demand model shows that
there is a signicant degree of cross-sectional correlation in the error terms for both the
FE and MG estimators (see Table 1.3), which conrms the need to attempt to take into
account the dependence.
12Since the MG estimator requires large N , and allows for cross-country heterogeneity anyway, we
pool all non-OECD countries in one group. A further decomposition of the non-OECD countries in e.g.
fast-growing and income-growth stagnating countries, as in Gately and Huntington (2002) and Dargay
and Gately (2010), might be interesting, but is unfortunately not feasible due to the limited number of
income-growers in the sample.
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We therefore apply the Bai and Ng (2004) PANIC decomposition to the residuals of
the model in order to estimate the common components in the residuals. In the spirit of
Bai et al. (2009), the estimated common factor(s) is (are) then in a second step included
in the model to get consistent estimates. This procedure allows us to remove, or at
least signicantly reduce, the common factors that are present in the residuals of the
rst step.13 Another advantage is that possible non-linear unobserved common variables
such as technological change (as in Gri¢ n and Schulman 2005) can be appropriately
controlled for without imposing an homogeneous coe¢ cient. By including the estimated
common components of the residuals of the MG regression as a proxy for omitted common
variables in the model, we notice a substantial decline of the cross-sectional correlation in
the residuals for the sample of OECD countries (Table 1.3, last two lines). The e¤ect for
the non-OECD group is, in contrast, limited.
In sum, in contrast to the existing empirical evidence on the demand for oil, we do
not only examine the role of the US dollar exchange rate for the demand for oil, we also
apply panel estimators that take both heterogeneity of the coe¢ cients and cross-sectional
dependence into account.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Panel estimations
Table 1.3 summarizes the estimation results of the panel error correction model as de-
scribed in section 2.1. In order to compare with the existing evidence, we report the
results for respectively OECD countries, non-OECD countries and the total sample of
oil-importing countries. For each sample, we show the results for the FE, MG and MG
estimator adjusted for cross-sectional dependence (MG_Ft), which should allow us to eval-
uate the relevance of the econometric features discussed in section 2.3 for the estimation
results. Notice that all estimated income and oil price coe¢ cients reported in the paper
are very similar when we re-estimate the oil demand models without the exchange rate
13The drawback of this approach, however, is that the estimation error from the rst step carries over
to the subsequent steps. The presence of multiple observed common factors as explanatory variables in
our model makes the more standard application of the Common Correlated E¤ects (CCE) estimators of
Pesaran (2006) to eliminate cross-sectional dependence however unattractive.
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variable. The corresponding conclusions are thus robust for the inclusion of the exchange
rate (unless otherwise mentioned).
Income elasticity We consistently nd a signicant positive e¤ect of real GDP on the
demand for oil. The short-run income elasticity in OECD countries is 0.69, which is larger
than the 0.40 found by Gri¢ n and Schulman (2005). Furthermore, the estimated average
impact of economic activity on the demand for oil is similar for non-OECD countries (0.53)
and the total sample of countries (0.60). The long-run income elasticity coe¢ cients are, in
contrast, more diverse across both groups of countries. Specically, the average long-run
income elasticity turns out to be 0.52, 1.06 and 0.94 for respectively OECD, non-OECD
and all 65 oil-importing countries, which is in line with most existing studies. A lower
income elasticity in more developed countries is, for instance, also found by Gately and
Huntington (2002).14
The econometric issues that we discussed in section 2.3 seem to matter for the mag-
nitudes of the estimates. Specically, the long-run income elasticity for OECD countries
increases from 0.52 to 0.92 if we do not take into account cross-sectional dependence in
the error terms, and even to 1.11 if we also do not allow for cross-country heterogeneity
in the coe¢ cients. Interestingly, exactly the opposite happens for non-OECD countries,
i.e., the long-run income elasticity declines from 1.06 to respectively 1.02 and 0.73 when
there is not allowed for correlation and heterogeneity across countries. In other words,
the bias resulting from the use of a FE estimator can be relevant and could work in both
directions.
(Global) oil price elasticity There are numerous papers that estimate the e¤ects of a
shift in (global) crude oil prices on the demand for oil. Most studies report a relatively low,
or even an insignicant (e.g. Askari and Krichene 2010) short-run price elasticity of oil
demand, which is important because a low oil price elasticity implies that any disruption
14Notice that the baseline specications of Gately and Huntington (2002) and Gri¢ n and Schulman
(2005) are di¤erent from our baseline model. In particular, Gately and Huntington (2002) allow for
asymmetric responses to increases and decreases in the crude oil price, whereas Gri¢ n and Schulman
(2005) add a time e¤ect to capture the non-linear nature of technological change and show that symmetric
price responses cannot be rejected once one allows for a time e¤ect. Adding proxies for unobserved common
factors (as in MG_Ft) is equivalent to the approach of Gri¢ n and Schulman (2005), with more degrees of
freedom. The possibility of asymmetric price-responsiveness is further examined in the next section.
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in oil production has a considerable impact on the price of oil. As can be seen in Table
1.3, we nd a signicant negative (short-run) e¤ect of a change in the global price of crude
oil expressed in US dollars on the demand for oil in OECD-countries (-0.05), non-OECD
countries (-0.03) and the overall sample of countries that do not use the US dollar for
local transactions (-0.04). These short-run elasticities turn out to be very similar for the
di¤erent estimators and are in line with several other panel studies.15 We further nd a
stronger response of oil demand to a global oil price shift in the long run, although the
magnitude of the long-run coe¢ cients are much lower for the MG coe¢ cients than for the
FE estimates. The estimated long-run price elasticities are respectively -0.12 and -0.15 for
OECD and non-OECD countries.
Exchange rate elasticity Our results reveal that there is a strong e¤ect of the US
dollar exchange rate on oil demand in the rest of the world, despite the fact that we control
for country-specic real GDP and global crude oil prices, which supports the conjecture
that the US dollar exchange rate is a signicant driver of oil demand. More specically,
when the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate appreciates by 1 percent, there is a short-
run decline in oil demand of 0.19 percent in OECD countries. Strikingly, the estimated
elasticity is considerably bigger than the global crude oil price elasticity expressed in US
dollar. The equality of the short-run price and real exchange rate elasticity is rejected
at the panel level.16 The negative e¤ect of the exchange rate on oil demand in OECD
countries rises even further to -0.31 in the long run, which is also much larger than the
long-run elasticity of the global oil price determined in US dollar of -0.12.
The short-run impact of the US dollar exchange rate on oil demand in non-OECD
countries is much lower (-0.06) and statistically not signicant. Notice that the latter
is not the case for the FE estimator that is typically used in the oil demand literature,
which conrms that not taking into account the features of macro panel data sets could be
misleading for the interpretation of the results. A possible explanation for the insignicant
exchange rate elasticity coe¢ cient can be the characteristics of the group of non-OECD
15Larger magnitudes for the short-run oil price coe¢ cient are found by Bodenstein and Guerrieri (2011)
within a DSGE framework, and in the SVAR studies of Baumeister and Peersman (2013) and Kilian and
Murphy (2012).
16Askari and Krichene (2010) estimate a time series simultaneous equation model for global oil demand
and supply using quarterly data over a similar sample period (1970-2008) and also nd an impact of the
US dollar (nominal) exchange rate on oil demand which is stronger in magnitude than the e¤ect of the
price of oil, but both elasticities turn out to be insignicant.
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countries. Specically, some of the non-OECD countries had varying exchange rate regimes
over time or experienced exchange rate crises during the sample period, which could reduce
the estimated response of oil consumption to US dollar uctuations.17 The estimated long-
run exchange rate elasticity coe¢ cient is, however, signicant and about twice the size of
the long-run price elasticity. This indicates that the factors that prevent oil consumption
in these countries to respond to changes in the value of the US dollar diminish over time.
Finally, the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate elasticity for the total sample of 65
oil-importing countries is -0.09 and signicant, which is again more than double the global
oil price elasticity expressed in US dollar for the same sample of countries. In sum, the
US dollar exchange rate matters for oil demand in countries which do not use the dollar
as a currency for local transactions. A weakening of the US dollar boosts oil consumption
in these countries. In the next subsection, we assess the robustness of this novel nding,
while we examine the relevance for global oil market dynamics in section 5.
3.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we assess the robustness of the baseline results. We rst check whether the
estimated exchange rate elasticities are robust to the choice of a price-symmetric model by
allowing for asymmetric oil price reactions. We then examine the robustness of the results
for possible endogeneity problems between oil demand and respectively global crude oil
prices and the US dollar exchange rate.
Asymmetric-price model The possibility of asymmetric responses of oil consumption
to price changes has received attention in several empirical studies.18 The underlying idea
is that higher prices induce more investment in energy-e¢ cient equipment and retrotting
of existing capital. When prices fall, however, there is no switch back to less-e¢ cient
capital, although there could be more intensive usage (Gri¢ n and Schulman 2005). More
recently, Dargay et al. (2007) and Dargay and Gately (2010) even allow for a di¤erent
reaction of oil demand to price increases that result in a new historical maximum price
(pmax), to price increases back to the previous maximum (prec), and to price decreases
17Some countries temporarily had a xed and/or crawling peg exchange rate regime. The sample,
however, does not contain countries which had a xed peg to the US dollar over the entire sample period.
18E.g. Walker and Wirl (1993), Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997), Haas and Schipper (1998),
Gately and Huntington (2002) and Gri¢ n and Schulman (2005).
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(pcut). They nd that oil demand responds di¤erently to the di¤erent price shifts, with
the largest (negative) e¤ect of price increases that result in new maximum values.19
Table 1.4 shows the results when we extend our baseline specication with the price
decomposition of Dargay et al. (2007) and Dargay and Gately (2010). Using Wald tests at
the panel level, we consistently nd that the e¤ect of a price increase to a new maximum
is signicantly larger than both other price movements, whereas there are no signicant
di¤erences between a price increase back to an earlier maximum and a price cut. More
importantly, however, we nd that the exchange rate elasticity of oil demand is still signif-
icant and similar in magnitude to the benchmark results reported in section 4 and Table
1.3. Interestingly, a Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis that the responsiveness of oil
demand to changes in the US dollar exchange rate and a price increase to a new maximum
are signicantly di¤erent. Overall, we can conclude that the benchmark results are robust
when we allow for asymmetric oil price responses of oil consumption. The US dollar ex-
change rate is still a signicant driver of oil consumption, with an impact that is generally
larger than shifts in global crude oil prices expressed in US dollar. In the rest of the
paper, we therefore continue to use the price-symmetric specication, with the estimated
unobserved common factors acting as a proxy for technological change.
Instrumental variables estimation In line with the existing cross-country panel stud-
ies on oil demand, we have assumed in the benchmark estimations that the demand for oil
of an individual country does not inuence the global price of crude oil on impact. How-
ever, if a country has a large share in global oil consumption, the assumption of exogenous
oil price movements could be violated.20 A similar reasoning can be applied to the use
of the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate. When shifts in oil consumption of an individual
country a¤ect the bilateral US dollar exchange rate on impact, and this country has a
large weight in the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate index, the estimated elasticity could
19These studies also allow for possible asymmetric responses to income changes, but Dargay and Gately
(2010) point out that this approach is primarily appropriate for oil exporting countries, a group which is
not included in our analysis. We therefore do not extend the model with this type of asymmetry.
20Note that this assumption is typically also made when individual country end-user prices are used
(e.g. Gri¢ n and Schulman 2005; Dargay and Gately 2010), which is more controversial. Notice also that,
in contrast to most existing panel studies on oil demand, we do not have the US in our sample. Since the
US has a share in global oil consumption of 27% over the sample period, endogeneity problems are more
likely for panels that include the US.
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be biased.21 Remark that, if such a bias is present, the true exchange rate elasticity of
oil demand is probably even larger than the one we have reported above. Specically, if
an increase in a countrys oil demand raises its demand for US dollars and leads to an
appreciation of the dollar, the estimated (negative) elasticity will decline.
To account for possible endogeneity between the demand for oil in individual (non-US
dollar) countries, the global oil price, and US dollar exchange rate, we have re-estimated
the baseline panel error correction oil demand model with instrumental variables (IV) as
another robustness check. In particular, we instrument the rst di¤erences of the global
price of crude oil and the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate in equation (1.2) by the
rst di¤erence and the level of the US federal funds rate.
As shown in the left panel of Table 1.5, the results of the IV estimations conrm a
relatively strong impact of the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate on oil demand in the
three samples but the e¤ect is conned to the long-run coe¢ cients. The di¤erences in
magnitudes relative to the global price coe¢ cient even increase for the long-run coe¢ cients,
relative to the benchmark results reported in section 3.1. We obviously have to be careful
when interpreting the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients, given the loss of power of two-stage
regressions with instrumental variables. This is reected in the relatively large standard
errors for the short-run price and exchange rate elasticities.
As a nal robustness check, we have estimated a specication with bilateral real ex-
change rates instead of the US dollar real e¤ective exchange rate. While the e¤ective US
dollar exchange rate reects changes in the overall value of the US dollar, i.e. the currency
unit which matters for global oil market dynamics, bilateral exchange rates capture more
of the e¤ects on the local oil price that consumers have to pay in each individual country.
We again use IV estimations.22 The right panel of Table 1.5 shows the results. In general,
the estimated coe¢ cients turn out to be di¤erent from the benchmark results, which is
probably due to the loss of power of the two-stage estimation procedure, and the di¢ culty
21Japan has the largest weight in the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate for our sample of countries,
notably 18 percent since 1990.
22Potential endogeneity problems between the bilateral US dollar exchange rate and the country-specic
demand for oil are more likely than for the specication with the e¤ective US dollar exchange rate. We
apply the same instruments for the bilateral exchange rates, but use the lagged level of the real e¤ective US
dollar exchange rate instead of the lagged level of the bilateral exchange rate to instrument the oil price,
given the common nature of the oil price variable. Notice that the sample size for the di¤erent groups of
countries is now smaller due to the non-availability of bilateral exchange rate and/or domestic CPI data
for some countries over the time period under consideration (see Appendix A).
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to nd proper instruments. In particular, the estimated global oil price elasticity becomes
insignicant for the non-OECD group, and even signicantly positive for the total sample
of countries in the short run. The exchange rate elasticity estimates are, in contrast, still
(signicantly) negative in the short run. The magnitudes are however large, in particu-
lar for the non-OECD and total sample, while the standard errors increase considerably,
which points to an ine¢ cient estimator.
4 Pass-through of USD exchange rate to oil product prices
A striking result is that we consistently nd that shifts in the US dollar exchange rate have
a stronger impact on oil consumption in non-US dollar oil-importing countries than changes
in the global price of crude oil expressed in US dollar. In this section, we analyze this in
more detail. More specically, we examine whether di¤erences in the pass-through of global
crude oil prices and the US dollar exchange rate to domestic end-user prices can explain
the di¤erence. The inertia of domestic prices of internationally traded goods to exchange
rate changes is well-documented in international economics (e.g. Engel 2003; Goldberg
and Hellerstein 2013) and might be di¤erent for shifts in global crude oil prices. Note that
the analysis in this section is restricted to a conned group of 20 OECD countries, and
only starts in 1978 due to the availability of end-user oil price data (see appendix). The
pass-through analysis thus covers a substantially reduced sample in terms of the number of
countries and time observations compared to the entire sample in the baseline oil demand
model, but should nevertheless be instructive. The data for the G-7 oil-importing countries
that are included in the analysis are shown in Figure 1.2.
In line with the existing literature on the pass-through of changes in the exchange
rate to domestic good prices (e.g. Bussière 2013), we estimate a simple dynamic linear
oil product price equation for the panel of 20 OECD countries over the sample period
1978-2008 of the following form:
P endit = 0i + 1iract + 2irert + 3iP
end
i;t 1 + "it (1.3)
where ract and rert are again the global price of crude oil expressed in US dollar and
the real e¤ective US dollar exchange rate, while P endit represents the domestic end-user
oil products prices in local currency of country i. These prices include taxes and are a
weighted average of 4 product groups, i.e. motor gasoline, gas/diesel oil, light fuel oil
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and residual oil. The results are shown in Table 1.6. According to Wald and CD tests,
the preferred estimator is the MG estimator adjusted for cross-sectional dependence. The
results reveal that both the pass-through of the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate and
the global crude oil price to domestic oil product prices is incomplete (i.e. less than
proportional). The incomplete pass-through is interesting by itself, because it suggests
for instance that studies which use the global price of crude oil to estimate the oil price
elasticity of oil demand probably underestimate the true elasticity.
More importantly in the context of the present study, however, is the appreciable
di¤erence in the magnitudes of the b1 and b2 coe¢ cients. In particular, the magnitude of
the exchange rate pass-through is about twice as large as the global crude oil price pass-
through to end-user product prices. The di¤erence between both coe¢ cients is statistically
signicant according to a Wald test. This nding suggests that a di¤erent pass-through of
US dollar and global crude oil price uctuations to end-user prices could be an explanation
for the di¤erent impact on oil demand that we have found.
A stronger pass-through of the US dollar exchange rate to end-user prices relative to
changes in the global price of crude oil, however, is not necessarily the only explanation for
the larger exchange rate elasticity of oil demand. On top of this, the exchange rate could
also a¤ect other conditions that have an impact on oil demand (e.g. by also a¤ecting the
cost of borrowing). To further examine this, Table 1.7 presents the estimation results of
the benchmark specication, where we have replaced the global price of crude oil expressed
in US dollars by the domestic end-user product prices expressed in local currency.23 The
results reveal that the oil price elasticity indeed increases when local prices are used, a
nding which is consistent with Dargay and Gately (2010), and van Benthem and Romani
(2009). Moreover, the exchange rate coe¢ cient is now never statistically signicant any-
more, which indicates that there is no additional e¤ect of the US dollar exchange rate on
the demand for oil once the pass-through to end-user prices is incorporated in the oil price
variable.24 In other words, we can conclude that di¤erences in the pass-through to local
oil product prices appear to be the key reason for the stronger e¤ect of shifts in the US
23Since local oil prices could be a¤ected by shifts in local oil demand, these results need to be taken with
more than the usual degree of caution. Notice also that the inclusion of the exchange rate does not seem
to absorb some of the true price and income e¤ects. Specically, as can be seen in Table 1.7, the price
and income coe¢ cients are very similar when we estimate the model without the US dollar exchange rate.
Only the long-run price elasticity coe¢ cient of the MG_Ft seems to be a¤ected, but also the standard
errors are quite large.
24When we re-estimate this specication by converting the local oil product prices to US dollar, the
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dollar exchange rate on oil demand relative to changes in global crude oil prices.
5 Economic relevance
In this section, we perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation in order to assess the rele-
vance of US dollar exchange rate uctuations for global oil market dynamics. Given its
simplicity, the exact numbers should be interpreted with caution. The calculation does,
for instance, not take into account endogenous dynamics. It should nevertheless give an
idea about the importance of the US dollar for the oil market.
First, we assume that the estimated exchange rate elasticity for the total sample
( 0:088) is representative for global (non-US) oil demand. Given the fact that the US
represents on average 27 percent of world oil demand over the sample, this implies that
a 1 percent appreciation of the US dollar leads to a decline in global oil demand by
 0:088  (1   0:27) =  0:064 percent. Based on this number, and the price elasticity
estimate, consider the following simplied short-run oil demand function for the global oil
market:
qoil =  0:039poil   0:064rerUS
where qoil, poil and rerUS are respectively global crude oil demand, the global real price of
crude oil and the real e¤ective US dollar exchange rate. Furthermore, according to Kilian
and Murphys (2012) reading of the literature, the upper bound on the short-run price
elasticity of oil supply is 0.025, which gives us the following simplied short-run global
crude oil supply function:
qoil < 0:025poil
Solving this model delivers the following e¤ects of a shift in the US dollar exchange
rate on oil prices and production:
jpoilj > 1:004 jrerUS j
jqoilj > 0:025 jrerUS j
As a benchmark, the monthly average of jrerUS j in the data is for instance 1:16
percent. According to our simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, this corresponds to an
exchange rate coe¢ cient becomes again signicant, while the magnitude of the oil price elasticity is hardly
a¤ected. These results are available upon request.
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average shift in global oil prices by 1:17 percent. Given the fact that the monthly average
of jpoilj in the data is 4:76 percent, the relevance of US dollar exchange rate uctuations
for global oil price dynamics is considerable. Due to the very low oil supply elasticity, this
is less the case for oil production. In particular, the monthly average of jqoilj in the data
is 1:08 percent, whereas exchange rate uctuations could only explain about 0:03 percent
according to our simple calculations.
Average elasticities are, however, not necessarily representative for the global oil mar-
ket, which is essentially a weighted average of all individual countries in the world. There-
fore, we have also calculated weighted MG estimates of the panel error correction oil
demand model, where the weights of the country-specic coe¢ cients are determined by
the share of the respective country in the total oil consumption over the sample. Accord-
ingly, countries with a larger share in global oil demand have more weight such that the
resulting MG estimates better represent global elasticities.25 The short-run price and ex-
change rate coe¢ cients that result from this exercise are respectively  0:045 and  0:122.
These coe¢ cients in turn result in an impact of US dollar e¤ective exchange rate uctu-
ations of more than 1:48 percent on world oil price dynamics and 0:03 percent on global
oil production using the above described procedure. In sum, our back-of-the-envelope
calculations demonstrate that the e¤ective US dollar exchange rate appears to be very
important for uctuations in global crude oil prices through its e¤ect on the demand for
oil. The e¤ect on oil production on the other hand is very limited due to the very low
short-run price elasticity of oil supply.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the role of the US dollar exchange rate for the demand for
oil in non-US dollar regions by using recent advances in panel data estimation techniques.
In particular, we have estimated a panel error correction oil demand model allowing for
cross-country heterogeneity in the slope coe¢ cients, and taking into account cross-country
common unobserved variables. The results show that an appreciation of the US dollar
exchange rate robustly leads to a decline in the demand for oil in countries that do not use
the US dollar for local transactions, which supports the premise of a signicant exchange
rate channel underlying oil demand dynamics. Strikingly, a 1 percent shift in the real US
25Our sample represents 59 percent of non-US global oil demand.
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dollar exchange rate seems to have a much stronger e¤ect on oil demand than a 1 percent
shift in the global real crude oil price determined in US dollar. A more detailed analysis
of the e¤ect of changes in the global crude oil price and the US dollar exchange rate on
country-specic end-user prices of oil products suggest that the di¤erence is the result of a
much stronger pass-through of exchange rate uctuations to end-user prices. The reason
for the stronger pass-through of the US dollar e¤ective exchange rate is beyond the scope
of this paper, but could be a promising avenue for future research. A potential avenue is
the lower volatility of the US dollar exchange rate compared to the global crude oil price.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation furthermore suggests that shifts in the US dollar
exchange rate are economically important for global (US dollar) crude oil price uctuations
due to its inuence on global oil demand. It is thus recommended to include the US dollar
exchange rate in the analysis of global oil market dynamics in the spirit of Kilian (2009),
Peersman and Van Robays (2009) and Juvenal and Petrella (2012).
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Data Appendix
Data sources:
 Total oil demand (1000 barrels per day): International Energy Agency (IEA), Oil
Information database
 Total midyear population (number of persons): US Census Bureau, International
database
 Global crude oil price (US dollars per barrel): Energy Information Administration
(EIA), Rener acquisition cost of imported crude oil
 Real gross domestic product per capita.: Penn World Tables 7.0, PPP Converted
GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), 2005 constant prices
 Real US dollar e¤ective exchange rate: BIS, real e¤ective exchange rate index (CPI-
based), Narrow Index (2010=100)
 Monthly Crude oil and NGL production for Figure 1.1 (1000 barrels per day): IEA,
Oil Information database
 Individual country nominal exchange rates [ER] (national currency unit to US $,
period average) : IMF, IFS database
 Consumer prices [CPI] (indices, 2005=100): IMF, IFS database
 End-user oil products prices [penduser]: IEA, Energy Prices and Taxes database
 US GNP deator: Datastream, US chain-type price index for GNP (code: US-
GNP..CE)
 US Federal Funds rate: Datastream, US Federal Funds e¤ective rate (code: FRFEDFD?)
Construction variables: -> Total oil demand per capita [DEM] (barrels per day,
per 1000 persons) = Total Oil demand/ Total population*1000
-> Real global crude oil price [POIL]: Global nominal crude oil price/ CPIust*100
-> Real exchanges rates [bRER] = ERit * CPIus,t / CPIit, index 2005=100
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-> Real end-user oil products price indexes in national currencies [penduser]: quan-
tity weighted real end-user price index (2005=100) of oil products based on Gri¢ n and
Schulman (2005), i.e.for 4 product groups: residual oil, light fuel oil, motor gasoline and
gas/diesel oil weighted based on their respective importance in aggregated consumption.
Sample coverage: The dataset is balanced for 65 oil-importing countries over the
sample period 1971-2008. All variables are converted to natural logarithms, such that the
models are of the constant elasticity form.
OECD sample (23 countries): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
Turkey
Non-OECD sample (42 countries) : Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kenya, Malta, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Romania, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania United Republic,
Thailand, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe
The following countries have been excluded from the analysis because of being a net
oil-exporting country, i.e. countries for which the production of crude oil has been
larger than total oil demand for at least 25 years: Canada, Mexico, Norway, United King-
dom, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, Congo Demo-
cratic Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and
Venezuela
When the model includes the bilateral real US dollar exchange rate instead of the real
e¤ective US dollar exchange rate index, the total sample reduces to 44 countries (20 OECD
and 24 non-OECD countries) due to missing data for the bilateral nominal exchange rates
and/or consumer price indices for the entire time period under consideration.
-> Missing OECD: Hungary, Poland, Turkey
-> Missing non-OECD: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China,
Ghana, Hong Kong, Israel, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Sudan, Uruguay,
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Zambia, Zimbabwe
When the model includes end-user oil product prices instead of the real global crude
oil price, the total sample reduces to 20 OECD countries due to missing data on end-user
oil products price indices for the entire time period under consideration (1978-2008).
-> Missing OECD: Australia, Iceland and Turkey
23
Bibliography
[1] Arellano, M. and S. Bond. (1991) "Some tests of specication for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations", The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, vol 58(2), 277-297.
[2] Askari, H. and N. Krichene (2010) "An oil demand and supply model incorporating
monetary policy", Energy, vol 35(5), 2013-2021.
[3] Austvik, O.G. (1987) "Oil prices and the dollar dilemma", OPEC Review, 11, 399-
412.
[4] Bai, J., C. Kao and S. Ng (2009) "Panel cointegration with global stochastic trends",
Journal of Econometrics , vol 149, 82-99.
[5] Bai, J. and S. Ng (2002) "Determining the number of factors in approximate factor
models", Econometrica , vol 70, 191-221.
[6] Bai, J. and S. Ng (2004) "A panic attack on unit roots and cointegration", Econo-
metrica, vol 72, 1127-1177.
[7] Banerjee, A., and L.J., Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) "Cointegration in panel data with
breaks and cross-section dependence", ECB Working Paper Series, 591.
[8] Baumeister, C. and G. Peersman (2013) "The role of time-varying price elasticities
in accounting for volatility changes in the crude oil market", Journal of Applied
Econometrics, vol 28(7), 1087-1109.
[9] Bodenstein, M. and L. Guerrieri (2011), "Oil e¢ ciency, demand, and prices: a tale
of ups and downs", Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International
Finance Discussion Papers, 1031.
24
-Chapter 1-
[10] Bond, S., and Leblebicioglu, A., and F., Schiantarelli (2010), "Capital accumulation
and growth: a new look at the empirical evidence," Journal of Applied Econometrics,
vol 25(7), 1073-1099.
[11] Borenstein, S and A.C. Cameron (1997), "Do Gasoline Prices Respond Asymmet-
rically to Crude Oil Price Changes?", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 112(1),
305-339.
[12] Brown, S.P.A. and K.R. Phillips (1984), "The E¤ects of Oil Prices and Exchange
Rates onWorld Oil Consumption", Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
[13] Bussière, M. (2013) "Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Trade Prices: The Role of
Nonlinearities and Asymmetries", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol
75(5), 731-758.
[14] Cooper, J.C.B. (2003) "Price elasticity of demand for crude oil: Estimates for 23
countries", OPEC Review, 27, 1-8.
[15] Dahl, C.A. (1993) "A survey of oil demand elasticities for developing countries",
OPEC Review, 17, 399-419.
[16] Dahl, C. and T. Sterner (1991) "Analyzing Gasoline Demand Elasticities: A survey",
Energy Economics, vol 3(13), 203-210.
[17] Dargay, J.M. and D. Gately (2010) "World oil demands shift toward faster growing
and less price-responsive products and regions", Energy Policy, vol 38, 6261-6277.
[18] Dargay, J.M., Gately, D., and H.G., Huntington (2007) "Price and Income Respon-
siveness of World Oil Demand, by Product", Energy Modeling Forum, Occasional
working paper EMF OP 61.
[19] Dickey, D.A., and W.A. Fuller (1979) "Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregres-
sive Time Series with a Unit Root", Journal of the American Statistical Association,
74, 427-431.
[20] Eberhardt, M., 2012. Estimating Panel Time Series Models with Heterogeneous
Slopes, Stata Journal 12, 6171.
[21] Engel, C. (2000) "Long-run PPP may not hold after all", Journal of International
Economics vol 51 (2), 243-273.
25
-Chapter 1-
[22] Engel, C. (2003) "Expenditure Switching and Exchange-Rate Policy", NBER Macro-
economics Annual 2002, vol 17, 231-299.
[23] Espey, M. (1998) "Gasoline Demand Revisited: An International Meta-Analysis of
Elasticities", Energy Economics, vol 20(3), 273-295.
[24] Fawcett, N. and S. Price (2012) "World oil demand in a cross-country panel", Working
paper.
[25] Frankel, J.A. (2006) "The E¤ect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices",
NBER Working Papers 12713, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[26] Gately, D. and H.G. Huntington (2002) "The asymmetric e¤ects of changes in price
and income on energy and oil demand", The Energy Journal, vol 23(1), 19-55.
[27] Gengenbach, C., J.-P. Urbain, and J. Westerlund (2008) "Panel error correction test-
ing with global stochastic trends", METEOR Research Memorandum RM/08/051,
Maastricht University.
[28] Goldberg, P. K. and R. Hellerstein (2013), "A Structural Approach to Identifying the
Sources of Local-Currency Price Stability", Review of Economic Studies, vol 80(1),
175-210.
[29] Gri¢ n, J.M. and C.T. Schulman (2005) "Price asymmetry in energy demand models:
a proxy for energy-saving technical change?", The Energy Journal, vol 26(2), 1-21.
[30] Haas, R. and L. Schipper (1998) Residential Energy Demand in OECD Countries
and the Role of Irreversible E¢ ciency Improvements, Energy Economics, vol 20(4),
421-442.
[31] Hamilton, J.D. (2009) "Causes and consequences of the oil shock of 2007-08", Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, vol 40(1), 215-283.
[32] Holtz-Eakin, D. and T.M, Selden (1995) "Stoking the res? CO2 emissions and
economic growth", Journal of Public Economics, vol 57(1), 85-101.
[33] Hughes, J.E., C.R. Knittel and D. Sperling (2008) "Evidence of a shift in the short-run
price elasticity of gasoline demand", The Energy Journal, vol 29(1), 93-114.
26
-Chapter 1-
[34] Huntington, H.G. (1986) The U.S. Dollar and the World Oil Market,Energy Policy,
Vol 14(4), 299-306.
[35] Juvenal, L. and I., Petrella (2012) "Speculation in the oil market," Economic Syn-
opses, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 8.
[36] Kilian, L. (2009) "Not all oil price shocks are alike: disentangling demand and supply
shocks in the crude oil market", American Economic Review, 99, 1053-1069.
[37] Kilian, L. and D. Murphy (2012) "Why Agnostic Sign Restrictions Are Not Enough:
Understanding the Dynamics of Oil Market VAR Models", Journal of the European
Economic Association, vol 10(5), 1166-1188.
[38] Kremers, J. J. M., N. R. Ericsson, and J. J. Dolado (1992) "The power of cointegration
tests", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol 54, 325348.
[39] Lee, C.-C. and J-D., Lee (2010) "A Panel Data Analysis of the Demand for Total
Energy and Electricity in OECD Countries", Energy Journal, vol 31(1), 1-23.
[40] Lombardi, M. and I. Van Robays (2011) "Do nancial investors destabilize the oil
price?", Working Paper Series European Central Bank, 1346.
[41] Mas-Colell, A., Whinston,M.D. and J.R. Green (2007) "Microeconomic Theory", Ox-
ford University Press: New York, NY.
[42] Moon, H. R. and B. Perron (2004) "Testing for a unit root in panels with dynamic
factors", Journal of Econometrics, vol 122, 81-126.
[43] Narayan, P.K. and R. Smyth (2007) "A panel cointegration analysis of the demand
for oil in the Middle East", Energy Policy, vol 12, 6258-6265.
[44] Nickell, S. (1981) "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed E¤ects", Econometrica, vol
49(6), 1417-1426.
[45] Peersman, G. (2005) "What caused the early millennium slowdown? Evidence based
on vector autoregressions", Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20, 185-207.
[46] Peersman, G. and I. Van Robays (2009) "Oil and the Euro Area Economy", Economic
Policy, vol 24(60), 603-651.
27
-Chapter 1-
[47] Pesaran, M.H. (2004) "General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in pan-
els", University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge Working Papers in
Economics No. 0435
[48] Pesaran, M.H. (2006) "Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with
a multi-factor error structure", Econometrica, vol 74, 967-1012.
[49] Pesaran, M.H. (2007) "A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross section
dependence", Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol 22, 365-312.
[50] Schmalensee, R., Stoker, T.M. and R.A., Judson (1998) "World Carbon Dioxide
Emissions: 1950-2050," The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80(1), 15-27.
[51] van Benthem, A. and M. Romani (2009), "Fuelling Growth: What Drives Energy
Demand in Developing Countries?", Energy Journal, vol 30(3), 91-114.
[52] Walker, I.O. and F. Wirl (1993) Irreversible Price-Induced E¢ ciency Improvements:
Theory and Empirical Application to Road Transportation, The Energy Journal,
vol 14(4), 183-205.
28
-Chapter 1-
Figure 1.1:  evolutions in oil consumption in G-7 countries in sample and in total OECD and non-OECD aggregates  versus the evolution 
of real effective US dollar exchange rate
Note: the left axis' units refer the percentage deviation from trend from total oil demand per capita (barrels per day, per 1000 persons), the right axis refers to the 
real effective US dollar exchange rate (RER) which is an index equal to 100 in base year 2005. 
Sources data: total oil demand: IEA / population individual countries: US Census Bureau (international database) / population OECD and non-OECD country 
aggregates: OECD (population database) / RER: BIS (narrow index).
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Note: All series are indexed with base year 2005 equal to 100. The individual country series refer to quantity weighted real end-user price indexes of oil products 
based on Griffin and Schulman (2005), i.e.for 4 product groups: residual oil, light fuel oil, motor gasoline and gas/diesel oil weighted based on their respective 
importance in aggregated consumption, the RER series refers to the real effective US dollar exchange rate and the OILP series to the global real crude oil price.
Sources data: end-user oil products prices for individual countries: International Energy Agency (Energy Prices and Taxes database) / OILP: Energy Information 
Administration website (refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil) / RER: BIS (narrow index).
Figure 1.2:  country-specific real end-user prices for G-7 countries in sample relative to the real effective US dollar exchange rate (panel 
1) and to the global real crude price (panel 2)
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CHAPTER 2
Traditional export determinants and export dynamics since
the Great Trade Collapse: a cross-country analysis.
Selien De Schryder
Ghent University
John Lewis
Bank of England,
Centre for Macroeconomics
Abstract
By means of a panel model of goods exports for 16 OECD economies, we quantify ad-
vanced economiesexport performance since the "Great Trade Collapse" (GTC) based on
traditional export determinants. We include a variable measuring shifts in the sectoral
composition of world trade and split the real exchange rates up into its constituent parts
to account for a di¤erent response to unit labour costs and the nominal exchange rate. We
nd that, on average, a pre-crisis model explains aggregate exports since the GTC well
once one controls for unobserved common factors. We do nd substantial cross-country
variation in export performance based on the average coe¢ cients.
JEL classication: C23, F14, F17
Keywords: International trade, forecasting, cross-country panel
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1 Introduction
In the immediate aftermath of the nancial crisis, the sharp falls in output across developed
economies were accompanied by even stronger falls in international trade. This fall in
trade, often termed "The Great Trade Collapse" (GTC) was by far the largest drop in
global trade in history, as global trade plunged by 15% year-on-year in late 2008 and early
2009. In addition, the GTC was characterised by an extremely high level of synchronization
with falls in exports across all advanced economies and nearly all industries ( Baldwin,
2009; IMF, 2013).
The dynamics of world trade since the GTC reheated the long-standing debate on the
relationship between trade and macroeconomic dynamics. The consensus is that the fall
in world output and industrial production that occurred at the same time played a key
part in the GTC. But some authors have argued that other factors outside of traditional
trade models contributed to the sharp fall in trade such as impaired trade nance (Chor
and Manova, 2012; JaeBin, Amiti and Weinstein, 2011) or heightened uncertainty (Novy
and Taylor, 2014). Others have argued that the GTC heralded an era of lower world
trade relative to GDP -either because aspects of globalisation such as o¤shoring may have
run their course (Krugman, 2013) or because of a rise in hidden protectionism (Davies,
2013). Whilst the former imply shorter-run shocks that may reverse over time as the global
economy recovered, the latter suggest a more permanent hit to trade due to a structural
break in the relationship between economic activity and trade. At the same time, export
growth following the GTC has been argued to be further constrained by the fact that global
growth remained relatively subdued. Some policymakers have highlighted the di¢ culties
posed by weaker external conditions for some economies seeking to rebalance away from
domestic demand towards exports.
Our focus in this paper is to analyse what has happened to exports of advanced
economies since the GTC and to gauge how consistent they were with pre-crisis export
models, rather than to uncover the cause of the GTC per se. In particular, we construct
a forecast benchmark for the actual exports of a panel of advanced economies to analyse
their export evolutions since the onset of the GTC. The capability of a pre-crisis standard
export relationship to account for the evolutions of exports during and following the GTC
is of great interest given its important policy implications. If the GTC marks structural
changes in the relationship between trade performance and the traditional macroeconomic
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determinants, counterfactual export analyses based on traditional export determinants can
provide misleading policy guidance.
In this work, we rst extend the standard export equation based on the imperfect
substitutes model of international trade (Goldstein and Kahn, 1985) to incorporate the
e¤ects of shifts in the sectoral composition of global trade and the role of imported inputs
and local nontraded costs on the e¤ect of the real exchange rate. We analyse this model
for goods exports in a panel error correction model (ECM) framework for 16 advanced
economies. Whereas recent empirical work using ECMs to model exports estimated either
a system of country specic equations or focused on aggregate exports1, we instead adopt a
panel approach using the Common Correlated E¤ects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006)
to control for the possible existence of unobserved common factors.
We develop a novel measure of sectoral shifts in world trade and examine its e¤ects
next to the traditional price and income determinants of exports as compositional e¤ects
have been found to be important for trade in the long run (Mayer, 2010) and in the short
run as well (Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar, 2010). The measure allows us to control for com-
positional demand e¤ects on export ows. Note that this is distinct from a decomposition
of aggregate demand into its expenditure components according to their trade intensity
as employed in Bussière et al (2013), because it divides the data up along sectoral lines.2
We nd the variable to have only a signicant lagged impact on export in the short run.
We further split up the real exchange rate (our preferred measure of relative prices) into
its two constituent parts, the nominal exchange rate and relative unit labour costs to di¤er-
entiate between the e¤ects of the nominal exchange rate and relative cost changes which
might be di¤erent because of the importance of nontraded costs and because marginal
producer costs strongly co-move with exchange rates due to imported inputs (Goldberg
and Hellerstein, 2008). Both factors can limit the responsiveness of exports to nominal
exchange rates because they a¤ect the pricing behavior of producers. A depreciation of
1CaZorzi and Schnatz (2007) estimate an ECM for aggregate euro area exports, with a focus on
assessing the best measure of competitiveness from a forecasting perspective. di Mauro, Rü¤er and Bunda
(2008) estimate country specic export demand equations for France, Germany and Italy, as well as a
pooled version for the three. Breuer and Klose (2013) estimate individual export demand equations for 9
euro area countries using the SURE methodology.
2Next to the fact that we focus on compositional e¤ects of global exports, the creation of an aggregate
export content weighted demand measure similar to the import content weighted measure in Bussière et
al (2013) is also infeasible to construct given the lack of export content data.
39
-Chapter 2-
the local currency renders imported inputs more expensive while nontraded costs are in-
variant to exchange rate changes. We nd that the source of the real exchange rate shock
matters for exports. The coe¢ cients for both components of the real exchange rate di¤er
signicantly -the response to relative unit labour costs is around six times as large as to
nominal exchange rates in the short run.
We next use the model estimated over a pre-crisis sample period to undertake a forecast
exercise to explore the dynamics of trade since the GTC. This exercise allows to construct
a benchmark to which the advanced economiesexports since the GTC can be compared.
First, we average the individual forecasts to yield an aggregate forecast.3 Comparing this
forecast benchmark with the actual average outturn allows us to assess how the export
ows since the GTC compare to the predictions of the pre-crisis model. Since the GTC,
the dynamics of the out-of sample forecast are highly similar to actual average exports.
The out-of sample forecast based on the pre-crisis model average coe¢ cients can explain
about 95 percent of the observed fall in exports between peak and through, i.e. between
2008Q2 and 2009Q2. Unobserved common factors, proxied by the cross section averages
of all variables, constitute a major part of the predicted decline in advanced economies
exports during the GTC.
Second, we examine the forecasts for each country conditional on the country-specic
variables and the common factors to gauge each countrys performance against its peers.
The forecasts in this case serve as uniform benchmarks to evaluate countries relative
export performance based on the estimated average coe¢ cients of the pre-crisis export
model. The performance of the individual countries relative to their benchmark varies
considerably across countries. From this, we can infer that advanced economiesexports
since the GTC relate to a varying degree to the average prediction based on the traditional
demand and competitiveness determinants.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant
literature on the traditional export determinants, section 3 describes the specication of
our model and outlines our data and estimation approach, section 4 presents the empirical
results, section 5 the conditional forecasts and section 6 concludes.
3The forecasts are conditional on both the country-specic variables and the cross section averages of
all variables in the model (which account for the unobserved common factors in the residual of the model).
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2 Changing nature of international trade
This paper is part of the empirical literature on international economics that focuses on
the estimation of trade elasticities and that dates back to the seminal work of Houthakker
and Magee in 1969. The imperfect-substitutes model of international trade (Goldstein
and Khan, 1985) o¤ers the standard formulation of an export equation. We apply this
theoretical framework to analyse the export performance of 16 OECD countries since the
GTC.
The standard model is however more and more a¤ected by the changing role of trade
in the economy. First, as economies have become more opened to international trade
by reducing trade barriers and tari¤s, the overall volume of world trade has increased.
Alongside traditional Ricardian channels, this evolution has increased the attractiveness
of o¤shoring certain stages of the supply chain, often to lower cost producers (Strauß, 2002;
Kleinert and Zorell, 2012; Yi, 2013). O¤shoring (alternatively called vertical specialisation
or outsourcing) results in an enlarged trade in intermediate goods between the o¤shoring
rm and the foreign intermediate good producer and further boosts the volume of world
trade (Kleinert and Zorell, 2012; Yi, 2013). Globalisation is likely to have increased the
trade intensity of GDP, as lower trade barriers, transport costs and tari¤s have led to a
lengthening in supply chains.
This evolution of the nature of international trade has important repercussions for the
standard trade equation as the income elasticity coe¢ cients of exports ends up to be a
combination of the traditional income e¤ect and the e¤ect of globalisation induced growth
spurring trade. Whilst the former points to an import elasticity of no more than unity,
the latter can generate a higher elasticity since trade is measured in gross and output in
net terms, such that a dollar of extra output may be associated with more than a dollar
of extra trade ows. The coe¢ cient on GDP should thus not be interpreted as measuring
the traditional income e¤ect but as a combination of this income e¤ect and the e¤ect of
increased globalisation.4
A separate channel is that globalisation is associated with increased international com-
petition. As it is commonly assumed that the sensitivity of exports to cost changes depends
4Recently, the OECD and WTO (2012) have published a dataset of bilateral trade ows in gross value
added (GVA). However, since this is only available for a single year (2009), it is unsuitable for the kind of
dynamic panel analysis undertaken here.
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on the degree of competition in the market (Carlin, Glyn and Van Reenen, 2001), also
the elasticity of exports to cost changes can be altered. On the other hand, an enlarged
import content of exports due to o¤shoring should lead to a decreased responsiveness to
exchange rate changes (di Mauro et al, 2008).
Second, there may be an important role for compositional e¤ects in international trade
due to structural shifts in global demand (Mayer, 2010). Countries that specialise in the
sectors in which world demand growth is concentrated or that are better able to respond to
changes in the structure of international demand by adjusting their production accordingly,
are likely to gain market share in global export markets. So even preference shifts that
do not necessarily result in quantity e¤ects at the aggregate level can be important for
countriesexports depending on which sectors are a¤ected.
In this paper, we address both issues by refraining from imposing a unit coe¢ cient on
the income elasticity coe¢ cient, by controlling for unobserved common factors5 and their
possible correlation with the export determinants in the model and by introducing a proxy
for the changing composition of trade for a given level of international trade.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Imperfect substitutes model
Our starting point is the standard export equation based on the imperfect substitutes
model of international trade (Goldstein and Kahn, 1985).
Xi;t = f
 
Y i;t; Ei;t

(2.1)
Where X is real exports in domestic currency, Y  is a country-specic trade-weighted
external demand measure, and E is real e¤ective exchange rates. Domestic exports are
a function of foreign income, the domestic price of goods and the price of goods that
compete with the reporting countrys goods in foreign markets. A rise in overseas output
and a lower real exchange rate are expected to lead to an increase in exports.
5The CCE estimators allow to account for the inuence of unobserved common factors by including the
cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables (see page 49).
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We extend this basic setup along two di¤erent dimensions. First, we allow for changes
in the sectoral composition of world trade to also play an important role in determining
exports, and to do so in a way that may di¤er across countries. For example, lower cost
emerging market economies (EMEs) may have displaced more established advanced econ-
omy producers in certain product types such as clothing and footwear. The e¤ect of this
shift in the sectoral composition of world trade will a¤ect countries di¤erently, depending
on whether they specialise in the sectors most a¤ected.6 On the other hand, sectoral shifts
may also be benecial. For example, whereas the group of rich developed countriesde-
mand tends to center on manufactured consumer goods, rapidly industrialising emerging
economiesdemand is more focused on industrial raw materials, energy and food products
(Mayer, 2010). Countries specialising in these products may benet more from the growth
in emerging economies than those who do not. Compositional e¤ects however do not only
relate to medium or long term structural changes, they can be important in the short run
as well (Levchenko et al, 2010). Given the potential importance of compositional shifts in
international trade, we add a variable (C) to the benchmark model to explore the e¤ect
of sectoral preferences for advanced economiesexports, which we spell out in more detail
in the next section.
Second, alongside the more standard approach of including a real exchange rate vari-
able, we also explore the consequences of decomposing the real exchange rate into separate
nominal exchange rate and domestic costs terms, i.e. E={S,U}, following Carlin et al
(2001), Allard et al (2005), Breuer and Klose (2013) and Chen, Milesi-Ferretti and Tressel
(2013). There are several reasons why the response of exports to a given real exchange
rate shock may depend on which of the components is driving the change. If production
of exported goods requires the use of imported inputs, then a given nominal depreciation
may be partially o¤set by a rise in non-labour production costs, that would not occur if
the real depreciation occurred because of an improvement in unit labour costs. Also the
presence of nontraded local costs reduces the response of prices to nominal exchange rates
(Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2008) and implies pricing-to-market (i.e. exchange rate changes
are associated with markup variation). Alternatively, Obstfeld and Rogo¤s (2001) ex-
change rate disconnect puzzle highlights the fact that nominal exchange rates are far
more volatile than fundamentals and that in the short run, the correlations between ex-
6For example, Giovanetti, Sanlippo and Velucchi (2012) nd evidence that Italy has been much more
adversely a¤ected by the rise of Chinese exports than Germany because Italys exports are in sectors with
greater competition from China.
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ports and nominal exchange rate appear low. Given the larger persistence of relative costs
compared to nominal exchange rates, exporters may react more swiftly to cost changes
than to movements in nominal exchange rates.
Equation (2.1) is thus extended as follows:
Xi;t = f
 
Y i;t; Si;t; Ui;t; C

i;t

(2.2)
where S refers to nominal exchange rates, U captures relative domestic costs and C
is a measure of sectoral shocks.
3.2 Data
We estimate our equation over an unbalanced panel at the quarterly frequency, comprising
16 advanced economies7 between 1984Q1 and 2008Q2. A panel approach provides us with
estimates of average elasticities over a comparable group of countries which can be used
to examine individual countriesexport performances relative to their peers.
Our dependent variable, X, is real export volumes in domestic currency for the goods
sector. Our preferred measure of international price competitiveness, E, is the IMFs
unit labour cost (ULC) based real e¤ective exchange rate (REER) index. This captures
relative unit labour costs versus competitors, using double weights to capture import
and export competition in third markets.8 Export prices are also commonly used as
a measure of international price competitiveness but they su¤er from the drawback of
being determined endogenously with export quantities. In addition, they may be largely
inuenced by pricing-to-market e¤ects or other pricing behaviour, which are conceptually
distinct from true cost competitiveness.
We prefer the ULC based REER to a consumer price index (CPI) based index because
unit labour costs are likely to better reect underlying cost shocks to producer prices.
The CPI basket includes non-traded goods, regulated prices and services which may be a
misleading indicator of traded goods prices. In addition, for many countries the CPI basket
includes a substantial imported component, which can results in an understatement of the
7The 16 countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US.
8For more details on the methodology, see Bayoumi, Lee and Jayanthi (2005).
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competitiveness e¤ects of a nominal exchange rate depreciation. By contrast, ULCs for
the manufacturing sector9 give a broad indication of international price competitiveness
as the manufacturing sector is representative for traded goods and labour costs represent
a major component of total costs per unit of output. Moreover, by focusing on costs rather
than prices, the competitiveness indicator is less subject to direct exchange rate e¤ects
on pricing behaviour. A ULC based REER is nevertheless by no means perfect as it also
abstracts from indirect taxes and non-labour costs such as costs of raw materials or capital
costs. We split the ULC based REER into its two subcomponents -relative ULCs and the
nominal exchange rate. We do so by subtracting the equivalent (logged) nominal exchange
rate series from its real counterpart to yield a measure of relative ULCs
To measure the role of external demand conditions, we calculate trade-weighted world
output growth (Y ), given by:
Y i;t =
PX
p=1
!iptYp;t (2.3)
where !ipt is the weight of country is exports at time t going to partner p, where the
weights are given by a three-year moving average of the export shares calculated for 76
trading partners using bilateral trade ows.10 Yp;t is real GDP growth in each trading
partner. The growth rate of trade-weighted world output growth is subsequently used to
construct the indexed (2009Q1=100) level variable Y .
We prefer this over an index of partnersimport growth for a couple of reasons. Over
the sample period, part of the rise in advanced economy imports reects the supply-side
shock of greater exports from emerging markets. The latter will either be orthogonal to
demand for advanced economies -and hence a source of unwelcome noise- or even negatively
correlated if they compete away advanced economiesmarket share. In addition, because
our left hand side variable covers advanced economies accounting for the bulk of world
trade, trade-weighted world import growth is likely to be closely related to some weighted
sum of LHS variables and so may create simultaneity problems.
9We prefer ULCs for the manufacturing sector because they correspond more closely to goods exports
than total economy ULCs which also include services and the government sector.
10The weights are calculated as the mean shares over the 12 previous quarters to avoid endogeneity
problems.
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To capture the e¤ect of changes in the sectoral composition of trade, we construct an
index of sectoral shifts.11
Ci;t =
KX
k=1
iktS

ikt (2.4)
where ikt is the weight of sector k at time t for country i, which is determined by a
three-year moving average of the share of sector k in total exports. To avoid simultaneity
issues, shares of each good in "world trade" are calculated over all other countries (i.e.
excluding the country concerned). Thus Sikt measures the importance of industry k in the
total exports of all other countries in the sample of advanced economies, i.e.:
Sikt =
IX
j=1;j 6=i
Xjkt
IX
j=1;j 6=i
KX
k=1
Xjkt
(2.5)
Constructed this way, the level variable C measures the general evolution in the
relative importance of sectors in the export ows of advanced economies, weighted by
the country-specic export shares of the particular sectors. A rise in C indicates that
sectoral demand shifts create an increase in the demand for a countrys exports. We opt
for a group of 34 OECD countries (j) as the benchmark group for our sample of reporting
countries (i), as we want to analyse the compositional e¤ects of world demand that a¤ect
advanced economiesexports.12
In practice, the sectoral shift variable does exhibit signicant variation across coun-
tries, and in a way which appears orthogonal to trade-weighted GDP growth. By way of
11An example may help here. Suppose there are two goods in the world, gin and tonic. Initially these
are combined in the ratio 1:4 to form the composite drink "G&T". Suppose that the total number of
servings of G&T (i.e. world output) is unchanged, but that due to a preference shock consumers now
prefer the drink to be mixed with a ratio of 1:3. The share of gin in world trade thus rises by 5 percentage
points (from 20% to 25%), the share of tonic in world trade falls by the same amount (from 80% to 75%).
Globally, the demand for gin would be 25% higher than before. This benets countries specialised in the
export of gin, at the expense of those specialising in tonic. For a country which only exported gin, the
change in demand arising from this shock will be 25 %.
12The 16 reporting countries are a subsample of the reference group of 34 OECD countries.
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illustration, the left panel of gure 2.1 shows trade-weighted GDP growth for a selection of
countries. Australia and Japan who are more exposed to China and other emerging Asian
economies have experienced stronger external demand growth than Europe or the US. But
the right hand panel shows that changes in the sectoral composition of trade have a¤ected
these two countries very di¤erently. Australia, where commodities, fuel and minerals ac-
count for over 60% of exports (more than double any other country in our sample) has
benetted from a shift in trade composition towards these items. Japan, where exports
have been geared towards the machinery sectors, has by contrast seen a modest decline in
C over the sample period. Further details of the coverage and data denitions are given
in the appendix.
Figure 2.1 External growth and sectoral shocks: 2000-2011
3.3 Econometric model specication
The econometric analysis is based on a single equation error correction model (ECM)
specication, in line with e.g. CaZorzi and Schnatz (2007), di Mauro et al (2008) and
Breuer and Klose (2013). Our variables are expressed in natural logarithms and are
within-country demeaned to bring them to the same scale and focus on the time variation
within countries. Denoting these transformed variables with lower case letters, our baseline
specication is:
xi;t = (xi;t 1   [lyi;t 1 + lei;t 1 + lci;t 1]) +
LdP
j=1
jxi;t j
+
LeP
j=0
(sjy

i;t j + 
s
jei;t j + 
s
jc

i;t j) + coni + i;t (2.6)
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The ECM framework permits us to separate out the inuence of short-run versus long-
run factors on trade. Since volumes may adjust only slowly to changes in relative prices
and demand, there are good grounds to believe that the longer-run reaction of exports
to a given shock may di¤er from what happens in the same quarter. In addition, the
property that exports tend to revert back to a long-run equilibrium level following a shock
may be important in capturing the bounce-back e¤ects of exports witnessed since the
nancial crisis. The choice of an ECM is furthermore appropriate for the non-stationary
level variables given the nding of signicant error correcting properties in the model from
diagnostic tests (see appendix B for details). The rst (round) brackets in equation (2.6)
represent the long-run relationship where the long-run coe¢ cients are indicated with the
superscript l. The second term captures the short-run dynamics. The average speed of
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is governed by , the error correction coe¢ cient.
To distinguish the short-run coe¢ cients, we depicted them with the superscript s.
Two econometric characteristics of macro panel data sets need to be considered for the
choice of the appropriate panel estimator -cross-sectional dependence of the error terms
and slope heterogeneity across panel units, as they can both lead to biased coe¢ cient
estimates. Cross-sectional dependence in the errors in general reects factors that are
common across countries but are not explicitly accounted for in the model. Not accounting
for cross section dependence results in inappropriate standard errors and even in biased
coe¢ cient estimates if the common factor in the residuals is correlated with the regressors
(Pesaran, 2006). Imposing slope homogeneity on the other hand, can also result in biased
coe¢ cients in dynamic panel models when slope heterogeneity is in fact present (Pesaran
and Smith, 1995).
To ensure consistent and unbiased estimates, we employ di¤erent panel estimators
and perform diagnostic tests on the residuals to discriminate between the estimators. We
consider the one-way FE estimator next to the Mean Group (MG) and pooled Mean Group
(PMG) estimators. The FE estimator assumes all slopes to be homogenous, whereas the
latter two estimators do not impose homogeneity on the short-run coe¢ cients. The MG
estimator in addition also treats the long-run coe¢ cients to be heterogeneous. The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) is employed to select the lag length in equation (2.6). The
maximum number of lags is restricted to 3 based on the rule 4*(T=100)2=9 suggested by
Gengenbach, Urbain and Westerlund (2008) with T=53, i.e. the minimum time dimension
of the individual country series when no additional lags are included, to preserve a su¢ cient
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number of degrees of freedom. The AIC suggests a lag order choice of one for the FE
estimator and three for the MG and PMG estimators, so Ld = Le = 1 and Ld = Le = 3.
The estimation results are shown in table 2.1 for both lag lengths13. The Bewley (1979)
transformation is used to obtain the long-run coe¢ cients and their standard errors. This is
a two-step procedure in which the dependent variable (xi;t) is rst regressed on its lagged
level, the contemporaneous levels of the exogenous regressors and the di¤erenced terms.
In a second step, xi;t is regressed on the rst stage tted value, the contemporaneous levels
of the exogenous regressors and the di¤erenced terms. The estimates on the level variables
of this second regression provide the long-run coe¢ cients. In case of the MG estimator,
the estimated individual long-run coe¢ cients are averaged to obtain the long-run MG
coe¢ cients. One can infer from the table that especially the error correction coe¢ cient
and the corresponding long-run slope estimates show noticeable di¤erences between the
considered panel estimators. Examining the validity of their underlying assumptions is
thus important.
We rst apply the cross section dependence test (CD test) of Pesaran (2004) to the
residuals of equation (2.6) to analyse the extent of correlation between the cross section
errors. The CD tests indicate the presence of a substantial amount of cross-sectional
correlation in the residuals in both cases (see bottom lines of table 2.1). This outcome
is of course not surprising given our discussion in section 2 on the role of globalisation
and increased international competition for individual countriesexports. The inclusion
of country-weighted measures of global external demand (y) and changes in the sectoral
composition of advanced economies exports (c) is thus insu¢ cient to account for all
common behaviour of exports.
We therefore opt to use Common Correlated E¤ects (CCE) estimators as these esti-
mators allow us to take account of the inuence of unobserved common factors on the
coe¢ cient estimates by augmenting the model with the cross section averages (CSAs) of
the variables. More specically, the residual term is specied as follows:
13The empirical analysis was carried out in Stata 13, and we employed the user-written Stata routines
xtcd and xtmg written by Markus Eberhardt (Eberhardt, 2012) and xtpmg writtend by Edward Blackburne
and Mark Frank (Blackburne and Frank, 2007). The MG results are based on outlier-robust means (by
employing the robust option of the xtmg command). To enhance the readability of the table, the estimates
for the lagged rst di¤erence terms are not shown. This also holds for table 2.2.
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Ld = Le = 1 Ld = Le = 3
FE PMG MG FE PMG MG
Short-run coe¢ cients
World output y 1.626 1.455 1.833 1.534 1.236 1.673
(0.206) 0.000 (0.304) 0.000 (0.241) 0.000 (0.207) 0.000 (0.341) 0.001 (0.242) 0.000
Real exchange rate e -0.123 -0.149 -0.148 -0.103 -0.083 -0.086
(0.028) 0.000 (0.043) 0.001 (0.056) 0.008 (0.028) 0.000 (0.051) 0.104 (0.061) 0.162
Sectoral composition c -0.096 0.175 -0.106 -0.264 0.205 0.060
(0.272) 0.724 (0.364) 0.631 (0.476) 0.824 (0.272) 0.331 (0.375) 0.584 (0.377) 0.874
Error correction -0.047 -0.103 -0.266 -0.044 -0.102 -0.272
(0.010) 0.000 (0.022) 0.000 (0.039) 0.000 (0.010) 0.000 (0.031) 0.001 (0.050) 0.000
Long-run coe¢ cients
World output y 2.020 1.848 2.124 2.130 1.852 2.135
(0.005) 0.000 (0.045) 0.000 (0.205) 0.000 (0.006) 0.000 (0.040) 0.000 (0.208) 0.000
Real exchange rate e -0.865 -0.521 -0.501 -0.853 -0.580 -0.467
(0.008) 0.000 (0.055) 0.000 (0.127) 0.000 (0.008) 0.000 (0.049) 0.000 (0.207) 0.024
Sectoral composition c 0.545 -0.092 -0.193 0.662 -0.063 0.183
(0.021) 0.000 (0.152) 0.545 (0.599) 0.747 (0.022) 0.000 (0.154) 0.681 (0.615) 0.765
CD statistic: 12.09 9.43 8.54 12.16 7.08 7.05
average correlation: 0.134 0.105 0.096 0.138 0.081 0.080
Number of observations: Total=1260, N=16, min T=52, max T=96, average T=79 for a lag order choice of 1.
and Total=1228, N=16, min T=50, max T=94, average T=77 for a lag order choice of 3.
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-values in italics.
Table 2.1 Estimation results - standard estimators
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i;t = 
0
ift + "i;t (2.7)
where ft captures an unspecied number of unobserved common factors. Together with
the country-specic factor loadings, i; the term 
0
ift allows to control for cross section
dependence and time-variant heterogeneity. The CCE approach augments the model with
the CSAs of both the dependent and independent variables in order to account for these
unobserved factors. In the particular case of our export model, common factors can be
linked to the globalisation of the world economy, increased international competition,
general trends in the importance of country blocks in the world economy and common
cost shocks to the model. In order to compare the results of the di¤erent CCE estimators,
table 2.2 shows the results for both lag orders Ld and Le equal to one and three, based on
the AIC.
Table 2.2 shows that the error terms are substantially less correlated across countries
when the CCE estimators are employed. The CD-test statistics on the residuals after the
inclusion of the CSAs nevertheless remain signicant. The statistics and average pairwise
correlations are however considerably smaller, which leads us to conclude that the possible
bias of the coe¢ cient estimates due to cross-sectional correlated residuals is considerably
reduced in light of weak cross section correlation.
A second consideration concerns the possible heterogeneity of the coe¢ cients across
countries. The pooled estimator (CCEP) is the most e¢ cient estimator of the CCE esti-
mators but will be inconsistent if the slopes actually di¤er between the panel units. The
same holds for the CCE pooled mean group (CCEPMG) estimator if the long-run slope
coe¢ cients actually di¤er between the panel country units. A look on the coe¢ cient esti-
mates in table 2.2 again suggests that the estimates of the error correction term and the
long-run coe¢ cients vary substantially between the estimators. Formal Wald tests can be
applied to examine the homogeneity restrictions imposed by the pooled and (pooled) mean
group estimators. Table 2.3 displays the F-test statistics and the corresponding p-values
for the homogeneity restrictions underlying the di¤erent estimators.
Wald tests on the homogeneity assumption of the CCEP versus the CCEMG estimator,
suggest a rejection of the restrictions at the 1 per cent level. Similarly, the homogene-
ity assumption on the shortrun slope coe¢ cients of the CCEP estimator relative to the
CCEPMG estimator is also rejected. The same holds for the test on the long-run homo-
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Ld = Le = 1 Ld = Le = 3
CCEP CCEPMG CCEMG CCEP CCEPMG CCEMG
Short-run coe¢ cients
World output y 0.838 0.326 0.330 0.926 1.449 0.843
(0.317) 0.008 (0.473) 0.491 (0.406) 0.416 (0.326) 0.005 (0.631) 0.022 (0.488) 0.084
Real exchange rate e -0.173 -0.150 -0.069 -0.175 -0.216 -0.132
(0.030) 0.000 (0.038) 0.000 (0.032) 0.030 (0.033) 0.000 (0.069) 0.002 (0.022) 0.000
Sectoral composition c -0.315 -0.298 -0.050 -0.118 -0.208 0.321
(0.281) 0.263 (0.279) 0.286 (0.362) 0.890 (0.288) 0.681 (0.436) 0.633 (0.572) 0.575
Error correction -0.300 -0.349 -0.540 -0.252 -0.408 -0.701
(0.023) (0.051) (0.060) (0.030) (0.081) (0.093)
Long-run coe¢ cients
World output y 0.974 0.700 1.415 0.974 2.142 1.810
(0.071) 0.000 (0.189) 0.000 (0.537) 0.008 (0.071) 0.000 (0.112) 0.000 (0.465) 0.000
Real exchange rate e -0.767 -0.637 -0.328 -0.767 -0.708 -0.340
(0.019) 0.000 (0.034) 0.000 (0.112) 0.003 (0.019) 0.000 (0.026) 0.000 (0.096) 0.000
Sectoral composition c -0.124 0.011 0.293 -0.124 0.192 0.273
(0.063) 0.047 (0.122) 0.928 (0.435) 0.501 (0.063) 0.047 (0.161) 0.233 (0.499) 0.583
CD statistic: -5.55 -4.48 -4.29 -5.27 -3.05 -2.33
average correlation: -0.060 -0.048 -0.047 -0.058 -0.033 -0.025
Number of observations: Total=1248, N=16, minT=52, maxT=94, average T=78 for a lag order of 1; Total=1228, N=16, minT=50,
maxT=94, average T=77 for a lag order of 3. Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard
errors are in brackets, p-values in italics. Note that the p-values for the error correction term are not listed, given that the t-statistic
is not standard normally distributed due to the approximation of unobserved common factor by the CSAs. The signicance levels
for the CCEMG estimator can instead be based on the simulated critical values provided by Gengenbach et al (2008, see appendix B).
Table 2.2 Estimation results - CCE estimators
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ccep versus ccepmg ccep versus ccemg ccepmg versus ccemg
Ld = Le = 1
statistic: 1.54 2.29 3.60
p-value: 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ld = Le = 3
statistic: 1.30 2.58 2.46
p-value: 0.005 0.000 0.000
Table 2.3 Tests of homogeneity restrictions
geneity restrictions of the CCEPMG estimator versus the CCEMG estimator. Based on
these tests, the CCEMG estimator can be considered to be the preferred estimator.
Phillips and Sul (2003) however show that Wald tests are not reliable in a dynamic
panel setup with cross section dependence. Given the nding of a low extent of cross-
section dependence under the CCE estimators, the results should be interpreted with care.
A Hausman test on the estimated coe¢ cients of the CCEMG and CCEPMG estimators
however also reveals that the obtained long-run panel coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent.
The test statistic is 18.65 with a p-value of 0.000 for a lag order of one and 10.49 with
a p-value of 0.015 for a lag order of three and suggests that the consistent estimator,
CCEMG, is to be preferred over the e¢ cient estimator, CCEPMG. The nding of cross-
country variation in the slope coe¢ cients of the export demand model is furthermore in
line with the evidence for cross-country variation in the literature (e.g. Carlin et al, 2001;
di Mauro et al, 2008).
Given the results of the cross-section dependence and homogeneity tests, we use the
CCEMG estimator for the remainder of our empirical analysis. The CCEMG estimator is
shown to be consistent in a dynamic single equation model (Chudik and Pesaran, 2013)
under the assumptions that the regressors are weakly exogenous, that the time dimension
of the panel is su¢ ciently long and that the number of CSAs corresponds to the number
of unobserved factors. To save degrees of freedom and to avoid over-parametrization, a
general-to-specic method was employed on the CCEMG estimates based on the method
proposed by Hendry (1993). Starting from 3 lags in the dynamics, any insignicant lags
were stepwise excluded. This procedure resulted in a parsimonious specication for the
CCEMG estimator which includes the contemporaneous rst di¤erences of the exogenous
regressors, except for the sectoral variable for which up to two lags of the rst di¤erences
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remain included in the model. This results in the following empirical model specication:
xi;t = i(xi;t 1   [liyi;t 1 + liei;t 1 + lici;t 1 + elifcsal]) +
+
2P
j=0
(siy

i;t + 
s
iei;t + 
s
ijc

i;t j + esij fcsast j) + coni + "i;t (2.8)
where fcsal and fcsas denote the CSAs for the variables in the long-run and short-run
part of ECM.
4 Estimation results
The estimation results of specication (2.8) are shown in table 2.4. Column I shows
the baseline specication, with output, real exchange rate and the sectoral composition
variable appearing in both the long-run and short-run parts of the ECM. Regression II
explores the possibility of di¤erential reactions to the two components of the real exchange
rate. Separating these out reveals a clear di¤erence in the short run -the elasticity with
respect to the nominal exchange rate is 0.05, but the elasticity with respect to unit labour
costs is about six times as large. A formal Wald test rejects (p-value of 0.06) the null that
the two coe¢ cients are equal. This nding supports the theoretical reasoning that one could
expect a larger impact of relative unit labor costs to export prices due to the comovement
of nominal exchange rates and imported inputs and due to their larger persistence relative
to the nominal exchange rate. The point estimates of the two coe¢ cients also show a
notable di¤erence in the long run and the corresponding Wald test rejects their equality
as well, although the p-value is close to the 10% boundary (p-value of 0.09). The unequal
e¤ects of the REER components thus continue to hold in the long run.
The coe¢ cients have the expected signs. An expansion in world GDP by 1% leads
on average to a 0.89% expansion in a countrys exports, while the long-run response is
1.9%. The short-run elasticity of exports with respect to the nominal exchange rate is
not signicant but has a signicant long-run coe¢ cient of -0.21. Similarly, the short-run
elasticity of exports with respect to the relative ULCs is 0.30, rising to 0.42 in the long
run. The values of these coe¢ cients are in line with earlier work.14 The contemporaneous
14E.g. Bayoumi, Harmsen and Turunen (2011) and Chen et al (2013)
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I II III
Estimation sample: 1984Q1-2008Q 1984Q1-2012Q1
Short-run coe¢ cients
World output y 0:519
(0:407) 0.202
0:886
(0:495) 0.073
0:852
(0:520) 0.102
Real exchange rate e -0:098

(0:045) 0.029
- -
Nominal exchange rate s - -0:051
(0:056) 0.361
-0:089
(0:046) 0.054
Unit labour costs u - -0:300

(0:117) 0.011
-0:288
(0:121) 0.017
Sectoral composition c -0:008
(0:416) 0.984
0:419
(0:563) 0.457
0:779
(0:409) 0.057
ct 1 0:669(0:408) 0.101
0:475
(0:459) 0.301
0:179
(0:408) 0.101
ct 2 0:791

(0:197) 0.000
0:665
(0:270) 0.014
0:512
(0:229) 0.025
Error correction -0:571
(0:050)
-0:643
(0:056)
-0:584
(0:067)
Long-run coe¢ cients
World output y 1:695
(0:404) 0.000
1:947
(0:480) 0.000
1:892
(0:521) 0.000
Real exchange rate e -0:366

(0:088) 0.000
- -
Nominal exchange rate s - -0:209

(0:088) 0.017
-0:331
(0:065) 0.000
Unit labour costs u - -0:415

(0:081) 0.000
-0:546
(0:082) 0.000
Sectoral composition c 0:180
(0:318) 0.571
0:144
(0:346) 0.677
0:317
(0:360) 0.378
CD statistic: -4.41 -4.33 -4.30
average correlation: -0.047 -0.046 -0.042
Number of observations for respectively columns I and II and column III: Total=1276, N=16, min T=53,
max T=97, average T=80 and Total=1516, N=16, min T=68, max T=112, average T=95. Note: ,,
denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-values in italics.
Note that the p-values for the error correction term are not listed, given that the t-statistic is not standard
normally distributed due to the approximation of unobserved common factor by the CSAs (see appendix).
Table 2.4 Estimation results - benchmark model (2.8)
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sectoral composition variable is not signicant although the lagged rst di¤erences have a
signicant positive e¤ect on exports. The error correction term is strongly signicant, with
a value of -0.64, implying that any disequilibrium is corrected over less than two quarters.
The results for the sample including the GTC (1984Q1-2012Q1) are further displayed in
column III. Comparing the second and third column, it is clear that the estimates for the
pre-GTC and entire period are fairly similar.
Given the results of the Wald tests on the REER components, our preferred speci-
cation allows for di¤erent e¤ects of the components both in the short run and the long
run. The model estimates in column II are by consequence used to construct the dynamic
forecasts in the next section.
5 Conditional forecasts
We use the model to conduct a dynamic forecast exercise in order to better understand
export performance since the GTC.15 Based on the CCEMG estimates of our preferred
model, we examine how the forecasts compare to actual export outturns to infer whether
the countriesexports are in line with the model predictions if one considers the expected
average e¤ect of the traditional demand and competitiveness determinants. The sam-
ple under analysis is the pre-GTC period (1984Q1 to 2008Q2), with the forecast period
beginning at the turning point in global trade (2008Q3).
First, we focus on a country-average export forecast to analyse whether the models
predictions are in line with actual observations during and following the GTC. In the rst
instance, we construct an out-of-sample forecast conditional on the actual paths of the
external demand, competitiveness and sectoral variables. Afterwards, the forecasts are
conditional on the realised values of the macroeconomic determinants of exports as well
as on the observed values of the CSAs. This forecast thus includes both the exogenous
shocks to external demand, sectoral composition and real exchange rates, as well as the
additional information about common unobserved shocks which is embodied in the CSAs.
Next, we examine the individual forecasts to evaluate the performance of each country
relative to its peers. The country-specic forecasts represent a benchmark for what country
exports "should have been" based on the obtained CCEMG coe¢ cient estimates and given
15As with any dynamic forecast, we forecast the change in each quarter and then compute a levels
forecast by cumulating these forecast in changes over time.
56
-Chapter 2-
the evolution of the country-specic exogenous variables and the CSAs. The forecast
for example allows to capture the general performance of other countries because each
countrys forecast utilises information about the cross section averages of all countries.
By using average coe¢ cient estimates, we obtain a uniform benchmark to compare each
countrys relative export performance. Our measure of performance is dened as the gap
between actual and forecast exports, expressed as a percentage of forecast exports. A
positive value indicates that a country has outperformed the forecast based on the average
coe¢ cients, a negative value indicates underperformance.
5.1 Aggregate trade
To understand what the forecasts imply for the path of the advanced economy exports as
a whole, we combined the individual country data and forecasts into weighted averages
based on each countries average share of exports between 2008Q1 and 2011Q416. Figure
2.2 shows the proles of these variables. The dashed line represents actual exports and the
solid lines the out-of-sample forecasts. The dotted lines depict the in-sample performance
of the model. The solid line with the squared markers shows the aggregate forecast when
the inuence of the CSAs is not taken into account. To remove the inuence of the CSA
terms during the forecast period, the CSAs of the level variables are kept at their value
of 2008Q2 and the CSAs of the di¤erences are set to zero since 2008Q3. The second solid
line depicts the aggregate forecast that in addition takes into account the observed values
of the CSAs.
From gure 2.2, we can infer that the model approximates average exports since the
start of the GTC quite well. At the time of the GTC itself, actual exports fell faster
and farther than what the model would have predicted out of sample when ignoring the
inuence of the CSAs and explains only about half of the fall in exports between the
peak in 2008Q2 and the through in 2009Q2. The out-of-sample forecast conditional on
the CSAs however almost fully captures that fall from peak to through. This di¤erence
is an indication that global factors, represented by the combined e¤ect of all the included
variables their CSAs and not captured by the models country-specic export determi-
nants, were a key driver of the GTC. Since the through, both out-of sample forecasts
evolve closer to each other. The out-of-sample forecasts on average show a level di¤erence
16These shares were calculated on the basis of the nominal US dollar value of exports for each country
and reect the share of country i in the total exports of all 16 countries.
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of about 1 and 0.5 % to actual exports since 2010Q1, respectively when conditioning on
both the country-specic variables and the CSAs and when not including the CSAs. The
in-sample forecast based on the CCEMG coe¢ cients (red dotted lines) overpredicts the
fall in exports between 2008Q2 and 2009Q2 by 18% and reaches an average di¤erence
of about 3.5% to actual exports since 2010Q1 as it starts to diverge from actual exports
from 2011 onwards. When the individual-specic coe¢ cients (CCEMGi, blue dotted line)
are used, the in-sample forecast explains 97% of the fall from peak to through and ap-
proaches actual export dynamics after the GTC to a larger extent. This suggests that the
largest part of the deviation from the in-sample forecast based on the average coe¢ cients
to actual exports can be explained by the use of the average instead of individual-specic
coe¢ cients.
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Figure 2.2 Actual weighted average of exports versus forecast
To gain more insight in the models dynamics, we computed a decomposition of the
prole of the out-of-sample forecast that conditions on the CSAs, shown in gure 2.3. The
decomposition clearly shows that the combined e¤ect of the CSAs is the driving factor
that brings the forecast down. Since the through in actual exports, the e¤ects of changes
in country-specic external demand (shown by the yellow bars) start to push down the
forecast while the e¤ects of the CSAs become less dominant. There is a small boost from
competitiveness after 2009Q4 (the grey bars) but sectoral shifts continue to have small
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downward e¤ect (pattern bars).
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Figure 2.3 Forecast decomposition (weighted average)
Taken together, this suggests that the explained fall in exports during the GTC can be
mainly attributed to the evolution of the common factors outside the scope of models at
the individual country level. Given that the aggregate out-of-sample forecast conditioning
on the observed CSAs captures the evolution of average actual exports since the GTC to a
large extent, the individual country forecasts based on the CCEMG coe¢ cients can o¤er
a relevant benchmark to evaluate individual export performances since the GTC.
5.2 Evaluating individual countries performance
The forecast proles for each country conditional on the observed country-specic vari-
ables and the CSAs, together with the actual outturn are shown in gure 5.2. This
gure clearly indicates that the level of actual exports relative to the forecasted exports
varies substantially across the countries in our panel. Based on the CCEMG coe¢ cients,
some countries (e.g. Germany and Netherlands ) show better export outcomes than their
benchmark whereas other countries exports are below the benchmark (e.g. Japan and
Canada). For other countries (e.g. Portugal and Italy) actual exports seem to be well ap-
proximated by the forecast. So, given the CSAs and the country-specic evolutions in the
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traditional demand and competitiveness determinants, the advanced economy countries
export performance since the GTC relative to their benchmark di¤ers to a considerable
degree.
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Figure 2.4 Actual exports versus forecasts for individual countries
The measures of relative performance are shown below in gures 2.5 and 2.6, for
respectively 2009Q2 and 2011Q4. We compare actual versus forecast exports at these two
points in time to evaluate the export performance in the immediate aftermath of the
GTC in 2009Q2 and next in 2011Q4, to gauge the longer-run e¤ects of the GTC on trade
dynamics. As already discussed above, the level of exports is on average close to the
models prediction in both periods.
This average however reveals considerable variation across countries. On this metric,
the strongest performers are Austria, the Netherlands and Germany with exports well
above 10% more than the model would have predicted in both quarters. Actual exports of
the European countries are in general better relative to the forecast benchmark, although
France also underperforms relative to its forecast in both quarters. Actual exports of
individual countries thus relate to a di¤erent extent to what can be expected based on
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Figure 2.5 Actual exports versus benchmark, 2009Q2
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Figure 2.6 Actual exports versus benchmark, 2011Q4
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the panels average coe¢ cients of the traditional external demand and competitiveness
variables. Conditional on the average coe¢ cients estimates, the United Kingdom (UK)
has underperformed by around 10% in 2009Q2 and by 8% in 2011Q4. Whilst the UKs
cumulative growth in exports from 2008Q1 to 2011Q4 is close to the cross-country median,
the large depreciation in sterling (and accompanying fall in the ULC based real exchange
rate) failed to boost exports by as much as the model would have predicted.
6 Conclusions
We analyse what has happened to advanced economies exports since the global Great
Trade Collapse witnessed during 2009Q2 and 2008Q3. To this end, we estimate a dynamic
panel model of goods exports for 16 advanced economies that includes the traditional ex-
port determinants, being foreign demand and competitiveness. We incorporate a measure
of the sectoral composition of trade as an additional determinant of the demand for ex-
ports and we allow for a di¤erent e¤ect of nominal exchange rates and relative costs on
exports. In addition, by using the Common Correlated E¤ects estimator of Pesaran (2006)
we control for unobserved common factors such as common globalisation dynamics and
evolutions in the degree of international competition. We nd that the two components of
the real e¤ective exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate and relative unit labour costs,
have a signicant di¤erent e¤ect on exports. The sectoral composition variable has only a
small inuence on export dynamics which is conned to a lagged e¤ect in the short run.
We use the model to construct a forecast benchmark to evaluate countries export
performance based on the average panel estimates of the model prior to the Great Trade
Collapse. First, we consider how the pre-crisis model fared in predicting the overall path
of advanced economy exports. We nd that the model can only explain around half of the
fall in exports during the Great Trade Collapse based on country-specic evolutions in
the variables but subsequently approximates actual exports. If the common unobserved
factors, proxied by the cross section averages of all variables, are taken into account, the
evolutions of exports are well tted over the entire forecast period. This nding suggests
that common factors played a major role during the Great Trade Collapse.
Given this good average forecast performance, we evaluate individual countriesexport
performance against their peers by constructing a forecast conditioning on both the path
of the country-specic variables and common unobserved factors. We nd substantial
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variation across countries in terms of their actual exports relative to the forecasts based
on the average panel coe¢ cients. For the United Kingdom in particular, exports in 2011Q4
came in about 8 per cent below the benchmark suggested by international comparisons.
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Appendices
A. Data sources and construction of variables
Real Exports: chain volume index of exports in national currencies, seasonally adjusted
(OECD Quarterly National accounts). UK export data are corrected for MTIC
fraude.
Trading partnersGDP: real GDP volume, seasonally adjusted, ( Datastream, ??GDP...D
code, except for Spain [code ESGDP..VE], Brazil [code BRGDP...G], Poland [code
POSMGDPC], Estonia [code EOGDPPIPDF], China [IMF World Economic Out-
look data], Malta [Eurostat data],the CensusX12 procedure is applied if the series
are not yet seasonally adjusted)
-> sample of countries for construction trade-weighted global GDP: 76 countries
[ UK, Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Cyprus, Malta, United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore, South Korea, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Turkey, Jor-
dan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Israel, Kenya, Namibia, Uganda, Venezuela, Egypt,
Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Paraguay, Mozambique, Sri Lanka ]
Bilateral export ows, for di¤erent sectors: goods exports for 63 sectors, current
US dollar (OECD International Trade by Commodity Statistics database, Standard
International Trade Classication (SITC) Revision 2)
-> sample of countries for advanced economies group: 34 OECD countries
[ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States ]
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country time span number country time span number
Australia 1989q2 2012q1 92 Netherlands 1989q2 2012q1 92
Austria 1989q2 2012q1 92 New Zealand 1990q2 2012q1 88
Canada 1984q2 2012q1 112 Portugal 1996q2 2012q1 64
Denmark 1992q2 2012q1 80 Spain 2001q2 2012q1 44
Finland 1991q2 2012q1 84 Sweden 1994q2 2012q1 72
France 1984q2 2012q1 112 Switzerland 1984q2 2012q1 112
Germany 1984q2 2012q1 112 UK 1984q2 2012q1 112
Italy 1992q2 2012q1 80 US 1984q2 2012q1 112
Japan 1995q2 2012q1 68
Table 2.5 Overview number of observations per country
-> 63 sectors: 69 available sectors - sector 35, 91, 93, 95, 96 and 97 due to data
quality (large amount of missing observations)
-> annual data: 1980-2012, interpolated to quarterly data
E¤ective exchange rates: nominal and real ULC-based e¤ective exchange rate in-
dices, double-weighted to capture import and export competition in third markets
(IMF, International Financial Statistics). For more details on the methodology, see
Bayoumi, Lee and Jayanthi (2005).
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Lag order x y e c
0 0.21 0.68 0.09 0.05
1 0.20 0.64 0.10 0.12
2 0.20 0.64 0.09 0.12
3 0.20 0.64 0.09 0.13
4 0.21 0.64 0.09 0.14
Table 2.6 Average cross-sectional correlation of residuals ADF tests
B.Time series properties
We apply the cross section dependence test of Pesaran (2004) to the residuals of individual
augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) tests.17 The results signify substantial cross section resid-
ual correlation between the country-specic series (see table 2.6), which calls for the use of
second generation panel unit root tests which take into account cross-sectional dependence
and provide critical values at the panel level which are simulated such that they are valid
under dependence of the individual series.
Given the unbalanced nature of our dataset, we opt for the cross-sectionally aug-
mented IPS (CIPSM) test of Pesaran, Smith and Yamagata (2013).18 The extent of
cross-sectional dependence of the residuals from the individual cross section augmented
ADF tests (CADF) based on this approach, is substantially reduced for all variables (table
2.7, bottom part). The CIPSM tests further indicate that the variables x, y, e and c can
considered to be nonstationary, although the test results on the y and e variables depend
on the imposed lag order.
To nd out whether equation (2.8) constitutes a meaningful long-run relation, we ap-
ply the panel error correction test of Gengenbach, Urbain and Westerlund (2008). This
approach tests the signicance of the error correction term within a conditional ECM
framework that allows for possible nonstationary common factors. If the error correction
term is found to be signicant, this implies the existence of a long-run equilibrium re-
lationship. Two panel tests of the null hypothesis of no error correction that the error
17A constant and trend are included for x, y, a constant only for c and e, both in the ADF and CIPSM
tests
18The cross-sectional averages of the other variables in (2.1) are added as additional common factors for
the CIPSM tests on x, y, e and c.
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cipsm
average test statistics
Lag order x y e c
0 -4.18 -2.66 -2.25 -0.85
1 -3.63 -2.41 -2.83 -2.30
2 -3.25 -2.45 -2.90 -2.15
3 -2.97 -2.31 -3.03 -2.21
4 -2.63 -2.29 -2.94 -2.31
average residual cross section dependence
0 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.02
1 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.04
2 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.04
3 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04
4 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04
Note: , ,  denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 2.7 Average cross-sectional correlation of residuals CIPSM tests
correction term for every i are provided, given by the (truncated) average of individual
t-tests and Wald tests. Based on the results of the unit root tests, we test the following
reparametrized conditional ECM-specication:
xit = i(xi;t 1 [1;iyi;t 1+2;iei;t 1+3;ici;t 1])+
LP
j=1
4;ijxi;t j+
LP
j=0
(5;ijy

i;t j+6;ijei;t j+7;ijc

i;t j)+
LP
j=0
~ ijC^At j+it (2.9)
wheregCA stands for the cross section averages which are used as proxies for unobserved
common factors. The t-test directly tests whether i is signicantly di¤erent from zero
whereas the Wald tests test whether i and the coe¢ cients on the lagged levels of the
exogenous regressors are jointly equal to zero. The panel testsnull hypotheses are both
rejected at the 5% signicance level for a lag order choice of 4, respectively with a statistic
of -3.88 and 34.96 where the critical values at the 1% signicance level and for N=20 are
respectively-3.53 and 20.36. Also for a lag order choice of 3, both tests reject the nulll with
statistics of respectively -4.12 and 34.62.19 The individual t-tests and Wald tests cannot
19The lag order L is determined based on the Aikaike Information Criterion, where the maximum number
of lags is set equal to 4*(T/100)2=9 as suggested in Gengenbach et al (2008). This resulted in a maximum
of 4 lags and a lag order choice of 4 for average and maximum T and in a maximum of 3 lags and a lag
order choice of 3 for the minimum T.
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reject the null for respectively 9 and 6 of the 16 countries for both lag order choices. The
panel test thus displays evidence of error correction, whereas the individual tests cannot
reject the null for an important subset of countries. Taking into account that the power
of the tests are greatly improved by pooling (Gengenbach et al, 2008), we conclude that
including the level information in our variables next to their di¤erences is appropriate.
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CHAPTER 3
Ination during times of economic slack and deleveraging:
a panel data analysis.
Selien De Schryder
Ghent University
Abstract
Historically, persistent and pronounced economic downturns gave rise to notable falls in the
level of ination but these falls are not observed in the aftermath of the global nancial
crisis of 2008-2009. This paper analyzes ination dynamics in a cross-country Phillips
curve framework while considering credit evolutions and periods of nancial stress and
documents a attening of the Phillips curve during economic slack.
JEL classication: E31, E32, E51
Keywords: Phillips curve, bank credit, nancial crisis, cross-country panel
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1 Introduction
Most advanced economies are today recovering from a pronounced economic downturn
following the global nancial crisis of 2008-2009. These downturns were particularly large
in historical terms but were also special in the sense that they occurred in association
with a synchronized nancial crisis. In addition, the immediate aftermath of the nancial
crisis has been marked to contain a "missing disination puzzle" since advanced economies
ination rates after the nancial crisis have declined less than what one would expect based
on standard Phillips curve coe¢ cients given the large and often very persistent activity
gaps.1 Commonly heard explanations to rationalize the missing disination puzzle within
the standard framework are incorrect output gap measures, a better anchoring of ination
expectations, the low level of ination and increased globalization. An alternative avenue
is to refer to unobservable shocks to the markup pricing behavior of rms. But also
nonlinearities and asymmetries in the Phillips curve relationship could account for the
muted reaction of ination.
The association of the downturns with a nancial crisis however prompts one to ques-
tion whether nancial distortions have inuenced the subsequent ination dynamics be-
yond their impact via real output. A nancial crisis typically involves impaired bank
balance sheets and a reduced intermediation role of banks. Consistent with standard
credit channels, deationary pressures are expected to arise following restrained credit
conditions. But next to the indirect e¤ect of credit on ination via GDP, credit rationing
could also alter the price-setting behavior of rms and, in turn, ination directly as rms
can be forced to look for alternative and possibly more expensive funding sources. Gilchrist
et al (2014) show in a calibration of a general equilibrium model that aggregate ination
dynamics are indeed directly inuenced by changes in nancial conditions when nancial
frictions are allowed to enter the model. These authors nd that especially under severe
nancial distortions, rms put o¤ investments in their market share via a lowering of the
price in response to changes in their cash ow or nancing conditions.2 The change in
the price-setting behavior may then counteract deationary pressures driven by increased
spare capacity, especially during periods of nancial stress. Accordingly, the relation be-
1Ball and Mazumder (2011) for example show this for the United States.
2This model implication is consistent with the empirical ndings in Gilchrist et al (2014) on price-
setting behavior of large publicly-traded US rms based on income, balance sheet and product-level price
data during 2005 and 2012.
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tween ination and economic activity might be a¤ected by the association with nancial
frictions and this can inuence the Phillips curve estimates.
This paper relates to the recent literature on the relationship between credit and busi-
ness cycles, which received a vast amount of attention in light of the Great Recession.
Previous ndings3 point out that the typical shape of a business cycle that is charac-
terized by a nancial and/or debt crisis di¤ers from the shape of a standard business
cycle. The run-up in debt during the expansion phase is typically higher, the recession
deeper and longer, while the recovery tends to be more sluggish than for a normal cycle
due to weak private demand and credit conditions. Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus (2011)
furthermore show that recoveries without a pick up in credit are more likely after more
severe recessions while their incidence even doubles after nancial crises. These creditless
recoveries moreover occur at a slower pace than recoveries associated with credit growth
(Bijsterbosch and Dahlhaus, 2010; Abiad, DellAriccia and Li, 2011) although Bech, Gam-
bacorta and Kharroubi (2012) and Takáts and Upper (2013) nd that deleveraging is not
always detrimental for the subsequent recovery. This is particularly the case if the run-up
to a nancial crisis is characterized by a high growth in credit, which can reveal a credit
boom. To the extent that the accumulation of debt during a credit boom leads to excessive
debt levels or a low quality of debt, deleveraging of the private sector may be neutral or
even supportive for the subsequent recovery. One can thus conclude that the source of
the recession and the subsequent credit conditions matter for the course of real GDP. It is
however not obvious whether credit evolutions also directly inuence ination dynamics
and the Phillips curve relationship.
The focus in this paper is therefore twofold: rst, we analyze whether the reaction of
ination to economic activity di¤ers depending on the sign, magnitude and persistence
of the deviation from potential activity. This analysis is warranted given the substantial
evidence of nonlinearities and asymmetries in the Phillips curve depending on the level
of economic activity documented in the existing literature4 and their potential to account
for the missing disination puzzle.
Second, we examine whether the reaction of ination to economic activity is in addition
a¤ected by the credit cycle. We particularly concentrate on credit cycle downturns and
3Terrones, Scott and Kannan (2009), Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2012), Leigh et al (2012)
4E.g. Laxton, Meredith and Rose (1995); Turner (1995); Barnes and Olivei (2003); Stock and Watson
(2010).
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upturns next to the occurrence of banking crises. As such, we try to answer the question
whether the large extent of economic slack can explain the relatively mild disination
during and in the aftermath of the global nancial crisis and whether the association with
a nancial crisis and related credit evolutions attenuated the ination reaction.
In addition, we shed light on the possibility of a speed limit e¤ect during periods
of spare capacity driven by a bounce-back in output. The occurrence of a high-growth
recovery after a deep recession, the so-called bounce-back e¤ect, has been documented
by, amongst others, Beaudry and Koop (1993), Sichel (1994) and Piger, Morley and Kim
(2005). The bounce-back occurs when there is no new production capacity needed to meet
recovering demand in presence of unused capacity. A quick pick up in aggregate demand
could however trigger speed limit e¤ects (Turner, 1995; Dwyer, Lam and Gurney, 2010)
that give rise to inationary pressures because resources cannot be reactivated immedi-
ately. Speed limit e¤ects could be more pronounced during periods of large and persistent
spare capacity due to a larger extent of obsolete and inadequate production capacity. A
bounce-back in GDP might thus result in a milder ination reaction during economic slack
episodes. Information on the existence of speed limit e¤ects and their possible nonlinear
nature is especially relevant to infer ination dynamics when aggregate demand recovers,
which is the situation currently faced by most advanced economies.
We analyze ination dynamics in a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve framework
for a panel of 15 OECD countries. Financial crises are rare events and persistently large
negative deviations of output from its potential level do not occur that often either. This
presents a challenge for the empirical analysis of the e¤ect of economic activity on ination
during these episodes. A cross-country perspective o¤ers a way to obtain a su¢ cient
number of observations on large negative output gaps, nancial crises, credit downturns
and their combinations.
We nd activity gaps to be signicant drivers of ination and obtain evidence for
an asymmetric ination reaction. Ination reacts considerably more to economic activity
when production capacity falls short of demand relative to when capacity is below potential
and in the latter scenario, there is no signicant ination reaction. The estimation results
further suggest that there is no additional e¤ect of the credit cycle on the slope of the hybrid
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Similarly, we cannot establish that the Phillips curve slope
is a¤ected during recessions and recoveries associated with periods of nancial distress.
Our ndings imply that the occurrence of economic slack, as experienced nowadays by
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many advanced economies, would result in a relatively limited reaction of ination to
output. Credit evolutions do not inuence ination dynamics over and above their indirect
e¤ect on aggregate output. A lower downward pull on ination during these economic slack
periods is thus expected, but credit evolutions do not seem to directly a¤ect the ination
response to economic activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 outlines the employed
Phillips curve model and briey reviews the possible drivers of nonlinearities and asym-
metries in the Phillips curve. Section 3 describes how we dene business and credit cycles
and their mutual relations while section 4 explains the empirical strategy and presents the
estimation results. Section 5 o¤ers some robustness checks and section 6 concludes.
2 Examining ination dynamics through the lens of the
Phillips curve relationship
2.1 Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve
We focus on the estimation of a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve (HNKPC) as the
Phillips curve allows us to examine the e¤ect of the level of economic activity on ination
next to ination expectations while controlling for other short-term pressures. The struc-
tural formulation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) implies that ination is
purely forward looking as price formation depends on the expected evolution of demand
and supply factors. We instead employ a hybrid form of the Phillips curve to control for
the observed persistence in realized ination, in which case the model is augmented with
lagged ination terms that capture inertia in the formation of ination expectations. We
assume a proportional relation between rmsmarginal costs and economic activity, such
that the employed specication of the Phillips curve is expressed in terms of economic
activity instead of (unobserved) real marginal costs.
A general representation of the HNKPC is given by the following specication:
i;t = i + gapi;t + Et[i;t+ ] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t (3.1)
Where  represents the ination measure5, gap the level of spare capacity, E[t+ ]
5Denoting the price index by pt, ination is dened as t=100*((pt / pt 1) 1).
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ination expectations, and ext external supply shock variables. i denotes the country
xed e¤ects and the subscripts i and t denote countries and time periods. The disturbance
term "i;t represents measurement errors and any other combination of unobserved shocks.
2.2 Possible originators of asymmetries and nonlinearities
Level of economic activity To analyze whether the combination of large economic
slack and credit evolutions induced by a nancial crisis entails an atypical reaction of in-
ation to economic activity, we rst focus on specic segments of the Phillips curve. The
reaction of ination to economic activity has been found to be asymmetric and nonlinear.
Laxton et al (1995) and Turner (1995) document that high levels of economic activity
increase ination more than that low levels of activity reduce it. Barnes and Olivei (2003)
and Stock and Watson (2010) on the other hand nd the Phillips curve to be essentially
at during normal times with relatively small activity gaps whereas the curve steepens in
periods of large gaps. A more muted ination reaction since 2008-2009 is in line with the
rst nding of asymmetric behavior whereas the second seems to conrm the missing disin-
ation hypothesis as economies were confronted with large negative output gaps, in which
case you would expect a larger reaction of ination. Asymmetric nonlinearities however
o¤er a possible explanation that merges both ndings in the sense that the nonlinearities
could mainly manifest themselves during expansions.
Credit evolutions We next consider the evolution of credit to the private sector as a
possible explanation for a attening Phillips curve. The reaction of ination to economic
activity might be altered due to changes in the rmsprice-setting behavior driven by
external nancing conditions, especially in times of nancial distress (Gilchrist et al, 2014).
Gilchrist et al (2014) posit that changes in nancial conditions can directly a¤ect ination
dynamics in presence of nancial frictions. To incorporate these frictions, the authors
depart from the standard assumption of frictionless nancial markets and base their model
on the theory of customer markets (Bils, 1989). Under the theory of customer markets,
rms actively set prices as an investment tool to build their future customer base. As
such, a rm has the incentive to lower prices today to increase its market share in the
(near) future. However, when external nance is costly or the rms cash ow is low,
rms might decide to reduce the extent of investment in the customer base via price
reductions and increase their price. This mechanism is therefore capable to alter the
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reaction of aggregate price dynamics to contractionary demand side shocks during periods
of nancial distortions. When aggregate nancing conditions worsen, the aggregate price
level will be pushed upwards which counteracts deationary pressures.
In the rst instance, we focus on the inuence of downturns and upturns in the credit
cycle on the HNKPC estimates. Downturns in the credit cycle are not necessarily corre-
sponding to periods of severe nancial distortions but can nevertheless pick up periods of
more stringent funding conditions that inuence macroeconomic outcomes. An important
caveat in this respect is that country-specic aggregate credit data do not allow us to dis-
tinguish between the part of private sector deleveraging that is due to supply constraints
and the part that reects a lower demand for credit triggered by contractions in economic
activity. We therefore analyze the e¤ects of the credit cycle on ination dynamics while
controlling for the business cycle and the level of capacity utilization.
As a second test of the inuence of restrictive credit conditions on the Phillips curve
slope, we elaborate upon the reaction of ination during recessions and recoveries that
occur in correspondence with times of outright nancial stress. We employ banking crises
datings as a key indicator of severe nancial turmoil and restrained credit supply. Banking
crisis start dates allow us to investigate the repercussions of a full-blown nancial crisis,
as during 2008-2009, on the estimation of the Phillips curve relationship in the subsequent
quarters. Given that the end dates of the crisis dating are to some extent subjective
in nature and are therefore prone to discussion, we also examine credit boom periods
as an alternative indicator of pronounced nancial stress. Schularick and Taylor (2012)
namely underline that the fragility of a nancial system is related to credit evolutions.
The authors show that the risk of a nancial crisis during a certain period is signicantly
increased when a credit boom occurs over the previous ve years. Credit booms preceding
a recession and subsequent recovery may therefore also signal the emergence of episodes
of elevated nancial stress throughout the credit bust. By focusing on the association of
the business cycle phases with periods of nancial stress, we in addition examine whether
the Phillips curve slope is particularly sensitive to nancial stress depending on the phase
of the business cycle.
In conclusion, ination could react di¤erently to economic activity depending on the
sign, the level and the persistence of the activity gap. The ination reaction might further
be directly a¤ected by nancial distortions.
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2.3 Speed limit e¤ects
We further quantify the importance of speed limit e¤ects, as these e¤ects might change
ination dynamics for a given level of the output gap. We specically focus on a pick
up in aggregate demand measured by positive changes in the output gap when the gap is
negative, i.e. on periods when the output gap "closes". We verify whether the speed limit
e¤ects are inuenced by the severity and persistence of the negative deviation of output
from its potential level.
3 Business and credit cycle denitions and banking crises
dating
Before we turn to the estimation results of the HNKPC, this section briey describes
the denitions which were used to construct the di¤erent phases of economic activity, the
credit cycle and banking crisis episodes. A more elaborate description of the employed
denitions is given in appendix C.
Persistent economic slacks/booms We consider economic slack periods to be
large when the negative output gap is larger than a threshold value of 1.5% and we
quantify them to be persistent if this lasts for at least 8 quarters, based on Meier (2010)6.
Economic boom periods are similarly dened based on positive deviations of output from
potential. Persistent economic boom periods thus capture periods of at least 8 consecutive
quarters with an output gap above 1.5%.
Business cycle phases We dene business cycle expansions and recessions based on
a threshold on the cyclical component of output similar to the method applied in the work
of, amongst others, Sugawara and Zalduendo (2013). Expansions run from trough to peak
(excluding the trough) and recessions run from peak to trough (excluding the peak). The
threshold value that is used to identify business cycle troughs equals minus the standard
deviation of the output gap. A peak is next determined based on the largest value of
6The 1.5% threshold is also in line with the estimated threshold values for the unemployment gap in
Barnes and Olivei (2003) for the US. These are respectively -1.34 and 1.40 for the core CPI ination
measure and a time-varying natural rate of unemployment.
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the output gap between 2 subsequent troughs. The rst 8 quarters of the expansions are
dened as recoveries.
Banking crises, bank credit cycle and bank credit booms We follow the dating
of banking crises in Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2011) and Laeven and Valencia
(2013) to infer the start dates of banking crises. To date credit cycles, we employ the
classical methodology used in Claessens et al (2012) on the real credit per capita data.
This classical approach is based on the algorithm put forward by Harding and Pagan (2002)
and allows us to quantify upturns and downturns in credit based on absolute declines and
increases in real credit per capita. The algorithm considers the value yt to be a peak if
(yt   yt 2) > 0; (yt   yt 1) > 0; (yt+2   yt) < 0 and (yt+1   yt) < 0; while a trough occurs
at time t if (yt   yt 2) < 0; (yt   yt 1) < 0; (yt+2   yt) > 0 and (yt+1   yt) > 0:
We also apply thresholds on the bank credit data to identify credit boom periods.7
Credit booms are dened as consecutive dates for which the cyclical component of the
Hodrick-Prescott ltered log of real credit per capita is equal or larger than 1.5 times
its standard deviation. The peak of a credit boom is subsequently dened as the quarter
from the set of consecutive quarters that satisfy the credit boom condition with the largest
di¤erence between the cyclical component and the threshold standard deviation. Given
the peak, the start and end date of the boom are the quarters before and after the peak
with the minimum di¤erence between the cyclical component and its standard deviation.
It should be noted that we limit our attention to bank credit data, obtained from the
BIS bank credit database8. A credit boom driven by non-bank nancial intermediaries
would consequently not be captured in the data that we use. Limited data availability and
comparability hamper a cross-country analysis of alternative funding sources and with the
exception of the United States( US), bank credit accounts for the dominant share of total
credit to the private sector. The BIS database is nevertheless particularly attractive as it
o¤ers a measure of total bank credit provided by both domestic and foreign banks, which
is an important advantage compared to data on credit from domestic banks only given
the increased importance of foreign banks in domestic markets.
7Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001), introduced threshold methods to dene credit boom
periods, followed by several recent studies, e.g. Mendoza and Terrones (2008), Abiad et al (2011), Bakker
et al (2012).
8We use the BIS series on total credit to the private non-nancial sector at quarterly frequency (see
appendix for details).
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Restrictive credit conditions under di¤erent business cycle phases Banking
crises are assumed to be associated with recessions if the crisis occurs during the 8 quarters
before the start of the recession or during the recession itself.9 In the same vein, we consider
recession episodes that are preceded by a credit boom during the 8 quarters preceding the
recession to indicate periods of elevated nancial stress. Economic recoveries are deemed
to be associated with a banking crisis or to be preceded by a credit boom if these episodes
occur within the 12 quarters preceding the expansion. We further dene recoveries to be
creditless following Sugawara and Zalduendo (2013) if the average growth rate of real bank
credit per capita during the recovery is below or equal to zero.
Results identication methods Using these methodologies on the underlying data
series since 1960Q1, we identify 45 recessions periods and 40 expansions in our sample of
15 countries since 1990 of which respectively 28 and 33 are complete business cycle phases.
We further identify 41 credit downturns and 44 credit upturns (of which 33 and 27 are
completed), 14 credit booms and 18 creditless recoveries. The precise identication of the
business and credit cycle phases inevitably demands some judgement. We therefore apply
an alternative business cycle denition in the robustness section in addition to already
considering di¤erent credit evolution indicators.
By way of illustration, gures 3.1 and 3.2 outline the results of the identication
methodologies for the US and Italy. The bars depict the values of the output gap and
make the distinction between recessions and expansions. The shaded background areas
denote credit cycle downturns. Periods of persistent and large economic slack are also
highlighted (dotted bars) next to creditless recoveries (bold horizontal striped bars). Both
gures illustrate that the number of persistent and large economic slack periods and the
number of severe recessions associated with a banking crisis or preceding credit boom is
rather small for individual countries.
Table 3.1 displays the details on the precise dates of these large and persistent slack
periods for the entire sample of countries, the interaction with the dened business and
credit cycles, and their association with a periods of restrictive credit conditions. Over
the 15 countries, we identify 24 periods of large and persistent output gaps where only
South Korea did not experience such episode. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that 20 of the
9This denition is based on Bech, Gambacorta and Kharroubi (2012).
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Figure 3.1 Evolution output gap US and dened business and credit cycle episodes
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1990q1 1992q1 1994q1 1996q1 1998q1 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1
recession expansion persistent economic slack creditless recovery
Onset banking crisis: 1990Q2 and 2007Q3 credit boom: 2007Q2-2009Q2 
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
1990q1 1992q1 1994q1 1996q1 1998q1 2000q1 2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1
recession expansion persistent economic slack creditless recovery
Onset banking crisis: 1992Q3 and 2008 credit booms: 1991Q3-1992Q4, 2007Q3-2008Q4 
Figure 3.2 Evolution output gap Italy and dened business and credit cycle episodes
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24 persistent economic slack periods are associated with a credit cycle downturn10, either
during the recession or expansion part of these persistent slack periods or during both.
The next columns o¤er some more information on the association of the business cycles
phases with periods of restrictive credit conditions during the persistent economic slack
periods.
17 of the persistent economic slack periods are associated with a banking crisis, again
during the recession or expansion part of the persistent slack periods or during both. 7
of the persistent economic slack periods are preceded by a completed credit boom and 14
recoveries during these persistent economic slack periods are dened to be creditless. From
this table, one can conclude that a large amount of persistent economic slack periods are
also identied as periods of elevated nancial stress. This nding highlights the importance
of analyzing whether ination dynamics are a¤ected by nancial stress over and above the
inuence through aggregate output.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Linear Phillips curve representation
We consider the following linear specication of the HNKPC in the remainder of this work:
i;t = i+gapi;t+
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j+Et[i;t+4]+
lP
j=1
ji;t j+
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j+"i;t (3.2)
Where E[t+4] denotes one-year-ahead ination expectations and gap the rst dif-
ference of the gap variable. gap enters equation (3.2) to measure speed limit e¤ects, i.e.
the e¤ects of lagged changes in economic activity on ination for a given level of economic
activity.
We opt for core ination as the ination measure to capture general price develop-
ments while abstracting from temporary uctuations. The model can of course be easily
extended to headline ination. Economic activity is measured by the OECD output gap
10Note that we consider a credit downturn to be associated with a recession and expansion similar to
the criterion employed for banking crises and credit booms; i.e. if the downturn occurs in the 8 quarters
before or during the recession and if the downturn occurs during the 12 quarters preceding the expansion.
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series. The measure is equal to the percentage di¤erence between the levels of actual GDP
and estimated potential GDP and allows to control for time-variation in potential otput.
Admittedly, the assessment of the level of spare capacity in real time is challenging and
subject to important ex-post revisions but this challenge is considered to be a distinct
research topic. In this work, the downward pull on ination of spare capacity levels is
analyzed conditional on the available (OECD) output gap data.
An alternative activity measure is based on the work of Beaudry and Koop (1993)
who dene a depth of recession variable as the di¤erence between the current level of
output and its historical maximum.11 This measure is developed in order to take possible
nonlinearities depending on the magnitude of deviations from output from its time-varying
maximum into account. We likewise construct an output recession gap measure calculated
as the di¤erence of real GDP and its maximum over the current and 11 previous quarters,
expressed in percentages of that maximum. This measure by consequence only considers
the timing of economic contractions and their severity.
We use the survey-based Consensus Economics one-year-ahead ination forecasts data
as a direct measure of ination expectations following, amongst others, Roberts (1997).
Empirical evidence shows that survey measures are in general not rational, which vio-
lates the rational expectation assumption on the formation of expectations underlying the
standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve framework. Henzel and Wollmershäuser (2008)
however derive the HNKPC under the assumption of subjective expectations and nd
the specication to be identical to the specication of the HNKPC specication derived
under rational expectations. In addition, the authors demonstrate that the use of survey
data gives more reliable empirical results than the instrumental-variable-based rational
expectations approach. The drawback of abandoning the rational expectation assumption
is that the HNKPC specication is no longer microfounded (Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Mller
and Stock, 2014) because the formation of expectations is left unmodelled. Following the
standard approach in empirical work on the Phillips curve that uses survey expectations,
we treat the survey ination forecasts as exogenous for the estimation of the HNKPC. We
thereby implicitly assume that "i;t is a pure news shock such that the use of contempora-
neous (and therefore not predetermined) forecasts is valid.12
11Stock and Watson (2010) similarly dene an unemployment recession gap measure as the di¤erence
between the current unemployment rate and its minimum over the current and 11 previous quarters.
12Alternatively, one might consider lagged survey expectations, i.e. Et 1[i;t+4], since these are denitely
predetermined. The estimates in table 3.2 are however highly similar in this case (the results are available
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We further include two external price shock variables (ext) as additional cost factors for
a given level of economic activity. We consider in this respect the dynamics of import prices
of commodity goods (extc) and of import prices of non-commodity goods and services
(extnc). Both series are normalized such that a zero value can be interpreted as the absence
of an external price shock. The data sources for the series are listed in the appendix.
We allow for a general downward trend in the level of ination by estimating equa-
tion (3.2) alternatively in ination gap form, where i;t, its lags and the one-year-ahead
expectations are replaced by their deviation from long-term ination expectations, i.e.
(i;t j Et[LTi ]) and (Et[i;t+4] Et[LTi ]). The long-term ination expectations are thus
used to measure the trend level of ination. This specication allows for a drift in the av-
erage ination rate over time as in Faust and Wright (2012) and previous works13. We use
the Consensus Economics six-to-ten-year-ahead ination forecasts data for the long-term
ination expectations where available and extend them with the long-run Hodrick-Prescott
ltered trend of headline ination since 1960Q1 or the rst available quarter of the series.
We estimate this HNKPC relationship for an unbalanced panel of 15 OECD countries14
over the period 1990Q1-2013Q1. We thereby posit that the number of time observations
is su¢ ciently large to avoid the Nickell (1981) bias in a dynamic panel data setup. We
limit our attention to OECD countries to have a group of countries which are relatively
similar in institutional and structural characteristics. The group of countries is further
determined by the data availability at quarterly frequency. The sample period further
starts in 1990 due to the cross-country data availability of ination expectations but is
also suited since we want to exclude the end of the Great Ination period, which runs
from the beginning of the 1970s until the mid-1980s, and focus on episodes of considerable
nancial market globalization and integration.
from the author on request). Because it is notoriously hard to nd strong instruments that satisfy the
exclusion restriction, an instrumental variable approach is not considered in this work.
13e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010), Stock and Watson (2010) and
Clark (2011). The specication assumes the unpredictability of changes in trend ination.
14These are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. The extent of unbalancedness is
very limited as the sample only starts later for Germany, Ireland and South Korea (respectively 1991Q3,
1991Q1 and 1991Q2) due to the data availability while the end dates are balanced.
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4.2 Estimation results
When considering macro panel estimators, one needs to check the validity of the underly-
ing assumptions of the estimators. In particular, the possible heterogeneity of the slope
coe¢ cients and the presence of cross section dependence in the error terms driven by com-
mon unobserved variables needs to be tested. Neglecting heterogeneity of the slopes will
result in biased coe¢ cient estimates in a dynamic panel (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) while
the presence of unobserved common factors can lead to inconsistent variance estimates
and even to inconsistent coe¢ cients if the factors are correlated with the variables in the
model (Pesaran, 2006).
We rst examine the slope homogeneity assumption underlying the standard Fixed
E¤ects (FE) estimator relative to the Mean Group (MG) estimator that allows for het-
erogeneous coe¢ cients by testing the restrictions by means of the Swamy test. Table 3.2
shows the estimation outcomes for equation (3.2) based on the di¤erent panel estimators
and the outcome of the corresponding Swamy test on the slope homogeneity assumption of
the FE estimator (see bottom lines).15 The statistic is highly signicant and thus suggests
the rejection of slope homogeneity.
Second, we test for cross-sectional correlation in the error terms by means of the cross
section dependence test (CD-test) of Pesaran (2004). To this end, we employ the Common
Correlated E¤ects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator developed by Pesaran (2006) which
allows to control for common unobserved factors in the residuals by including the cross
section averages of all variables to the model. The CCEMG estimator is shown to be
consistent in a dynamic single equation model (Chudik and Pesaran, 2013) under the
assumptions that the regressors are weakly exogenous, the time dimension of the panel is
su¢ ciently long and the number of unobserved factors is adequately captured by the cross
section averages. The CD-test statistics are displayed below in table 3.2 and indicate the
presence of signicant correlation in the residuals of the model estimated by the FE and
MG estimators but an insignicant correlation for the CCEMG estimator.
15The estimated equation includes the contemporaneous term of the output gap and one-year-ahead
ination expectations, 2 lags of the rst di¤erence of the output gap, 5 lags of ination and the contem-
poraneous term and 3 lags of the commodity goods and non-commodity goods and services import price
ination variables. So k=2, l=5 and g=3 in (3.2). This lag structure is based on the signicance of the
variables when k, l and g increase from 1 to 8 (where the maximum lag is determined by the Akaike
information criterion) to obtain a parsimonious model.
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Given the results of the homogeneity test and the CD-tests, the coe¢ cients in the third
column of table 3.2 are considered as benchmarks values for the estimates of the nonlinear
Phillips curve specications in section 4.4. Allowing for heterogeneous slopes and proxies
for unobserved common factors especially a¤ects the estimates of the backward-looking
expectation component.
The slope is signicant and implies that there exists a positive empirical link between
the output gap and ination measures, although the magnitude is relatively modest. A
change in the output gap of 1% leads to an increase in quarter-on-quarter ination of
0.03%. The speed limit e¤ect, measured by the sum of the  coe¢ cients, is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero according to an F-test. The estimates of  and
5P
j=1
j are positive
and signicantly di¤erent from zero, suggesting the combination of forward-looking and
backward-looking components of ination dynamics. The sum of the  and
5P
j=1
j estimates
turns out to be signicantly di¤erent from 1 and equals 0.64. This nding indicates that
the dynamic process is stable, i.e. the sum does not exceed one16. The fourth column
shows the CCEMG results for the ination gap form. Controlling for a slowly-varying
trend ination, however, does not change the estimation results of (3.2) in an important
way.
4.3 Incorporating nonlinearities and asymmetries
To assess whether the reaction of ination to economic activity is indeed di¤erent depend-
ing on the level of economic activity and credit conditions and whether speed limit e¤ects
are relevant, we extend equation (3.2) to the following multiplicative interaction model:
i;t = i+gapi;t+
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j+Et[i;t+4]+
lP
j=1
ji;t j+
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j+"i;t (3.3)
where
 = 1I(D
gap
i;t ) + 0
 = 1I(D
gap
i;t ) + 0
 = 1I( eDconi;t ) + 0eDconi;t = (Dgapi;t ; Dgapi;t )
16For the FE and MG estimators, the sum is not signicantly di¤erent from 1, also suggesting a stable
process.
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i;t = i + gapi;t +
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j + Et[i;t+4] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t
standard specication
ination gap
specication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fe mg ccemg ccemg
b 0:018
(0:004) 0.000
0:018
(0:005) 0.000
0:030
(0:013) 0.017
0:021
(0:014) 0.136
2P
j=1
b 0:026
0.091
 -0:009
0.091
0:011
0.622
0:009
0.650b 0:535
(0:065) 0.000
0:620
(0:072) 0.000
0:469
(0:130) 0.000
0:434
(0:199) 0.030
5P
j=1
bj 0:4710.000  0:3310.000  0:1710.036  0:1440.056 
3P
j=0
b'cj 0:0210.221 0:0080.782 0:0160.802 -0:0160.763
3P
j=0
b'ncj 0:0580.012  0:0280.318 0:0550.191  0:0340.423
CD-test
statistic: 2.32 3.25 1.60 1.53
average correlation: 0.024 0.033 0.016 0.016
Swamys heterogeneity test on FE coe¢ cients
327.58
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets,
p-values in italics. The hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of
an F-test. The total number of observations is 1379, with T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15.
Table 3.2 Estimation results - linear Phillips curve
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Equation (3.3) allows for changes in the level and the slope of the Phillips curve de-
pending on the indicator variables I( eDconi;t ); I(Dgapi;t ) and I(Dgapi;t ). I(Dgapi;t ) and I(Dgapi;t )
equal 1 if the specic gap and gap characteristic one is testing for occurs during the
quarter t and equals 0 otherwise. The intercept, the coe¢ cient on the economic activity
gap and the coe¢ cient on the change in the gap are thus allowed to be di¤erent according
to the values of I(Dgapi;t ) and/or I(D
gap
i;t ). Our main interest lies in the estimates of 
and
P  in equation (3.3), which gives the values of the slope of the Phillips curve and
the speed limit e¤ect for di¤erent values of Dgapi;t and D
gap
i;t .
17
In the next section, we incorporate these dummy variables into the model to analyze
whether the  and  coe¢ cients in equation (3.2) are a¤ected by the di¤erent states of
the economy.
4.4 Estimation results
Level and persistence of output gaps
Table 3.3 presents the results of the analysis of asymmetries and nonlinearities in the
Phillips curve depending on the sign, level and persistence of the output gap. Column 1
repeats the benchmark results of estimating equation (3.2) whereas column 2 provides a
rst test of asymmetric behavior by adding the interactions with the dummy Dgapi;t equal
to one if the output gap is nonnegative and zero otherwise. The di¤erence between 0
and , indicated by sign1 , is signicant and implies that the slope coe¢ cient is smaller for
negative than for nonnegative output gaps. For negative output gaps, the Phillips curve
slope is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Column 3 shows the e¤ects of large output gaps relative to moderate gaps. We allow for
an asymmetric threshold e¤ect by including two binary dummies to quantify the e¤ects of
output gaps below -1.5 and above 1.5 next to the sign dummy. e1 thus captures three slope
e¤ects, ~1 = (
sign
1 ; 
LP
1 ; 
LN
1 ); where 
sign
1 denotes the change in the slope for positive
output gaps, LP1 for large positive output gaps and 
LN
1 for large negative gaps. In this
case, the interactions are not signicant.
17The standard errors of the estimates of ;  and  are computed via the Delta method. In case of
multiple indicator variables, the 1 and 1 or 1 coe¢ cients and D
gap
i;t or D
gap
i;t are replaced by vectors
(which are denoted by a tilde).
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i;t = i + gapi;t +
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j + Et[i;t+4] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t
Linear
model
Interaction model
Linear
model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dgapi;t =1 if: gapi;t > 0
gapi;t <  1:5 /
gapi;t > 1:5
gapi;t <  1:5 /
gapi;t > 1:5, persistently
recession
gap
b 0:020
(0:004) 0.000
b0 0:016(0:017) 0.334 -0:034(0:047) 0.403 -0:024(0:026) 0.355 -0:044(0:026) 0.595
- b 0:073
(0:033) 0.027 0:015
(0:062) 0.808
= -0:006
(0:104) 0.954
0:069
(0:049) 0.162
= 0:058
(0:057) 0.309
-
- ^sign1 0:057

(0:028) 0.045
0:044
(0:092) 0.632
0:069
(0:060) 0.250
-
^LN1 =^
LP
1 - 0:049
(0:047) 0.302
= -0:006
(0:072) 0.935
- -
^slack1 =^
boom
1
- - 0:094

(0:042) 0.025
= -0:014
(0:044) 0.750
-
2P
j=1
b 0:004
0.802
2P
j=1
b 0:006
0.820
-0:006
0.799
-0:005
0.836
0:004
0.802
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-values in italics. The
hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of an F-test. The total number of observations is 1379, with
T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15 but reduces to 1358, with T=91, max T=93, min T=75 when using the recession gap variable.
Table 3.3 Estimation results - level and persistence of output gap (ccemg)
Column 4 further explores the possibility of di¤erential e¤ects during persistently
large output gaps on ination during either positive or negative output gap values, so
~1 = (
sign
1 ; 
boom
1 ; 
slack
1 ). The slope for persistent economic slacks is signicantly larger
(b = 0.07) than for the moderate or non-persistently large slack periods (^0 =-0.02). The
0 estimate points to an insignicant Phillips curve slope for the latter periods. The total
slope e¤ect during persistent slack periods nevertheless remains insignicantly di¤erent
from zero. Persistent economic booms do not generate a signicantly di¤erent slope esti-
mate. The next column displays the results of the linear model for the output recession
gap variable.18 The reaction of ination to economic activity during periods with out-
put below the time-varying maximum is not found to be signicant. The recession gap
measure therefore also suggests that a downward pull on ination does not occur in times
of spare capacity which conrms the nding in column 2. This alternative activity gap
measure however has the drawback that it imposes that economic activity only exerts an
inuence on ination in times of spare capacity. We therefore opt to employ the dummy
18Note that the time dimension of the sample is reduced (total observations is 1358) because the recession
gap variable requires data up to 11 lags of the output gap.
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interactions for the level of the output gap instead of imposing such restriction
In conclusion, these results suggest an asymmetric Phillips curve which is at for neg-
ative output gaps and positively sloped for periods of activity above potential. Persistent
economic slack periods do not imply a meaningfully di¤erent Phillips curve slope than
periods with small to moderate gaps. Speed limit e¤ects are not found to be relevant.
Given the evidence of asymmetries in the Phillips curve and the lack of a threshold level
e¤ect, we further control for the sign of the output gap in the remainder of this work and
do not continue to include the threshold dummies.
Credit evolutions
In this section, we focus on the sensitivity of the Phillips curve slope coe¢ cient to bank
credit evolutions next to the sign of the output gap. Given that the countries included
in the analysis experienced negative gaps throughout 2009Q1-2013Q1 with the exception
of Germany and Japan which experienced respectively 7 and 1 quarter(s) with positive
values as well19, a focus on the Phillips curve slope estimates for negative output gap
values is most appropriate to analyze the missing disination hypothesis. We therefore
only show the  estimation outcomes obtained for the negative output gap values. First, we
analyze the e¤ects of the general credit cycle20 and afterwards we particularly concentrate
on restrictive credit conditions depending on the phase of the business cycle. Table 3.4
displays the results for the former.
The rst column shows the benchmark estimates of the model in equation (3.3) when
only the dummy interaction for the sign of the output gap is included. The next two
columns focus on the results of estimating equation (3.3) where the interactions capture
upturns in the credit cycle next to business cycle interactions21, so ~1 = (
sign
1 ; 
bus
1 ; 
cred
1 )
where bus1 = 1 during expansions and 
cred
1 = 1 during upturns of the credit cycle. Since
we only focus on the slope estimates for the negative output gap values, the displayed
result for b do not consider the e¤ects of sign1 . The results indicate that both credit
upturns and credit booms do not exercise a signicant inuence on the Phillips curve
19 i.e. during 2011Q1-2011Q4 and after 2012Q2 for Germany and in 2013Q1 for Japan.
20Note that we cannot test for a di¤erent slope during banking crises as the datings pinpoint the starting
dates of a banking crises but remain vague about the end dates.
21The business cycle phases are introduced in the estimation of equation (3.3) to control for correlations
between business and credit cycles (infra, p. 79).
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i;t = i + gapi;t +
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j + Et[i;t+4] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t
Interaction model
(1) (2) (3)
Dgapi;t =1
a if: gapi;t > 0 /expansion
gapi;t > 0 /expansion/credit
upturns
gapi;t > 0 /expansion/credit
booms
^0 0:016
(0:017) 0.334
0:026
(0:020) 0.191
0:015
(0:010) 0.133b for gap< 0 - 0:007
(0:032) 0.832
0:010
(0:026) 0.707
^bus1 - -0:021

(0:010) 0.038
0:010
(0:016) 0.536
^cred1 - 0:002(0:022) 0.936
-0:015
(0:018) 0.400
2P
j=1
b 0:006
0.820
0:003
0.882
0:005
0.850
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets,
p-values in italics. The hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of
an F-test. The total number of observations is 1379, with T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15.
a  depicts the slope estimate when the output gap is negative
Table 3.4 Estimation results - business cycle and credit evolutions (ccemg)
slope once controlled for the business cycle. A split up of the business cycle in recessions
and expansions leads to a signicant interaction term in column 2 but the slope estimate
remains insignicant during recessions as well.
We next focus on the association of recessions and recoveries (i.e. the rst 8 quarters
of expansions) with periods of elevated nancial stress, captured by the association of
recessions and recoveries with banking crises or preceding credit booms. For the recoveries,
we additionally examine the HNKPC slope during creditless recoveries.
Recessions In table 3.5, we zoom in on recession periods in combination with periods
of severe nancial distortions. In this case, ~1 = (
sign
1 ; 
bus
1 ; 
fin
1 ) where 
fin
1 = 1 during
periods of nancial stress associated with recessions. Note that  in table 3.5 now refers
to the HNKPC slope estimates when ~1 = (0; 0; 1) as we are interested in the slope
e¤ects during recession periods conditional on credit conditions. Column 2 focuses on
the association with a banking crisis and column 3 on credit boom busts. The estimates
indicate that the Phillips curve slope coe¢ cient is not signicantly a¤ected when recessions
are associated with a banking crisis or preceded by a credit boom.
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i;t = i + gapi;t +
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j + Et[i;t+4] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t
Interaction model
(1) (2) (3)
Dgapi;t =1
a if: gapi;t > 0 /expansion
gapi;t > 0
/expansion/associated with
banking crisis
gapi;t > 0
/expansion/preceded by credit
boom
^0 0:016
(0:017) 0.334
0:026
(0:030) 0.711
0:030
(0:022) 0.173b for gap< 0
and in recession
- -0:005
(0:039) 0.900
0:020
(0:023) 0.386
^bus1 - -0:004(0:019) 0.827
-0:017
(0:014) 0.250
^fin1 - -0:016(0:024) 0.500
-0:010
(0:007) 0.137
2P
j=1
b 0:006
0.820
0:024
0.262
0:011
0.694
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-
values in italics. The hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of an F-test. The
total number of observations is 1379, with T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15.a  depicts the slope estimate
when the output gap is negative, the business cycle dummy equals 0 and the nancial stress dummy equals 1.
Table 3.5 Estimation results - recessions in association with nancial stress (ccemg)
Recoveries Table 3.6 displays the results in case the interaction variables include the
association of nancial distortions with business cycle recoveries. In this case, ~1 =
(sign1 ; 
bus
1 ; 
fin
1 ) where 
fin
1 = 1 during periods of nancial stress associated with re-
coveries.  in table 3.6 refers to the estimates for ~1 = (0; 1; 1) , such that we can analyze
the e¤ect on the Phillips curve slope during recovery episodes with restrictive credit con-
ditions. As columns 2 to 4 indicate, the Phillips curve slope is not signicantly di¤erent
for recoveries that are associated with a banking crisis, when they are preceded by a credit
boom or when they are characterized as creditless.
These results therefore suggest that one cannot expect an e¤ect of the credit cycle
over and above the impact on output, even for an underemployed economy. The Phillips
curve slope estimate is also not expected to be altered during periods of restrictive credit
conditions, either during recessions or during recoveries.
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i;t = i + gapi;t +
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j + Et[i;t+4] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t
Interaction model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dgapi;t =1
a if: gapi;t > 0 /expansion
gapi;t > 0
/expansion/associated
with banking crisis
gapi;t > 0
/expansion/preceded by
credit boom
gapi;t > 0
/expansion/creditless
recovery
^0 0:016
(0:017) 0.334
-0:003
(0:010) 0.793
0:027
(0:015) 0.079
-0:000
(0:014) 0.993b for
gap< 0
- 0:022
(0:037) 0.545
0:021
(0:020) 0.303
0:002
(0:024) 0.946
^bus1 - -0:011(0:016) 0.513
-0:013
(0:011) 0.251
-0:019
(0:015) 0.214
^fin1 - 0:036(0:032) 0.261
0:006
(0:006) 0.302
0:020
(0:013) 0.130
2P
j=1
b 0:006
0.820
0:025
0.242
0:010
0.627
0:032
0.123
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-values
in italics. The hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of an F-test. The
total number of observations is 1379, with T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15. a  depicts the slope estimate
when the output gap is negative, the business cycle dummy equals 1 and the nancial stress dummy equals 1.
Table 3.6 Estimation results - recoveries in association with nancial stress (ccemg)
i;t = i + gapi;t +
kP
j=1
jgapi;t j + Et[i;t+4] +
lP
j=1
ji;t j +
gP
j=0
e'jfexti;t j + "i;t
Interaction model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dgapi;t =1
if:
gapi;t > 0
Dgapi;t =1 and
Dgapi;t =1 if:
gapi;t > 0 and
gapi;t > 0
jgapi;tj > 1:5 and
gapi;t > 0
jgapi;tj > 1:5
persistently and
gapi;t > 0
^0 0:016
(0:017) 0.334
0:028
(0:019) 0.126
0:013
(0:018) 0.494
0:011
(0:017) 0.513
2P
j=1
b0 0:006
0.820
-0:027
0.493
0:001
0.947
-0:002
0.921
2P
j=1
b - -0:025
0.644
0:018
0.864
0:100
0.366
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-values
in italics. The hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of an F-test. The
total number of observations is 1379, with T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15.
Table 3.7 Estimation results - speed limit e¤ect (ccemg)
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Speed limit e¤ect
Finally, we examine the results on the existence of a speed limit e¤ect during periods
of spare capacity. We therefore consider gap interactions next to the interaction term
concerning the sign of the level of the output gap variable (1 = 
sign
1 ). The rst column
in table 3.7 shows the results when the gap terms are interacted with a binary dummy
that equals 1 when the output gap is closing for a given level of capacity utilization (i.e.,
gapi;t > 0). Columns 2 and 3 next display the results when the speed limit dummy is
1 only for periods of respectively large gaps and persistently large gaps. Only in the last
column, the speed limit e¤ects appear to be considerably di¤erent in case the output gap
closes (
2P
j=1
;j = 0:10) relative to the other periods (
2P
j=1
;j =-0:00). The interactions are
however insignicant, as is the case for the other columns. These ndings suggest that
speed limit e¤ects do not arise when the aggregate economy revives, even in case of a
period of persistent economic slack.
5 Robustness checks
As a rst test of the robustness of the results, we examine the consequences of controlling
for a time-varying trend in the level of ination over time for the tests of asymmetries
and nonlinearities depending on the sign, level and persistence of the output gap and
the estimates of the speed limit e¤ect. Table 3.8 displays the coe¢ cient estimates when
ination and the next-year ination expectations enter the regressions in deviation from
the long-term ination expectations. The results show that the coe¢ cients for this ination
gap specication are highly similar to the ones in table 3.3 although the HNKPC slope is
not anymore signicant when there is no control for the asymmetry with respect to the
sign of the output gap.
Table 3.9 depicts the results of the analysis of the e¤ect of credit evolutions on the
Phillips curve slope coe¢ cient for the ination gap specication and an alternative business
cycle denition. We employ the classical methodology used in Claessens et al (2012) on
the log of real GDP to obtain an alternative dating of the business cycle phases. The
rst 2 columns conrm the documented insignicance of the credit cycle on the slope
coe¢ cient in table 3.4. This also holds when the alternative business cycle dating is
employed (columns 3 and 4). The credit cycle interaction is however signicant at the 10
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Ination gap specication
Linear
model
Interaction model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dgapi;t =1
if:
gapi;t > 0
gapi;t <  1:5 /
gapi;t > 1:5
gapi;t <  1:5 /
gapi;t > 1:5,
persistently
b 0:021
(0:014) 0.136
b0 0:009(0:016) 0.576 -0:039(0:038) 0.308 -0:006(0:0346) 0.851
- b 0:061
(0:031) 0.051
0:023
(0:058) 0.393
= 0:068
(0:128) 0.599
0:097
(0:052) 0.064
= 0:056
(0:087) 0.517
- ^sign1 0:053

(0:027) 0.052
0:083
(0:064) 0.195
0:061
(0:056) 0.277
^LN1 =^
LP
1 - 0:024(0:105) 0.817
= 0:062
(0:043) 0.149
-
^slack1 =^
boom
1
- - 0:103

(0:040) 0.010
= 0:001
(0:057) 0.981
2P
j=1
b 0:009
0.650
2P
j=1
b 0:006
0.820
0:005
0.928
0:006
0.539
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively. Standard errors are in brackets, p-
values in italics. The hypothesis that the sum of coe¢ cients is equal to zero is tested by means of an F-test.
The total number of observations is 1379, with T=92, max T=93, min T=86 and N=15.
Table 3.8 Robustness check - level and persistence of output gap and speed limit e¤ect (ccemg)
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percent level and with the a-priori expected sign in case the ination gap specication is
run with the alternative business cycle dummy. The e¤ect is however relatively small and
does not lead to a HNKPC slope that is signicantly di¤erent from zero. From this, we
can infer that the results in table 3.4 are robust to the ination gap specication and the
alternative business cycle denition.
In table 3.10, we inspect the robustness of the estimates when recessions are analyzed
in relation with the indicators of nancial stress episodes. When the alternative business
cycle is employed, we conne the attention to the credit cycle since the amount of eco-
nomic contractions associated with credit booms is too limited according to this criterion.
Overall, the message remains the same than in table 3.5, the credit cycle does not seem
to a¤ect the Phillips curve.
Finally, it is clear from table 3.11 that also the results for nancial stress periods
associated with recoveries are fairly similar to table 3.6. Creditless recoveries now however
exert a signicant negative e¤ect on the HNKPC slope when the ination gap specication
is employed (column 3). The eventual  estimate however remains insignicant from zero.
In conclusion, the previous ndings are robust to the use of the ination gap speci-
cation and the use of an alternative business cycle dating method.
99
-Chapter 3-
In
a
ti
on
ga
p
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
de
n
it
io
n
In
a
ti
on
ga
p
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
&
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
de
n
it
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
up
tu
rn
s
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
s
up
tu
rn
s
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
s
up
tu
rn
s
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
s
^
0
0:
00
9
(0
:0
2
4
)
0.
69
1
-0
:0
06
(0
:0
1
5
)
0.
68
6
-0
:0
05
(0
:0
2
0
)
0.
80
9
-0
:0
13
(0
:0
2
4
)
0.
57
1
-0
:0
0
7
(0
:0
2
3
)
0.
76
5
-0
:0
1
3
(0
:0
2
2
)
0.
56
0

fo
r
ga
p<
0
-0
:0
25
(0
:0
3
4
)
0.
46
6
-0
:0
1
1
(0
:0
2
9
)
0.
70
8
0
:0
25
(0
:0
3
7
)
0.
50
5
-0
:0
16
(0
:0
3
9
)
0.
68
9
0:
0
21
(0
:0
3
9
)
0.
58
1
-0
:0
16
(0
:0
3
5
)
0.
64
0
^
bu
s
1
-0
:0
23

(0
:0
1
3
)
0.
08
4
0:
00
2
(0
:0
1
8
)
0.
88
8
0
:0
43
(0
:0
2
8
)
0.
12
4
0
:0
17
(0
:0
2
5
)
0.
49
2
0:
0
4
9
(0
:0
2
9
)
0.
09
2
0
:0
10
(0
:0
2
0
)
0.
60
1
^
cr
ed
1
-0
:0
11
(0
:0
2
1
)
0.
59
5
-0
:0
0
8
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
68
4
-0
:0
14
(0
:0
1
3
)
0.
30
5
-0
:0
19
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
30
7
-0
:0
2
0

(0
:0
1
1
)
0.
07
5
-0
:0
14
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
46
7
2 P j=1b 
0:
0
02
0.
91
8
-0
:0
04
0.
89
4
-0
:0
06
0.
75
3
-0
:0
0
5
0.
83
8
0:
0
02
0.
90
2
0
:0
0
6
0.
81
0
N
ot
e:
 ,

,

de
no
te
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
10
,
5,
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
,
p-
va
lu
es
in
it
al
ic
s.
T
he
hy
p
ot
he
si
s
th
at
th
e
su
m
of

co
e¢
ci
en
ts
is
eq
ua
l
to
ze
ro
is
te
st
ed
by
m
ea
ns
of
an
F
-t
es
t.
T
he
to
ta
l
nu
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
is
13
79
,
w
it
h
T
=
92
,
m
ax
T
=
93
,
m
in
T
=
86
an
d
N
=
15
.

de
pi
ct
s
th
e
sl
op
e
es
ti
m
at
e
w
he
n
th
e
ou
tp
ut
ga
p
is
ne
ga
ti
ve
.
T
ab
le
3.
9
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
ch
ec
k
-
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
an
d
cr
ed
it
ev
ol
ut
io
ns
(c
c
em
g
)
100
-Chapter 3-
In
a
ti
on
ga
p
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
de
n
it
io
n
In
a
ti
on
ga
p
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
&
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
de
n
it
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
is
pr
ec
ed
ed
by
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
is
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
is
^
0
0:
0
06
(0
:0
3
2
)
0.
84
0
0
:0
16
(0
:0
2
2
)
0.
47
4
-0
:0
2
3
(0
:0
2
8
)
0.
41
0
-0
:0
28
(0
:0
2
9
)
0.
34
4

fo
r
ga
p<
0
an
d
in
re
ce
ss
io
ns
-0
:0
16
(0
:0
4
1
)
0.
69
1
0
:0
1
1
(0
:0
2
9
)
0.
70
0
-0
:0
3
0
(0
:0
3
4
)
0.
37
2
-0
:0
27
(0
:0
3
0
)
0.
37
5
^
bu
s
1
0
:0
03
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
89
3
-0
:0
09
(0
:0
1
6
)
0.
57
1
0:
02
2
(0
:0
2
0
)
0.
28
0
0:
0
0
8
(0
:0
1
4
)
0.
57
1
^
f
in
1
-0
:0
23
(0
:0
2
5
)
0.
36
8
-0
:0
04
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
82
2
-0
:0
0
7
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
70
2
0:
0
0
1
(0
:0
0
8
)
0.
92
1
2 P j=1b 
0:
0
08
0.
76
5
0
:0
04
0.
87
3
-0
:0
2
7
0.
29
6
-0
:0
18
0.
43
4
N
ot
e:
 ,

,

de
no
te
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
10
,
5,
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
,
p-
va
lu
es
in
it
al
ic
s.
T
he
hy
p
ot
he
si
s
th
at
th
e
su
m
of

co
e¢
ci
en
ts
is
eq
ua
l
to
ze
ro
is
te
st
ed
by
m
ea
ns
of
an
F
-t
es
t.
T
he
to
ta
l
nu
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
is
13
79
,
w
it
h
 T
=
92
,
m
ax
T
=
93
,
m
in
T
=
86
an
d
N
=
15
.

de
pi
ct
s
th
e
sl
op
e
es
ti
m
at
e
w
he
n
th
e
ou
tp
ut
ga
p
is
ne
ga
ti
ve
,
th
e
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
du
m
m
y
eq
ua
ls
0
an
d
th
e
n
an
ci
al
st
re
ss
du
m
m
y
eq
ua
ls
1.
T
ab
le
3.
10
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
ch
ec
k
-
re
ce
ss
io
ns
in
as
so
ci
at
io
n
w
it
h
n
an
ci
al
st
re
ss
(c
c
em
g
)
101
-Chapter 3-
In
a
ti
on
ga
p
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
de
n
it
io
n
In
a
ti
on
ga
p
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
&
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
de
n
it
io
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
is
pr
ec
ed
ed
by
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
cr
ed
it
le
ss
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
is
pr
ec
ed
ed
by
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
cr
ed
it
le
ss
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
ba
nk
in
g
cr
is
is
pr
ec
ed
ed
by
cr
ed
it
b
oo
m
cr
ed
it
le
ss
^
0
-0
:0
0
7
(0
:0
1
5
)
0.
64
5
0:
01
4
(0
:0
1
4
)
0.
32
9
-0
:0
0
4
(0
:0
2
0
)
0.
82
8
-0
:0
2
4
(0
:0
2
5
)
0.
32
8
-0
:0
15
(0
:0
2
2
)
0.
49
5
-0
:0
22
(0
:0
2
3
)
0.
33
7
-0
:0
31
(0
:0
2
8
)
0.
27
0
-0
:0
17
(0
:0
1
4
)
0.
22
8
-0
:0
2
3
(0
:0
2
8
)
0.
42
0
b for gap<
0
0:
02
9
(0
:0
5
1
)
0.
56
3
-0
:0
02
(0
:0
2
1
)
0.
91
4
0
:0
0
3
(0
:0
3
0
)
0.
93
1
0:
0
23
(0
:0
5
8
)
0.
68
8
0:
00
6
(0
:0
2
7
)
0.
83
8
0:
03
1
(0
:0
4
3
)
0.
46
6
0
:0
20
(0
:0
6
2
)
0.
74
8
0
:0
26

(0
:0
3
6
)
0.
47
8
0:
0
4
2
(0
:0
5
1
)
0.
41
3
^
bu
s
1
-0
:0
24
(0
:0
2
0
)
0.
22
1
-0
:0
21
(0
:0
1
6
)
0.
18
5
-0
:0
2
9

(0
:0
1
5
)
0.
05
0
0:
0
19
(0
:0
3
0
)
0.
53
6
0:
02
1
(0
:0
1
6
)
0.
19
5
0:
03
4
(0
:0
2
4
)
0.
14
8
0
:0
08
(0
:0
2
4
)
0.
73
7
0
:0
1
2
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
51
8
0:
0
1
9
(0
:0
1
9
)
0.
31
4
^
f
in
1
0
:0
6
0
(0
:0
4
4
)
0.
17
0
0:
00
5
(0
:0
0
4
)
0.
25
9
-0
:0
36

(0
:0
1
6
)
0.
02
3
0:
0
29
(0
:0
4
3
)
0.
50
3
-0
:0
00
(0
:0
0
0
)
0.
35
9
0:
01
9
(0
:0
2
7
)
0.
48
9
0
:0
42
(0
:0
4
9
)
0.
39
3
0
:0
3
1
(0
:0
2
8
)
0.
26
5
0:
0
4
6
(0
:0
3
9
)
0.
23
8
2 P j=1b 
0
:0
23
0.
31
8
0:
01
3
0.
55
6
0
:0
4
1
0.
01
7
0:
0
17
0.
31
6
0:
00
3
0.
90
8
0:
00
4
0.
79
1
0
:0
20
0.
24
5
0
:0
01
0.
96
4
0:
0
0
8
0.
65
7
N
ot
e:
 ,

,

de
no
te
si
gn
i
ca
nc
e
at
10
,
5,
an
d
1%
le
ve
ls
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
br
ac
ke
ts
,
p-
va
lu
es
in
it
al
ic
s.
T
he
hy
p
ot
he
si
s
th
at
th
e
su
m
of

co
e¢
ci
en
ts
is
eq
ua
l
to
ze
ro
is
te
st
ed
by
m
ea
ns
of
an
F
-t
es
t.
T
he
to
ta
l
nu
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
is
13
79
,
w
it
h
 T
=
92
,
m
ax
T
=
93
,
m
in
T
=
86
an
d
N
=
15
.

de
pi
ct
s
th
e
sl
op
e
es
ti
m
at
e
w
he
n
th
e
ou
tp
ut
ga
p
is
ne
ga
ti
ve
an
d
w
he
n
b
ot
h
th
e
bu
si
ne
ss
cy
cl
e
du
m
m
y
an
d
th
e
n
an
ci
al
st
re
ss
du
m
m
y
eq
ua
l
1.
T
ab
le
3.
11
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
ch
ec
k
-
re
co
ve
ri
es
in
as
so
ci
at
io
n
w
it
h
n
an
ci
al
st
re
ss
(c
c
em
g
)
102
-Chapter 3-
6 Conclusions
In light of the global nancial crisis of 2008-2009 and the hypothesized missing disination
puzzle, we estimate a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve for a panel of 15 advanced
OECD economies while considering the evolution of bank credit to the private sector and
the occurrence of nancial stress periods next to possible nonlinearities and asymmetries
depending on the level of economic activity. The goal is to examine why the reaction
of ination has been relatively mild in the immediate aftermath of the global crisis and
whether restrictive credit conditions have lowered this reaction. Overall, we nd that the
Phillips curve is "alive". The output gap matters, at least when the economy is booming.
Our ndings suggest that the Phillips curve is signicantly steeper for positive output
gaps relative to negative output gaps and that the slope is insignicant for the latter. The
magnitude of deviations of GDP from potential does not have an additional inuence on
the reaction of ination once one controls for the sign of the deviation. Also persistently
large output gaps do not exert an inuence on the Phillips curve slope. Negative output
gaps were omnipresent since 2009 and the fairly stable ination rates and the non-realized
deation fears subsequent to the nancial crisis are thus consistent with the established
at Phillips curve during these episodes.
Given the signicant asymmetry in the Phillips curve with respect to the sign of the
output gap, we accordingly focus on episodes of spare production capacity to examine the
Phillips curve relationship in relation with bank credit evolutions. We nd no evidence
for di¤erent ination dynamics driven by the credit cycle. The reaction of ination to
the output gap is not attenuated during credit cycle downturns relative to credit booms
and more general credit upturns. We also do not nd evidence of an e¤ect on the slope
of the Phillips curve during recoveries and recessions associated with periods of nancial
stress. We therefore conclude that there is no rm evidence in our sample that bank credit
evolutions and nancial distress have signicantly altered the Phillips curve relationship
following the global nancial crisis. The mild ination reaction subsequent to the nancial
crisis can thus be linked to an asymmetric reaction towards the extent of spare production
capacity whereas the occurrence of a credit downturn for 13 of the 15 countries occurring
in association with the global nancial crisis does not seem to have counteracted the
expectations of disination.
We further have no evidence that underpins the existence of a speed limit e¤ect on
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ination when the extent of spare capacity shrinks. The speed limit e¤ect is found to be
insignicant, even in presence of persistent and severe economic slack periods. The fact
that a long-lasting and pronounced contraction is more likely to alter production resources
obsolete and inadequate does not seem to generate additional inationary pressures.
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Appendices
A. Data sources
Core ination: consumer price index, all items non-food, non-energy, growth rates with
respect to previous quarter, seasonally adjusted [OECD, Main Economic Indicators].
Nominal/Real GDP: gross domestic product in billions of national currency, value/
volume, market prices [ OECD, Economic Outlook No 93].
Output gap: output gap of the total economy [OECD, Economic Outlook No 90 (for
historical episodes) and 93 (for post-2010 episodes).
One-year-ahead ination expectations: expectations of headline ination for the
next year, annualized growth with respect to the previous year, transformed to
quarterly growth rates [Consensus Economics].
Long-term ination expectations: expectations of headline ination for the next 6
to 10 years, annualized growth with respect to the previous year, transformed to
quarterly growth rates [Consensus Economics]. Observations on the 6-to-10-years
ination expectations are however more limited in time and over countries. Missing
observations from 1990Q1 onwards are replaced by a HP-ltered trend on headline
CPI ination since 1960Q1 of the rst available quarter to obtain balanced series
over the entire sample period.22
Commodity imports price ination: price of commodity imports, growth rates with
respect to previous quarter, seasonally adjusted [OECD, Economic Outlook No 93].
Non-commodity imports of goods and services price ination: price of non-
commodity imports of goods and services, growth rates with respect to previous
quarter, seasonally adjusted [OECD, Economic Outlook No 93].
22There are no data on these long-term ination expectations for Denmark, Finland and Ireland. For
Australia, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, the survey data series start in, respectively,
1991Q2, 1995Q2, 1995Q2, 1998Q4 and 1995Q2. The data are collected from 1990Q2 onwards and the
1990Q1 observations are thus based on the HP trend for all countries.
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country time span number country time span number
Australia 1990Q1 2013q1 93 Japan 1990Q1 2013q1 93
Canada 1990Q1 2013q1 93 Korea, South 1991Q2 2013q1 88
Denmark 1990Q1 2013q1 93 Netherlands 1990Q1 2013q1 93
Finland 1990Q1 2013q1 93 Norway 1990Q1 2013q1 93
France 1990Q1 2013q1 93 Sweden 1990Q1 2013q1 93
Germany 1991Q4 2013q1 86 UK 1990Q1 2013q1 93
Ireland 1991Q1 2013q1 89 US 1990Q1 2013q1 93
Italy 1990Q1 2013q1 93
Table 3.12 Overview number of observations per country (for baseline model in (1))
Total bank credit to the private non-nancial sector: long series on total credit
and domestic bank credit to the private nonnancial sector in billions of national
currency, adjusted for breaks, annualized [BIS].
Headline CPI: consumer price index, all items, index 2010=100 [OECD, Main Eco-
nomic Indicators].
Population: total population, midyear estimates [World bank, World Development In-
dicators database].
B. Sample coverage
C. Cycle denitions
Persistent economic boom or slack: periods with output gap >1.5 or <-1.5 for at
least 8 consecutive quarters. This denition is based on the employed threshold
value in Meier (2010) for economic slack periods and the estimated threshold values
in Barnes and Olivei (2003) for the unemployment gap of the US.23
Business cycle: recessions and expansions in economic activity are dened based on the
output gap measure. Expansions run from trough to peak (excluding the trough)
23Note that the cycle datings are based on data since 1960Q1 or the rst available quarter, particular
episodes starting before 1990Q1 but continuing through the sample under consideration can be accordingly
dened such that the number of observations is maximized.
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and recessions run from peak to trough (excluding the peak). A trough is identied
as a period in which the output gap is below minus its standard deviation. To avoid
double dip episodes, it is assumed that there are at least 8 quarters between two
troughs. If several troughs occur within 8 quarters, the quarter with the lowest value
of the output gap is considered to be the trough period. A peak is subsequently
dened as the quarter with the largest output gap value between 2 consecutive
troughs. It is further imposed that the recessions and expansions last for at least 2
quarters. If a business cycle phase is dened to last for only 1 quarter, this period
is considered to belong to the other phase. This methodology is based on the work
of Sugawara and Zalduendo (2013) although they employ Hodrick-Prescott (HP)
ltering on real GDP to infer the cyclical variation in output whereas we make use of
OECD output gap series where potential output is estimated based on a multivariate
production function methodology. The rst 8 quarters of the expansions are dened
as recovery periods.
Banking crises: we use the (quarterly) dating of Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis
(2011) and supplement it with the (annual) dating of Laeven and Valencia (2013).
Credit cycle: we employ the classical methodology used in Claessens et al (2012) on
the real credit data to dene upturns and downturns in bank credit per capita. As
in Claessens et al (2012), the algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002) is applied on
the log level of real credit to determine the cycles turning points. The value yt is
considered as a peak at time t, if (yt  yt 2) > 0, (yt  yt 1) > 0, (yt+2  yt) < 0 and
(yt+1   yt) < 0;while a trough occurs at time t if (yt   yt 2) < 0, (yt   yt 1) < 0,
(yt+2   yt) > 0 and (yt+1   yt) > 0. The downturn then runs from peak to trough
and the upturn from trough to the next peak. The restriction is thereby imposed
that the downturn lasts at least 2 quarters and the upturn at least 5 quarters.
Credit booms: similar to Mendoza and Terrones (2008), a HP lter on the log of real
credit per capita from 1960Q1 (or from the rst available observation) onwards is
applied to obtain deviations of credit from its country-specic long-run trend. Boom
periods are dened as consecutive quarters for which the cyclical component is equal
or larger than 1.5 times its standard deviation. Credit data are deated by headline
CPI. The peak of a credit boom is subsequently dened as the quarter from the
set of consecutive quarters that satisfy the credit boom condition with the largest
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di¤erence between the cyclical component and its standard deviation. Given the
peak, the start date of the boom is the quarter before the peak with the minimum
di¤erence between the cyclical component and its standard deviation. The end date
of the boom is similarly determined as the quarter after the peak that satises this
latter condition.
Creditless recoveries: a creditless recovery is dened as a recovery without a pick
up in real credit per capita. Based on the denition in the work of Sugawara and
Zalduendo (2008), the recovery is considered to be creditless when the average growth
rate of real credit per capita (deated by headline CPI) during the recovery is less
then or equal to zero.
Alternative business cycle denition: as in Claessens et al (2012), the algorithm of
Harding and Pagan (2002) is applied on the log level of real GDP to dene recessions
and expansions in the business cycle. A recession runs from peak to trough and the
upturn from trough to the next peak. Again, the restriction is imposed that the
recession lasts at least 2 quarters and the upturn at least 5 quarters.
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Abstract
We estimate a New Keynesian wage Phillips curve for a panel of 24 OECD countries, and
allow the degree of wage indexation to past ination to vary according to the monetary
policy regime. We nd that the extent of wage indexation is signicantly lower in an
ination targeting regime, in contrast to monetary targeting, exchange rate targeting and
policy regimes without an explicit quantitative anchor. The results put into question
whether embedding a constant degree of wage indexation in standard DSGE models is
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1 Introduction
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models typically assume
sticky wages and partial wage indexation to past ination. Notably, the degree to which
wages are indexed to past ination is hard-wired as a xed and policy invariant para-
meter (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007). The
assumption of a constant degree of wage indexation, however, has been rejected by insti-
tutional and empirical evidence for the United States (US). In particular, Holland (1986)
documents a substantial rise in the proportion of wage contracts with indexation clauses
to price level changes in the US between the late 1960s and mid 1980s, after which there
was again a decline. Hofmann, Peersman and Straub (2012) estimate the extent of wage
indexation in the US over time, and nd a considerably higher degree of indexation during
the "Great Ination" of the 1970s compared to the earlier and later periods. Holland
(1986) attributes the rise of indexation practices in the 1970s to much higher ination un-
certainty, whereas Hofmann et al. (2012) explain the rise and fall of wage indexation by a
weaker reaction of the Federal Reserve to ination during the "Great Ination", and more
aggressive ination stabilization before and after this period. Specically, a weakly ina-
tion stabilizing monetary policy regime is conducive to high and volatile ination, which
fosters the use of wage indexation clauses as protection against ination uncertainty.
To the extent that ination uncertainty is determined by the monetary policy regime,
a possible link between the degree of wage indexation and monetary policy is supported
by economic theory. Gray (1978), for example, shows in a neoclassical model with wage
rigidities that the optimal proportion of wage contracts indexed to ination increases with
the variance of monetary disturbances. Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983) further show
in an e¢ cient contract model that the gain of indexation for risk averse workers, and hence
the likelihood of indexation, rises when ination uncertainty is higher. On the other hand,
Carrillo, Peersman and Wauters (2014) demonstrate that utility maximizing workers only
want to index wages to past ination when permanent shocks to the ination target (and
technology) dominate output uctuations, but not when temporal ination target (and
aggregate demand) shocks dominate.
In this paper, we formally examine whether wage indexation varies across monetary
policy regimes.1 More precisely, we estimate the reduced-form empirical New Keynesian
1Although empirical work has found that higher ination uncertainty raises the prevalence of cost-of-
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wage Phillips curve of Galí (2011) on a panel dataset covering 24 OECD countries between
1960Q1 and 2011Q4, and allow the degree of wage indexation to vary according to the
monetary policy regime. Since the monetary policy regime of an individual country is in
general quite stable over time, a panel dataset approach increases the number of observa-
tions signicantly, which allows us to formally estimate the role of the policy regime. We
control for labor market institutions and include an estimate of the time-varying ination
target of the central bank to examine the importance of wage indexation once variation
in trend ination is taken into account.
We identify the monetary policy regime of a country in a specic period based on the
presence of an explicit quantitative monetary target, which takes three forms: ination,
money growth and exchange rates targets. Quantitative targets are transparent policy
indicators and can easily be measured.2 A formal commitment to a quantitative target
is expected to inuence (improve) the formation of ination expectations and (reduce)
ination uncertainty of workers (Mishkin, 2007). We distinguish between the presence of
an ination, money growth and exchange rate target, because the underlying dynamics
of these strategies and formation of ination expectations are inherently di¤erent. For
example, ination targeting central banks typically try to stabilize ination in the short
to medium term, whereas money growth targeting is more a commitment to low ination
in the long run.3
The estimation results provide a number of important considerations for macroeco-
nomic analysis and policymakers. First, we nd that wage indexation is signicant and
economically relevant for the sample under analysis. Second, the results conrm that wage
indexation varies across monetary policy regimes. The degree of wage indexation to past
ination turns out to be signicantly lower in a regime which has a quantitative ination
target but this condition does not hold for money growth or exchange rate targets. Since
living adjustment clauses in collective wage bargaining agreements in the US (Holland, 1986; Ragan and
Bratsberg, 2000), there is, to the best of our knowledge, no study showing that macroeconomic wage
indexation varies systematically with monetary policy regimes.
2There is a large literature that has focused on domestic institutions to represent the monetary policy
regime, such as the degree of central bank independence and indicators of transparency (e.g. Alesina and
Summers, 1993; Eij¢ nger and Geraats, 2006; Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014). The use of such indicators,
however, would reduce our panel dataset considerably. Moreover, the construction of these indicators
involves debatable personal judgment.
3The inationary outcomes of the three di¤erent types of nominal anchors also turn out to be di¤erent
(Fatás, Mihov and Rose, 2007).
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the extent of wage indexation is di¤erent across monetary policy regimes, the constant
indexation assumption embedded in standard DSGE models is susceptible to the Lucas
(1976) critique, i.e. it is not intrinsic to the deep structure of the economy and not a policy
invariant parameter. The analysis of alterations to the policy regime and counterfactual
policy simulations in these models are thus potentially misleading. Similarly, the compu-
tation of optimal monetary policies that are conditional on the estimated parameters of
these models may produce unreliable results if the optimal policy strategy implies changes
to the degree of wage indexation and thus the structure of the economy.
Third, to the extent that having a quantitative ination target itself is the key mech-
anism that lowers wage indexation to past ination, the results suggest that the adoption
of an explicit ination target could reduce the inationary consequences of shocks hitting
the economy, the costs of disination, and the volatility of output and prices.4 Specif-
ically, given that ination is driven by real marginal costs, which are directly linked to
wages, a signicant reduction in the degree of wage indexation implies less amplication
of the inationary consequences of shocks hitting the economy due to mutually reinforc-
ing feedback e¤ects between wages and prices, i.e. less so-called second-round e¤ects of
inationary shocks. A reduction in the inationary e¤ects of shocks hitting the economy
requires in turn less aggressive monetary policy responses to stabilize ination, lowering
also output volatility (Hofmann et al., 2012).
Our work is related to several strands in the literature. Messina and Sanz-de-Galdeano
(2014) use micro level data to document how Brazils and Uruguays disination policies
changed the nature of wage rigidities. For Brazil in particular, they document how the
introduction of ination targeting a¤ected wage indexation. Alogoskous and Smith (1991)
study wage and price ination series from 1892 to 1987 for the US and the UK; they report
coinciding shifts in the wage Phillips curve and price ination persistence, which they
link to departures from international xed exchange rate regimes. Muto and Shintani
(2014) perform an empirical evaluation of the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve for
Japan and the US. They show with rolling window regressions that the importance of
4Based on the estimations, we can only conclude that the degree of wage indexation is di¤erent across
monetary policy regimes, and signicantly lower in regimes that have a quantitative ination target.
Whether the ination target itself is the mechanism that reduces indexation practices is a question out of
the scope of this paper. Specically, other features of a monetary policy regime that are typically asso-
ciated with an explicit ination target could reduce the degree of wage indexation, for instance enhanced
transparency, more independent central banks or an ination averse society.
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wage indexation has declined over time for both countries, which they link to lower and
more stable ination. Benati (2008) questions whether the intrinsic ination persistence
found in post-WWII US data is truly structural. He estimates the price Phillips curve on
historical data for a set of countries and nds the price indexation parameter to be very
low or zero under stable monetary policy regimes with clearly dened nominal anchors.
Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) nd that ination expectations appear to be more
forward looking, and ination less persistent, in ination targeting countries. A related
study is also Fatás et al. (2007), who nd that having an explicit quantitative target
for monetary policy, in particular an ination target, is systematically related to a lower
average level of ination. Finally, our study is related to the literature that analyzes the
role of monetary policy institutions for ination outcomes and economic growth, such
as central bank independence (Alesina and Summers, 1993) and transparency (Sterne,
Stasavage and Chortareas, 2002; Eij¢ nger and Geraats, 2006; Dincer and Eichengreen,
2014).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the
estimation results for a benchmark wage Phillips curve model with a constant degree of
wage indexation. In section 3, we extend the benchmark model to analyze the inuence of
the monetary policy regime on the extent of backward-looking wage indexation, controlling
for a set of labor market characteristics. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Wage Phillips curve with constant indexation
In this section, we present the estimation results of a wage Phillips curve, assuming a
constant and policy invariant degree of wage indexation. We rst derive a benchmark
empirical New Keynesian wage Phillips curve in section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents the data
and discusses some econometric issues, whereas the estimation results are shown in section
2.3.
2.1 Model specication
Theoretical framework Our theoretical framework is drawn from Galí (2011), who
derives the empirical wage Phillips curve from a New Keynesian model that includes the
unemployment rate. He thereby provides both a theoretical foundation for the empiri-
cal relation and a structural interpretation of the reduced form coe¢ cients. The model
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assumes staggered wage setting as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), which means
that a workers wage cannot be re-optimized in every period. When the wage cannot
be reset, it is assumed to index to a weighted average of past price ination (pt 1) and
the central banks ination target (), and additionally trend productivity growth (g):
pt 1+(1 )+g, with  2 (0; 1) as the weight to past ination. We denote wage ina-
tion by wt and the di¤erence between unemployment and the natural rate by u^t  ut un.
The models solution is given by
wt = + 
p
t 1 +  0u^t +  1u^t 1; (4.1)
where   (1  ) + g (Galí, 2011, equation 19).
Econometric model Bringing (4.1) to a panel data setting results in the econometric
benchmark wage ination model
wi;t = i + 
p
i;t 1 +  0ui;t +  1ui;t 1 + i;t; (4.2)
with subscripts i and t denoting the country and time period and i referring to (1  
)i + gi   ( 0 +  1)uni and other time-invariant e¤ects. Our main interest is the degree
of indexation to past price ination (), which is expected to lie between 0 and 1.
As a robustness check, we extend the benchmark wage ination model (4.2) by in-
cluding a time-varying ination target of the central bank (t ), as Cogley and Sbordone
(2008) argue that the price indexation parameter in a standard DSGE becomes zero once
a time-varying trend ination of the central bank is introduced. More specically, for each
country, we estimate trend ination (t ) with the AR-Trend-bound model of Chan, Koop
and Potter (2013) as
pt   t = t
 
pt 1   t 1

+ eht=2t; (4.3)
where t  N(0; 1) and the central banks trend ination, the persistence of the ination
gap (t), and the log-volatility of the error term (ht) all follow a random walk. The
estimation details are provided in Appendix B. As trend ination is time-varying, it no
longer appears in the intercept of the benchmark wage ination model (4.2). Accordingly,
specication (4.2) is extended to the benchmark wage gap model form5:
~wi;t = i + ~
p
i;t 1 +  0ui;t +  1ui;t 1 + i;t; (4.4)
5Equation (4.4) is obtained under the theoretical assumption that the coe¢ cients on past and trend
ination ( and ) in wi;t = i + 
p
i;t 1 + 
i;t 1 +  0ui;t +  1ui;t 1 + i;t sum to one. A Wald test
on the estimated panel coe¢ cients did not reject this assumption (infra, p.120).
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where ~wt  wt   t and ~pt 1  pt 1   t .
Note that we make the implicit assumption in (4.4) that there is no immediate e¤ect
of wt on 

t . Given that our measure of trend ination captures ination expectations at
an innite horizon, this assumption is very likely to hold in practice.
2.2 Panel dataset and econometric considerations
We use an unbalanced panel covering quarterly data between 1960Q1 and 2011Q4 for 24
OECD economies.6 In general, an individual countrys monetary policy regime is quite
stable over time and in some cases, a regime can even last for decades. We therefore
use the information from a group of countries to broaden the information set and to
increase the power of the test whether the degree of wage indexation depends on the
type of monetary policy regime. Our wage index consists of the average hourly earnings
of employees in the manufacturing sector, sourced from the OECD MEI database. The
earnings data are comparable to wage rate series that proxy for the basic wages or cost-of-
living allowances, but they provide a more complete measure of the overall wage income
because they also include premium pay for overtime and bonuses.7 Our price measure
consists of the quarterly all-items consumer price index. We construct quarter-on-quarter
wage and price ination series as 100 times the log di¤erences of the wage and price indices.
We follow Galí (2011) in taking the average of the 4-quarter lags of past ination as a
smoothed price indexation measure. The unemployment rate is expressed as a percentage
of the total labor force. Appendix A provides further details on the coverage and data
denitions.
There are two issues of panel estimation that we need to take into account. First,
we have to verify the appropriateness of homogenous regression parameters. When the
regression does not contain lagged dependent variables, as in equation (4.2), and the
estimators are strictly exogenous, both homogeneous and heterogeneous estimators deliver
consistent coe¢ cient estimates (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). We nevertheless check whether
6The 24 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.
7Compensation rates, which also include employer contributions to social security or social insurance
schemes, are a widely used alternative measure. However, this series is unavailable for 10 of the 24 countries
in our sample.
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the assumption of homogeneous parameters a¤ects our small sample coe¢ cient estimates
by comparing Fixed E¤ects (FE) and Mean Group (MG) estimation results with a Wald
test.
Second, it is well known that macro panel estimates can be a¤ected by cross-sectional
dependence in the errors. Such dependence generally indicates the inuence of factors that
are common across countries but not explicitly modeled. To ensure consistent estimates,
we apply the cross section dependence test (CD test) of Pesaran (2004) to the residuals
of the equations (4.2) and (4.4). If the test indicates a signicant correlation between the
cross section errors, we apply Common Correlated E¤ects (CCE) estimators.8
2.3 Results
Table 4.1 depicts the estimation results for the benchmark wage ination model (4.2) in
columns 1 and 2, while the estimates for the trend ination adjusted wage gap model (4.4)
are given in columns 3 and 4.9 A test on the homogeneity assumption of the coe¢ cients
validates the use of pooled estimators.10
The FE estimation in column 1 indicates a substantial amount of backward wage
indexation. The point estimate of  is 0.81, which is within the estimated range of 0.52 and
0.83 obtained by Galí (2011) for the US. The negative contemporaneous and positive lagged
e¤ect of unemployment is in line with theoretical expectations (Galí, 2011). On impact, a
1 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.37% increase in nominal
wages. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are employed to
obtain a consistent inference. All parameters are statistically signicant at the 1% level.
The presence of a signicant cross-sectional correlation in the residuals according to the
CD test (bottom of Table 4.1) results makes a case for CCE estimators. Adding the cross
8The CCE estimators conveniently abstract from the possible inuence of common factors by augment-
ing the observed regressors with the cross section averages (CSAs) of all variables, leaving least squares
estimation still adequate. This approach yields consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates
in a cross-country panel with a fairly large number of countries (Pesaran, 2006).
9The hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cients on past and trend ination sum to 1 is not rejected by
a Wald test (value=1.04, F-statistic=0.26, p-value=0.61).
10We performed the empirical analysis in STATA 12 with the user-written xtcd and xtmg routines of
Eberhardt (2012). Wald tests on the null of coe¢ cient homogeneity of FE versus MG generate insignicant
chi-square test statistics of 3.88 and 4.39. The Wald tests on the CCE pooled and MG estimates also cannot
reject the null of homogeneity (the test statistics are 2.36 and 3.07).
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Table 4.1 Results benchmark model
Regressand: wage ination (wi;t) wage gap (~
w
i;t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE CCEP FE CCEP
Unemployment rate (ut) -0:374
(0:089)
  0:195
(0:103)
 -0:381
(0:097)
 -0:168
(0:082)

Lagged unemployment (ut 1) 0:269
(0:090)
 0:108
(0:119)
0:277
(0:109)
 0:125
(0:085)
Lagged price ination (pi;t 1) 0:806
(0:043)
 0:408
(0:091)
    
Lagged price gap (~pi;t 1)     0:285
(0:090)
 0:456
(0:060)

CD test (average correlation) 0:090 -0:035 0:053 -0:042
CD test (statistic and p-value) 15:95
0:000
-5:73
0:000
9:77
0:000
-6:88
0:000
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.
Robust standard errors are in brackets
Sample: T=141, max T=207, min T=47 and N=24
section averages (CSAs) as regressors decreases the average residual correlation although
it remains signicant (column 2). All coe¢ cients decline to around half their previous
size, with the indexation coe¢ cient now attaining 0.41.
Compared to the constant trend ination estimates in columns 1 and 2, the coe¢ cients
of the wage gap specication with time-varying trend ination in columns 3 and 4 are
broadly similar, although the FE indexation parameter shrinks somewhat.11 The FE and
CCEP estimators furthermore result in a less pronounced decline in the extent of cross-
sectional residual correlation. Interestingly, wage indexation is still statistically signicant
and economically important, with values of respectively 0.29 and 0.46 for the FE and
CCEP estimators. This result contrasts with Cogley and Sbordone (2008), who estimate
a DSGE model which incorporates drifts in trend ination on US data and nd price
indexation to be essentially zero.12 Our approach di¤ers from theirs in the sense that
11By using conventional OLS variance estimates, trend ination is treated as known and the potential
generated regressor bias on the variance estimates (Pagan, 1984) is ignored. A two-step bootstrapping
approach to compute the standard errors is however infeasible given the stochastic volatility-model to
estimate trend ination. We therefore rely on robust standard errors that are consistent in the presence
of unknown forms of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
12Cogley and Sbordone (2008) extend the Calvo pricing model in a standard DSGE model to incorporate
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we assume full indexation of wages to a weighted average of past and trend ination, we
focus on the dynamics of wages instead of prices, and our empirical approach concerns a
single-equation model for a panel of 24 countries.
Given that the results of both models (4.2) and (4.4) do not signal important di¤erences
concerning the signicance of the lagged ination variable, we conne the attention to the
extensions of the benchmark wage ination model in the remainder of this work.
3 Phillips curve with variable wage indexation
3.1 Wage indexation and the monetary policy regime
Motivation
A number of theoretical studies conclude that the degree of wage indexation to past ina-
tion may depend on ination uncertainty and the conduct of monetary policy. Specically,
Gray (1978) presents a neoclassical model with short-term wage rigidities and uncertainty,
and shows that the degree of wage indexation that minimizes the deviation of output from
full-information output increases with the variability of monetary disturbances. Ehrenberg
et al. (1983) demonstrate in an e¢ cient contract model that a rise in ination uncertainty
may lead to greater use of wage indexation because wage indexation helps to insulate the
workers real wage from the e¤ects of unanticipated ination, whereas it reduces the im-
pact of lower-than-anticipated ination on the real cost of labor inputs for rms. Carrillo
et al. (2014) show that utility maximizing wage setters raise the extent of wage indexation
to past ination when the variability of permanent shocks to the ination target of the
central bank increases, whereas the amount of indexation declines when there is a rise in
the volatility of temporal ination target shocks.
A possible link between wage indexation, ination uncertainty and monetary policy is
also supported by institutional and empirical evidence for the US. Holland (1986) demon-
drifts in trend ination and derive a reduced form New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) with time-varying
coe¢ cients. This reduced form NKPC is estimated on US data by means of a Bayesian time-varying VAR.
Under the assumption that non-optimized prices are fully indexed to a mixture of current trend ination
and one-period lagged ination, the reduced form NKPC collapses to a more traditional NKPC based
on the ination gap with constant coe¢ cients and without additional forward-looking terms. This latter
specication is similar to our gap specication.
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strates that the proportion of cost-of-living adjustment clauses in major collective bargain-
ing agreements was much higher in the 1970s and rst half of the 1980s than the preceding
and subsequent periods. He nds that this pattern can be explained by a sizable increase of
ination uncertainty in the 1970s, measured by the mean squared forecast error of ination
surveys. Hofmann et al. (2012) estimate the evolution of US wage dynamics over time,
and nd a degree of wage indexation to past ination of 0.91 during the "Great Ination"
of the 1970s, compared to 0.30 and 0.17 before and after this period.13 Hofmann et al.
(2012) argue that this evolution can be explained by a shift in the monetary policy reaction
function of the Federal Reserve. More specically, a weakly ination stabilizing conduct of
monetary policy in the 1970s resulted in high and volatile ination, which encouraged the
use of indexation clauses in wage contracts as a protection against ination uncertainty.
Conversely, the credible establishment of price stability after the disination of the early
1980s reduced the need for protection against unforeseen ination, thus mitigating wage
indexation.
Both theory and empirical evidence thus suggest that the assumption of a constant
degree of wage indexation in a wage Phillips curve is questionable. However, although the
degree of wage indexation in the US was denitely higher during the "Great Ination"
compared to earlier and later periods, it is not clear whether this was indeed the conse-
quence of monetary policy. For example, the 1970s were also characterized by very volatile
supply shocks, whilst changes in labor market institutions may also have played a role. It
is also not clear whether a link between indexation and the conduct of monetary policy
can be established in other countries. In the rest of this paper, we formally examine the
inuence of the monetary policy regime on wage indexation within our panel dataset of
24 OECD countries.
Monetary policy regimes
We identify the monetary policy regime by the presence of an explicit quantitative mone-
tary target. It is commonly accepted that a policy regime that clearly commits to a nom-
13Hofmann et al. (2012) rst estimate a time-varying parameters Bayesian structural vector autoregres-
sive (TVP-BVAR) model, and document considerable time variation in the impulse responses of wages
and prices to aggregate supply and demand shocks. In a second step, the parameters of a standard DSGE
model containing a wage Phillips curve are estimated for respectively 1960Q1, 1974Q1 and 2000Q1, by
matching the impulse responses from the TVP-BVAR for these periods with the impulse responses of the
DSGE model using a Bayesian impulse response matching procedure.
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inal anchor can help promote price stability and stabilize ination expectations (Mishkin,
2007). A quantitative monetary target should help to lower ination uncertainty. Ac-
cordingly, also the degree of wage indexation is expected to be lower in a monetary policy
regime with an explicit nominal anchor. The advantage of dening a policy regime by
the presence of a quantitative target is that it can easily be measured and veried in an
objective and mechanistic way (Fatás et al., 2007).
There are di¤erent types of nominal anchors, and in this work, we consider three di¤er-
ent monetary target strategies: the ination rate, the exchange rate and the money supply.
These three frameworks have distinct characteristics. Ination targeting provides a ratio-
nal way to control ination because policy decisions are based on conditional medium-run
ination forecasts. Its high degree of transparency and accountability further allows for
close monitoring by the private sector (Svensson, 1999). A xed exchange rate is easy
to communicate to the private sector, but it cannot guarantee a strong policy commit-
ment: monetary policy cannot react to domestic shocks independently from the anchor
country, which makes the xed exchange rate di¢ cult to maintain under international
capital mobility and leaves the country vulnerable to speculative attacks. Money growth
targeting also o¤ers immediate signals to the general public, but this strategy should be
seen primarily as a way to communicate a commitment to low and stable ination in the
long run (Issing, 1996). A money aggregate is a less e¢ cient predictor of future ination
in the short to medium term due to the unstable relationship between ination and money
aggregates. Broad monetary targets are also not under the direct control of a central bank.
The literature ascribes some di¤erent macroeconomic e¤ects to the monetary regime
types.14 Empirical evidence has found that ination targeting has led to lower and less
volatile ination in developing economies, but these e¤ects have not been noted for indus-
trial countries (Walsh, 2009). Ination targeting further seems to have anchored ination
expectations (Walsh, 2009) and lowered ination persistence, which strengthens the nom-
inal anchor (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007).15 Although xed exchange rate regimes
have been linked to greater output volatility and lower and more stable ination (Ghosh,
Gulde, Ostry and Wolf, 1997), no signicant e¤ects have been reported for industrial coun-
tries (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001). Monetary target regimes have been found to
14See Fatás et al. (2007) and the references therein for further reading.
15Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2010); Gürkaynak, Levin, Marder and Swanson (2007) and Levin
et al. (2004) in particular provide evidence for better anchoring of ination expectations under ination
targeting.
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keep ination under control in the longer run by means of a exible approach towards the
target rule and an active and elaborate communication of the monetary policy strategy
to the public (Mishkin, 1999). Finally, several countries have also achieved low and stable
ination with hybrid targets (e.g. the EMU countries under the European Central Bank
and, formerly, Germany) and with implicit targets (most notably, the US until 2012).
Figure 4.1 Monetary regimes
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Figure 4.1 summarizes the evolution of the monetary regimes for the countries in our
sample. The overall message is consistent with the shifts in policy regimes documented
in the literature (Fatás et al., 2007). Exchange rate targeting was the dominant regime
during the 1960s and early 1970s, but in the mid-1970s some countries shifted to monetary
targeting.16 For a couple of decades, there are only minor changes. Then, in the early
1990s, ination targeting enters the picture. This framework continuously gains ground
and becomes the dominant policy framework at the end of the sample. An important event
is the emergence of the European Central Bank for the EMU members in 1999. Our data
classies EMU members as having both an ination and a monetary target since 1999,
16Exchange rate frameworks characterized as a managed or free oat are not considered as an exchange
rate targeting regime.
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics: Regime switches
HHHHHHHFrom
To
ER Mon IT No target
ER - 8 12 13
Mon 1 - 2 3
IT 0 0 - 0
No Target 5 6 5 -
which is why the series jump at this point. Note also that the total number of regimes
is always larger than the total number of countries, which indicates the combination of
di¤erent targets, and that it rises over time while the share of regimes without an explicit
target became negligible in the last decade.
Table 4.2 shows in detail how often one policy regime was abandoned for another, a
move to which we refer as a regime switch. There are 55 of these regime switches in total,
or more than 2 on average per country.17 It appears that countries often switched from
exchange rate targeting to a regime without a target before nally settling on monetary
or ination targeting. If we look at the number of instances where there is a change
in the policy regime without abandoning the regime already in place (including cases
where, for instance, a monetary targeter adds an ination target as second objective), we
obtain a total of 70 regime changes. All countries, except Denmark, have changed their
policy objective at some point in time; some countries have even done so for 6 times. We
conclude that there is quite some variation in the data in terms of policy regime shifts,
which demonstrates the advantage of pooling the data.
3.2 Econometric model specication
We formally explore the role of the monetary policy regime for wage indexation by ex-
tending the benchmark wage Phillips curve of section 2. Specically, we allow the degree
of wage indexation to vary according to the monetary policy regime, as well as some la-
bor market characteristics, by estimating a multiplicative interaction wage Phillips curve
17Of these 55 cases, only 6 are "double counted" cases where a country with one target switched to a
regime with 2 other targets, and vice versa.
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model that has the following form:
wi;t = i + e0Di;t + pi;t 1 + e0Di;tpi;t 1 +  0ui;t +  1ui;t 1 + i;t; (4.5)
where di;t  (regimei;t;udi;t;coordi;t)0
Di;t is a k  1 vector of variables that are interacted with past ination and the constant
i, whereas e and e are k  1 vectors with the corresponding interaction coe¢ cients.18
The policy regime interaction dummies (regime) indicate the presence of an explicit
quantitative monetary target (target), or respectively an ination target (it), a money
growth target (mon) or an exchange rate target (er).
We control for possible e¤ects of changes in the wage bargaining process on indexation
by including the coordination level of wage bargaining (coord) and the union density rate
(ud) in the estimations. Cecchetti (1987), for instance, documents that policy interven-
tions in the bargaining process in the US during the 1960s and early 1970s altered both the
e¤ective degree of indexation and the frequency of union wage changes. Recent empirical
evidence of Gnocchi and Pappa (2013) shows that wage bargaining reforms that reduced
the centralization of wage bargaining have led to changes in wage dynamics. Messina and
Sanz-de-Galdeano (2014) relate the di¤erent evolution of wage indexation in Uruguay and
Brazil to the dynamics in the centralization level of wage bargaining and changes in the
union coverage. The authors nd that a decline in union coverage and a more decentral-
ized wage bargaining reduces wage indexation. Carrillo et al. (2014) further show that
the economys equilibrium degree of wage indexation can di¤er depending on whether the
labor market coordination is centralized or decentralized.
We use the coordination level of wage bargaining to capture the degree to which major
institutional players decisions extend to lower-level institutions and the percentage of
workers that are a¢ liated with a labor union to control for the power of labor unions in
wage bargaining negotiations. The coordination variable ranges from 1 (decentralized) to
5 (highly centralized), while the union density rate is expressed as a percentage. Figure 4.2
shows the evolution over time in the coordination measure for the countries in our sample.
The proxy varies strongly across countries and time, and there is also a di¤erence in the
extent of time variation across countries (compare, e.g., Norway to the US). The same
message holds for the union density rate, depicted in gure 4.3, although most countries
seem to experience a downward or stable trend over time.
18 Interacting with the intercept prevents the estimation of spurious interaction e¤ects (Brambor, Clark
and Golder, 2006).
127
-Chapter 4-
Figure 4.2 Degree of wage bargaining coordination (index: 1-5)
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Figure 4.3 Union density rate
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3.3 Results
We now discuss the estimation results of the wage Phillips curve with interaction variables,
for which we only report FE estimates. Although one can motivate the CCEP estimator
for the benchmark model, it is not suitable for the interaction e¤ects model. The reason for
this limitation is explained in table 4.3, which gives an overview of the mean and median
correlation of the country-specic regime and labor market indicators with their respective
CSA for the entire group of countries. The correlations are quite high, attaining 90%
and more for the ination target dummy, which indicates that changes in the interaction
variables are synchronized in time across countries. This result makes controlling for
their CSAs unattractive, as they will interfere with our goal of measuring the inuence
of the policy regime on . In addition, we found that including the CSAs of the other
(non-interacted) variables does not lead to further important reductions of the extent of
cross-sectional residual correlation. We therefore decided not to apply the CCE estimators
for the estimation of the interaction model.
Table 4.3 Cross-country correlations
Correlation interaction variables with their CSA
it er mon coord ud
mean 0.88 0.40 0.78 0.29 0.61
median 0.92 0.51 0.81 0.32 0.78
Table 4.4 reports the estimates of equation (4.5) with the monetary regime interaction
variables. At the bottom of the table, we report the total indexation coe¢ cient under
both values of the binary monetary regime dummy variables.19 The rst column indicates
that monetary policy regimes with a quantitative monetary target, irrespective of the
type of target, have a degree of wage indexation to past ination which is on average
not signicantly lower than regimes without a quantitative target. Note however that
the number of countries in our sample with an implicit target or an opaque monetary
regime has become increasingly smaller over time and is especially limited since the 1990s
(see gure 4.1). The results could by consequence be sensitive to the magnitude of the
comparison group of countries with no formal and explicit monetary target.
A closer look at the e¤ect of an ination, money growth or exchange rate target, pro-
19The total indexation attains @wi;t=@
p
i;t 1 = + ~
0Di;t. Standard errors are computed with the Delta
method.
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vided in column 2, shows that the e¤ects di¤er. Specically, the degree of wage indexation
is on average 0.60 lower in policy regimes that have an explicit ination target. With the
labor market variables set to their sample means, wage indexation to past ination is even
statistically insignicant for countries with a quantitative ination target. In contrast, a
money growth or exchange rate target has no substantial e¤ect on the indexation parame-
ter.20 The level of coordination and the union density rate exert no signicant inuence
on .21
The result that an ination target lowers wage indexation is consistent with Benati
(2008), who nds that price indexation vanishes in countries with a stable nominal anchor.
Ination targets, unlike exchange rate and money targets, directly represent the ultimate
goal of monetary policy and have been associated with strong nominal anchors (supra,
p.124). The stability of a regime can also drive di¤erent e¤ects, as more durable regimes
produce better ination outcomes (Rose and Mihov, 2008). Money growth and exchange
rate regimes have been relatively short-lived in general. By contrast, no central bank has
yet abandoned the ination targeting framework.
20The substantial reduction of indexation under ination targeting is robust to using the rst or fourth
lag of the regime dummies. The e¤ect is also robust to using the wage gap specication. These results are
available from the authors on request.
21We also tested for a possible nonlinear relationship of the extent of coord and ud on wage indexation in
the spirit of Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988), but the quadratic e¤ects were found to be statistically insignicant.
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Table 4.4 Results interaction model
Regressand: wage ination (wi;t)
(1) (2)
Unemployment rate (ui;t) -0:370
(0:089)
 -0:334
(0:092)

Lagged unemployment (ui;t 1) 0:247
(0:087)
 0:214
(0:091)

Lagged price ination (pi;t 1) 0:979(0:138)
 0:961
(0:109)

Interactions:
coord 0:015
(0:027)
0:010
(0:021)
ud -0:316
(0:253)
-0:350
(0:230)
target -0:157
(0:114)
 
it   -0:598
(0:224)

mon   -0:031
(0:083)
er   -0:126
(0:096)
Total indexation e¤ect for (binary) MP regime dummies
TARGET =0/1 [coord&ud at means] 0:897/0:740 -
IT=0/1 [coord&ud at means] - 0:852/0:254
MON=0/1 [coord&ud at means] - 0:852/0:820
ER=0/1 [coord&ud at means] - 0:852/0:725
CD test (average correlation) 0:078 0:052
CD test (statistic and p-value) 13:14
0:000
9:38
0:000
Note: ,, denote signicance at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample: N=24, T=137, min T=43, max T=207
pi;t 1 coe¢ cient shows level of backward-looking indexation when all interactions Di;t = 0.
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4 Conclusions
We have examined the standard assumption in New Keynesian DSGE models that wage
indexation to past price ination is invariant to policy regimes. In particular, we have
estimated the reduced form empirical wage Phillips curve of Galí (2011) with a panel model
for 24 advanced economies, and allowed the degree of backward-looking wage indexation
to vary according to the monetary policy regime while controlling for the evolution of
labor market institutions.
We nd that wage indexation to past ination varies across monetary policy regimes.
Specically, policy regimes that have an explicit quantitative ination target are charac-
terized by a lower degree of wage indexation. Discerning between three di¤erent types
of explicit targets - an ination, money or exchange rate target - makes it clear that the
extent of wage indexation is signicantly di¤erent (lower) in countries that have an ina-
tion target whereas the e¤ects of money and exchange rate targets are not signicantly
di¤erent from a regime without any formal quantitative target. These di¤erences could be
due to varying strengths of the nominal anchor under the di¤erent frameworks, as ination
targeting has been found to establish better anchored ination expectations (Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Walsh, 2009), which, in turn, could strengthen the nominal anchor.
Overall, our results question the structural nature of hard-wiring a xed degree of wage
indexation in standard DSGE models. Our work corroborates and extends the nding of
Hofmann et al. (2012) of substantial time variation in the degree of wage indexation for
the US. It further shows that the monetary policy dependence of price indexation found by
Benati (2008) can be extended to wage indexation. From a policy standpoint, our ndings
suggest that counterfactual policy simulations and the analysis of optimal monetary policy
based on modern macroeconomic models are potentially misleading.
A caveat to our analysis is that we focus on changes in wage indexation and do not
measure changes in contract duration, a parameter that could also have been a¤ected by
policy changes (Cecchetti, 1987). We believe that our work provides empirical support
for research that aims to endogenize the extent of wage indexation in structural models.
Some steps have already been taken by Wieland (2009); Carrillo et al. (2014), but further
research in this direction is warranted.
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Appendix A: data sources and construction of variables22
Hourly earnings: average total earnings in manufacturing paid per employee per hour,
index 2010=100, seasonally adjusted [OECD, Main Economic Indicators database,
quarterly frequency].
Note: The earnings series constitutes wage rates plus overtime payments, bonuses
and gratuities regularly and irregularly paid, remuneration for time not worked,
and payments in kind. Not included are employer contributions to social security or
insurance schemes and unfunded employee social benets paid by employers. Adding
these components to the earnings series delivers compensation rates.
Unemployment rate: the unemployment rate is dened as the ratio of the number
of unemployed workers to the working population [OECD, Main Economic Outlook
No.93, quarterly frequency].
Note: The German series prior to 1992 were extended backwards based on the growth
rates of unemployment rate as percentage of civilian labor force for West-Germany
(source: Bundesbank, series BBK01.USCY01).
Prices: consumer price index, all items, index 2010=100, seasonally adjusted by Census
X12 [OECD, Main Economic Indicators database, quarterly frequency].
Monetary policy quantitative target dummies: 0-1 dummy variables, which in-
dicate if a country has a formal ination, exchange rate or monetary target in the
respective time period. If an exchange rate regime is classied as having a managed
or freely oating exchange rate, we consider it to have no formal target [quarterly
frequency].
Our main sources for the classication of quantitative monetary targets are Fatás et
al. (2007) and Houben (2000). An additional source for ination targeting regimes
is Rose (2007); for exchange rate and monetary targeting regimes, it is Borio and
White (2003).
22We initially started from a data sample of 29 OECD countries over 1960Q1-2013Q2. Due to data
availability of the labor market indicators, the sample was limited to 2011Q4 and 3 countries were dropped
(Iceland, Israel and Mexico). We further eliminated Japan and Luxembourg from the sample as these
countries are characterized by severe outliers concerning the coe¢ cients on the unemployment rate vari-
ables.
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Note: Conicting dates were examined and remaining gaps were lled based on cen-
tral bankswebsites, individual central bank reports and, where necessary, additional
publications.
Coordination: indicator of degree of wage coordination ranging from 1 (fragmented
wage bargaining, conned largely to individual rms or plants) to 5 (centralized bar-
gaining by peak association(s), with or without government involvement) [ICTWSS
database version 4.0 from Visser (2013) (Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour
Studies), annual frequency, 1960-2011].
Trade union density: the trade union density rate is dened as the ratio of the number
of wage and salary earners that are trade union members to the total number of wage
and salary earners [OECD, Labour statistics, annual frequency, 1960-2011].
Trend ination: for each country, we estimate trend ination with the AR-Trend-
bound model of Chan et al. (2013) (see appendix B). The model delivers estimates
of a central banks time-varying ination target, which is restricted to lie within
bounds, based on di¤use uniform priors.
Overview number of observations per country:
country time span # country time span #
Australia 1984Q2 2011Q4 111 Italy 1960Q2 2011Q4 207
Austria 1969Q2 2011Q4 171 Korea, South 1992Q2 2011Q4 79
Belgium 1960Q2 2011Q4 207 Netherlands 1970Q2 2011Q4 167
Canada 1960Q2 2011Q4 207 New Zealand 1989Q2 2011Q4 91
Czech Republic 1993Q2 2011Q4 75 Norway 1960Q2 2011Q4 207
Denmark 1971Q2 2011Q4 163 Poland 1995Q2 2011Q4 67
Estonia 2000Q2 2011Q4 47 Portugal 2000Q2 2011Q4 47
Finland 1960Q2 2011Q4 207 Slovak Republic 1993Q3 2011Q4 74
France 1960Q2 2011Q4 207 Spain 1981Q2 2011Q4 123
Germany 1962Q2 2011Q4 199 Sweden 1971Q2 2011Q4 163
Hungary 1995Q2 2011Q4 67 United Kingdom 1963Q2 2011Q4 195
Ireland 1990Q2 2011Q4 87 United States 1960Q2 2011Q4 207
Table 4.5 Overview number of observations per country
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Appendix B: AR-Trend-bound model
This section provides additional details on the estimation of the AR-Trend-bound model
(see section 2.1). Chan et al. (2013) propose a new model of trend ination which restricts
the central banks ination target to vary between bounds. They argue that the commonly
used random walk specication for the ination target is counterintuitive because it implies
that long-run expectations can grow in an unbounded fashion. Furthermore, they show
that bounding trend ination results in good long-term forecasting properties for ination.
Model specication The AR-trend-bound model species that
pt   t = t
 
t 1   t 1

+ texp

ht
2

t = 

t 1 + 

t
ht = ht 1 + ht
t = t 1 + 

t ;
where t  N (0; 1) and ht  N
 
0; 2h

. Although trend ination follows a random walk,
the model restricts it to lie within bounds: a  t  b 8t. The t parameter governs
the persistence of the ination gap, i.e. the di¤erence between ination and the target,
and it is restricted as a  t  b 8t.23 Given these restrictions, the innovations to the
state equations of trend ination and the persistence parameter are assumed to follow a
truncated normal distribution:


t  TN
 
a  t 1; b  t 1; 0; 2

t  TN
 
a   t 1; b   t 1; 0; 2

The Priors One can x the bounds (a; b) in advance or estimate them. We have set rela-
tively di¤use uniform priors for the lower and upper bounds as a  U(a; a) and b  U(b; b)
23We have also experimented with the UC-SV model of Stock and Watson (2007), both with constant
and stochastic volatility processes for the shocks in the law of motion of trend ination. The problem is
that the UC-SV model assumes that the ination gap series to be independently distributed error terms
(with stochastic variance). This implies a highly volatile ination trend and causes past ination and trend
ination to be highly collinear.
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for each country (see table 4.6). Keep in mind that these bounds apply to quarter-on-
quarter non-annualized growth rates of the consumer price index and that some countries
experienced signicantly high ination rates.
Chan et al. (2013) initialize the state equations with
1  TN
 
a; b;0; !
2


1  TN
 
a; b; 0; !
2


h1  N
 
h0; !
2
h

;
with 0 = h0 = 0 = 0, !2 = !2h = 5, and !
2
 = 1 in order to ensure proper yet
relatively uninformative prior distributions for the initial states. They set a and b such
that 0 < t < 1 8t. Since our analysis contains many countries, we opted to use di¤use
priors that put even more weight on the sample information and can be applied for all
our countries. Relative to their setup, we make initial conditions more di¤use by setting
!2 = !
2
h = 25 and set 

0 equal to the mean of the rst four observations of the ination
series. Furthermore, we only restrict the ination gap to be stationary:  1 < t < 1 8t.
Chan et al. (2013) assume the following inverse gamma priors for the error variances:
2  IG( ;S)
2  IG(;S)
2h  IG(h;Sh);
with small (uninformative) degrees of freedom parameters  =  = h = 10 and
S = :18, S = :009, and Sh = :45. For our analysis, we follow Cogley and Sargent (2005)
in placing the most weight on the sample information by using an IG prior with a single
degree of freedom for all three variances: IG(12 ;
0:012
2 ).
Our estimation uses Bayesian MCMC methods, as detailed in Chan et al. (2013), and
we drew 55,000 samples and discarded the rst 5,000 as burn-in. The results are available
upon request.
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Table 4.6 Uniform prior settings for the trend-ination bounds
Country a a b b Country a a b b
Australia 0 1 1 4 Italy 0 1 1 5
Austria 0 1 1 2.5 South Korea 0 1 1 6
Belgium 0 1 1 2.5 Netherlands 0 0.5 0.5 2.5
Canada 0 1 1 3 New Zealand 0 0.5 0.5 3.5
Czech Republic 0 1 1 4 Norway 0 0.5 0.5 3
Denmark 0 1 1 3.5 Poland 0 1 1 15
Estonia 0 1 1 3 Portugal 0 1 1 6
Finland 0 1 1 3.5 Slovak Republic 0 1 1 3
France 0 1 1 3 Spain 0 1 1 5
Germany 0 0.5 0.5 1.75 Sweden 0 1 1 3.5
Hungary 0 1 1 7 United Kingdom 0 1 1 4
Ireland 0 1 1 5 United States 0 0.5 0.5 3
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